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ABSTRACT
To understand the workings of the macroeconomy, it is not enough to simply focus on the move-
ments of the aggregate variables of the economy. It is necessary to also understand the behavior
of its various components and their interactions. In this thesis, I study three important components
of macroeconomic behavior; prices, wages, and the financial system and their connection to the
behavior of the aggregate economy.
In the first chapter (joint work with Andrew Usher), we use retail scanner data to show two pre-
viously unknown empirical facts about prices. First, the probability of price adjustment increases
with product revenue. Second, the absolute size of price adjustment decreases with revenue. These
facts are consistent with a menu cost model where the fixed cost of adjustment does not scale with
product revenue. Taken together, these facts suggest that prices of products with higher revenues
respond more to monetary policy than prices of products with lower revenues. Over the business
cycle, both the mean and variance of the (log) revenue distribution across goods decrease with the
unemployment rate. These empirical facts imply that monetary policy should have stronger effects
on the economy in recessions than in expansions. We verify this property using a quantitative menu
cost model, and we provide additional evidence of the state-dependence of monetary policy using
aggregate data.
In the second chapter (joint work with Miles S. Kimball), we study the optimal wage structure
of a firm with imperfect monitoring of worker effort. We find that when firms can commit to
(implicit) long-term contracts, imperfect monitoring leads to optimal wage profiles that reflect
ix
worker seniority. We provide a precise definition of seniority as a measure of worker value to
the firm rather than the length of service by a worker. The paper illustrates how worker seniority
will evolve over the worker’s tenure with the firm and how wage, effort, and separation evolve
with seniority. We also show that monitoring and amenities reflect seniority as well. To solve the
optimal contract problem, we present a solution technique, the “retrograde approach,” of solving
complex optimization problems with endogenous discounting and forward-looking state variables
in a simple and intuitive way.
In chapter three, I find that system wide runs can be triggered by small shocks to fundamental
asset values. Informational frictions amplify small shocks causing large contractions in the amount
of credit provided to financial institutions. Asset fire sales exacerbate these effects and force a com-
plete collapse of lending to these institutions; a system wide run. The paper identifies the incentive
of healthy institutions to differentiate themselves from distressed ones as the key channel driving
the contraction in credit. This contrasts with traditional bank runs that stem from the coordination
failures of lenders. The findings lead to direct policy implications; including a government clearing
house for loans and quantitative easing.
x
CHAPTER 1
Product Revenue and Price Setting: Evidence and Aggregate Implications
1.1 Introduction
Using scanner data on retail goods, we find that the probability of price adjustment increases with
product revenue and the average size of adjustment decreases with product revenue. These facts
are consistent with menu cost models, in which the fixed cost of adjustment does not scale with
product revenue. These facts suggest that monetary policy is state-dependent; the real effect of
monetary policy is larger in low output states compared to high output states.
Recent studies of price setting have found that accurately reflecting micro facts about price
changes have important consequences for aggregate behavior. (See for example Golosov and Lu-
cas 2007, Midrigan 2011, Nakamura and Steinsson 2010). This paper shows that, for many prod-
ucts, whether the products’ price is changed or not depends importantly on how much revenue
the product makes. In addition, this relationship between price adjustment and product revenue
matters at the aggregate level.
First, we demonstrate that high-revenue goods adjust prices more often and by smaller amounts
than low-revenue goods do and that this pattern is strong and robust in our data. The relationship
between product revenue and price setting behavior remains strong even when we control for
1
product category, stores and UPC. These relationships can arise naturally from menu cost models
in which the menu cost does not scale with product revenue. Losses from charging the “wrong”
price are greater if the product accounts for more revenue. As a result, firms are less likely to
tolerate price discrepancies for high-revenue products. In a menu cost framework, this implies that
the range of prices for which firms don’t pay the menu cost is relatively small for high-revenue
goods. As a result, for these goods, there is a greater likelihood of price adjustment and a smaller
size of adjustment. A key component of this analysis is that menu costs do not scale with revenue.
Many influential papers, however, implicitly assume that menu costs scale with revenue. This
assumption is often made for technical purposes.1 We find that not only is this at odds with our
results, but that it has important implications for aggregate behavior.
The relationship between price setting behavior and revenue introduces what we refer to as a
revenue effect, where products with higher levels of revenue are more likely to change prices then
those with lower levels of revenue in response to changes in monetary policy. This has important
implications for menu cost models and monetary policy transmission as the revenue effect inter-
acts with the cross-sectional distribution of product revenue in a meaningful way. First, because the
probability of price adjustment increases with the level of product revenue, the real effect of mon-
etary policy decreases when average product revenue increases. Furthermore, the output response
to a monetary policy shock decreases when the variance of the revenue distribution increases for
a given level of average revenue. This is due to the fact that products with high revenue consti-
tute a disproportionate fraction of aggregate output and as the probability of adjustment for these
products increases the response of the aggregate price level increases, leading to a decrease in the
response of aggregate output. Assuming that menu costs scale with revenue ignores the revenue
effect and its implications.
1Examples of influential papers with such assumptions include Gertler and Leahy (2008), Midrigan (2011), Alvarez
and Lippi (2013), and Alvarez et al. (2016). Midrigan, Alvarez and Lippi, and Alvarez et al. assume that demand
shocks exactly offset productivity shocks so that firm size is normalized; this is similar to assuming that menu costs
scale with revenue.
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We then shift our attention to the aggregate implications of our findings. First, using variation
from regional unemployment, we empirically characterize how the distribution of log revenue
changes across the business cycle. Not surprisingly, the mean and the median of log revenue
falls with an increase in the unemployment rate. While the change in the mean is to be expected,
we also find that the variance and the spread of the log revenue distribution also decreases with
unemployment. These systematic shifts in the revenue distribution, taken together with the revenue
effect, suggest that aggregate prices are stickier in recessions than they are in expansions. As
revenue decreases in recessions, product prices change less frequently and become less responsive
to monetary shocks promoting adjustment via output.
To quantify the degree of state-dependence implied by the revenue effect, we simulate the econ-
omy using a menu cost model modified to match the behavior of the revenue distribution across
the business cycle. We find considerable state-dependence in monetary policy transmission over
the business cycle. We compare the response of output to a one standard deviation shock to mon-
etary policy across two states where the initial output difference is 7 percent, reflecting a large
fluctuation in output between peak and trough in the post-war era. The cumulative response of
output, measured as the area under the impulse response function, is 43 percent greater in the low
output state compared to the high output state. If the baseline model is augmented to include habit
formation and persistent monetary shocks then the difference in reactions is even larger – roughly
81 percent greater in low output states.
Finally, using measures of monetary shocks proposed by Romer and Romer (2004) and ex-
tended to 2007 by Wieland and Yang (2017), we find strong evidence that the output effect of
monetary policy is stronger during recessions than expansions, consistent with our results.2 In
addition, the differential effect of monetary policy is pronounced for both durable and non-durable
2For additional discussion of the evidence for the state-dependence of monetary policy see (among others) Weise
(1999), Garcia and Schaller (2002), Peersman and Smets (2005), Lo and Piger (2005), Santoro et al. (2014), Barnichon
and Brownlees (2016), Tanreyro and Thwaites (2016), and Jorda et al. (2017).
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consumption goods. The latter result is especially noteworthy as it supports our evidence from
retail goods.
This paper is most closely related to the large literature using micro data to evaluate the fre-
quency and size of price changes. The modern literature empirically analyzing price adjustment
began with Bils and Klenow (2004), who argued that the duration of prices is surprisingly short.
Since that paper, there have been many studies using micro datasets to analyze price setting. Both
Nakamura and Steinsson (2008) and Klenow and Kryvtsov (2008) find that, once one excludes
price changes due to sales, the duration of prices increases considerably.3 Many papers have
shown that accurately reflecting price setting behavior as documented in the empirical literature
has important aggregate implications for New Keynesian models. For example, Golsov and Lu-
cas (2007) and Midrigan (2011) show that matching the distribution of the size of price changes
have important implications monetary neutrality.4 Our paper adds to this literature by studying the
relationship between product revenue and price setting behavior.
Our results regarding the state-dependence of monetary policy is most closely related to Vavra
(2014). Vavra finds that the cross-sectional standard deviation of the size of price changes is
countercyclical. He argues that, if this is driven by volatility shocks to idiosyncratic productivity,
the real effects of monetary policy will be weaker in recessions, contrary to our findings. However,
Berger and Vavra (2016) find evidence that the countercyclicality in the dispersion of the size of
price changes is not due to volatility shocks but rather the endogenous responsiveness of agents to
different states of the economy. Our findings match more closely the results in Berger and Vavra.
Also, in related work, Santoro et al.(2014) show that loss aversion could imply stronger monetary
policy transmission in recessions.
3Other papers that study the behavior of prices using micro price data include Anderson et al. (2015), Bhattarai
and Schoenle (2014), Coibion et al. (2015), and Eichenbaum et al. (2011).
4For other papers that study the relationship between price setting behavior at the micro level and aggregate fluc-
tuations, see also: Alvarez and Lippi (2014), Alvarez et al. (2016), Burstein and Hellwig (2007), Caballero and
Engel (2007), Caplin and Spulber (1987), Gertler and Leahy (2008), Midrigan and Kehoe (2015), and Nakamura and
Steinsson (2010).
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The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses our empirical results
relating revenue and price setting behavior and the implications for menu cost models. Section
3 documents business cycle movements in the revenue distribution and quantifies the degree of
state-dependence implied by our findings. Section 4 provides evidence for state-dependence using
aggregate data and Section 5 concludes.
1.2 Revenue and Price Setting
In this section, we study the relationship between price setting and revenue. We present empirical
evidence showing that (1) the probability of price adjustment increases with revenue and that (2)
the average size of price adjustment is decreasing in revenue. We argue that this is supported by
the menu cost framework and derive analytical expressions for the two relationships from a static
menu cost model.
1.2.1 Data
We use retail scanner data from The Nielsen Company (US), LLC and marketing databases pro-
vided by the Kilts Center for Marketing Data Center at The University of Chicago Booth School
of Business. The scanner dataset they provide includes information on weekly prices, quanti-
ties sold, and various product and store characteristics beginning in the year 2006. Over 90 retail
chains across all US markets participate in providing information on over 2.6 million UPCs,5 1,100
product categories and 125 product groups. The entire data set covers over half of the total sales
volume of US grocery and drug stores and above 30 percent of all US mass merchandiser sales
volume.
The dataset is very large with over a hundred billion observations, making it computationally
5A UPC (Universal Product Code) is a unique identification number assigned to a retail item.
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Table 1.1: Summary statistics
Statistic Statistic
Adjustment probability 5.3% Revenue (1st percentile) $1.59
Average adjustment size 14.7% Revenue (10th percentile) $5.03
Median adjustment size 10.6% Revenue (50th percentile) $25.13
Average revenue $64.43 Revenue (90th percentile) $132.00
Revenue (99th percentile) $635.18
intractable to use in its entirety. For this reason, we randomly choose a sample of 30 product
categories and 30 markets on which we conduct most of our analysis.6 Nevertheless, even when
using this subset of the available data, our coverage of products and markets is comparable and
often greater than most studies that utilize retail scanner data as our sample covers 18,612 different
stores and 31,746 different UPCs.
As is standard in studies using micro price data, we choose to focus on “regular” prices and
price changes, excluding temporary sales prices. Since not all sales are directly flagged in our
dataset, we use the algorithm used by Midrigan (2011) and Midrigan and Kehoe (2015) to compute
regular prices. We compute the regular price as the modal price in any given window surrounding
a particular week provided the modal price is used sufficiently often.7 We define a price change as
any change in regular price greater than 1% in magnitude.
Our primary unit of analysis is a product. We define a “product,” as a unique UPC-store pair.
For example, a two-liter bottle of Coca Cola from Kroger’s on Main Street would be considered
a separate product from a two-liter bottle of Coca Cola from Kroger’s on State Street as well as
from a two-liter bottle of Pepsi Cola from Walmart on State Street.8 Because we treat each UPC
6A product category is a relatively finely defined subset of products defined by The Nielsen Company. Examples
include canned tuna, canned fruit and household cleaners. A market is a designated market area defined by The Nielsen
Company, which correspond approximately to a metropolitan statistical area (MSA). The full list of product categories
and markets in our sample is provided in Appendix A.
7A detailed description of the algorithm we use to compute regular prices can be found in the appendix of Midrigan
(2011).
8While these examples reflect what we refer to as products, the name and location of the stores are hypothetical
and do not represent any actual stores in our sample.
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at each store separately, there can be large random swings in revenue from week to week. In
addition, in some of the smaller stores there will occasionally be zero sales over a week for some
products. To address these concerns, we aggregate the data up to monthly frequency. We thus
compute revenue as the total sales of each product each month. This aggregation has the added
benefit of easier comparison of our results to previous studies of price setting behavior, which are
usually conducted at monthly frequency.
In Table 1.1 we provide some summary statistics of our sample. The average probability of
adjustment in our sample is 5.3 percent. The average size of price adjustment conditional on
adjustment is 14.7 percent and the median adjustment size is 10.6 percent. These statistics are
comparable to other studies using retail scanner data such as Coibion et al. (2015) who find an
average frequency of price change of 5.4 percent and absolute size of change around 12 percent.
The average revenue of a product in our sample is 64.43 dollars, with revenue ranging from 1.59
dollars for the lowest revenue products (1st percentile) to 635.18 dollars for the highest revenue
products.
1.2.2 Empirical Findings
We now formally test for the relationship between product revenue and the probability and size of
price changes. We focus on the probability of price adjustment and size of adjustment not only
because they have been the focus of many previous studies, but also because as we show in Section
2.3, the menu cost model generates clear predictions about the relationship between revenue and
these two variables distinct from other price setting models. Figures 1.1 and 1.2 represent our main
findings.
Figure 1.1 depicts the relationship between the probability of price change and revenue in our
sample. In panel (a) we compute the average monthly revenue of each product and group them into
7
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Figure 1.1: Revenue and probability of price adjustment
Note: In Panel (a) we compute the average probability of price adjustment for each product and categorize
them into percentile bins by revenue. We then plot the average probability of adjustment by percentile. The
sample consists of over 16 million products resulting in over 160,000 products per each percentile bin. Panel
(b) shows the expected probability of price adjustment by log revenue from a local polynomial regression.
percentiles by their revenue. We then compute the average probability of price adjustment within
each bin and plot this relationship. Panel (b) shows the expected probability of change by log
revenue from a local polynomial regression. Panels (a) and (b) clearly show that there is a strong
positive relationship between revenue and the probability of price adjustment. For example, in
panel (a), a product in the tenth percentile of average revenue has a probability of adjustment of less
then 1 percent, while a product at the ninetieth percentile has close to a 6 percent probability.
Figure 1.2 depicts the same relationship between revenue and absolute size of price adjustment.
Panel (a) shows the average absolute size of adjustment for each percentile of revenue and panel
(b) shows the relationship by log revenue. The figure shows a clear negative relationship between
revenue and size of adjustment. Panel (a) shows that the average size of adjustment for a product
in the tenth percentile of average revenue is approximately 18 percent, while the average size of
adjustment for a product at the ninetieth percentile is approximately 11 percent.
The figures are based on simple averages and compares across different product categories and
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Figure 1.2: Revenue and size of price adjustment
Note: In Panel (a) we compute the average absolute size of price adjustment for each product and categorize
them into percentile bins by revenue. We then plot the average size of adjustment by percentile. Panel (b)
shows the expected average size of price adjustment by log revenue from a local polynomial regression.
markets. Although these simple exercises show a very strong relationship, we proceed to test the
robustness of the relationship controlling for various factors. We find that the relationships remain
strong even as we add controls to mitigate potential concerns.
Revenue and Probability of Price Adjustment
To test the relationship between revenue and probability of adjustment, we first construct a
dummy variable Dijt that takes the value of one if product i in store j has changed price in month
t and zero otherwise. Then we test the relationship using the regression specification
Dijt = αt + βlogrevijt−1 + ijt (1.1)
where logrevijt−1 is the log revenue of product i at store j in month t − 1 and αt is a month
fixed effect.9 Equation (1.1) can be interpreted as a linear probability model, and the coefficient β
9Because we are concerned about changes in regular price there is concern about how to treat revenue in weeks the
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represents the increase in the probability of a price change in response to increases in log revenue.
For example, a β equal to 0.03 would imply that a 10% increase in revenue will result in a increase
in the probability of price change by 0.3 percentage points.
Because price changes in a given month can directly affect revenue in that month, we use lagged
rather than current revenue.10 Standard errors in all specifications are clustered on month, store and
UPC separately, in order to alleviate concerns about correlation in consumer preferences within
localities or products, store or UPC characteristics, and macroeconomic shocks. We also estimate
specifications that add product category, UPC, and store fixed effects to the baseline specification.
The time fixed effect, present in every specification, mitigates concerns about spurious correlations
with long-term trends such as inflation and growth, in particular with regard to product entry and
exit. The inclusion of product category fixed effects rules out the possibility that the results are
solely driven by differences across product categories. By adding UPC and store fixed effects, we
can similarly rule out the possibility that the relationship is driven completely by differences across
UPCs or stores.
We also compute the average frequency of price adjustment11 and the log of average revenue of
each product and test for a relationship between the two variables using,
freqij = α + βlogrevij + ij (1.2)
This specification is the closest analogue to panel (b) of figure 1.1, and the coefficient β loosely
reflects the average slope in the picture. We also add product category fixed effects.
product is on sale. Throughout the paper we use the average revenue of the product over a week in a month multiplied
by 4 weeks as monthly revenue. Alternatively we have also tried using the average of weekly revenue of a product
in weeks when the product is not on sale multiplied by 4 weeks for monthly revenue and found results that are both
qualitatively and quantitatively similar (results not reported).
10Results (not reported) from a regression with current log revenue are qualitatively and quantitatively very similar.
11The average frequency of price adjustment is computed as a simple ratio of the number of price adjustments over
the number of observations we have for each product.
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Table 1.2: Probability of price adjustment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Baseline Category Store, UPC Cross-section CS category
log revenue 0.0276 0.0290 0.0282 0.0188 0.0208
(monthly) (0.0007) (0.0008) (0.0007) (0.0004) (0.0004)
Observations 348,736,845 348,736,845 348,735,564 16,062,396 16,062,396
R-squared 0.029 0.041 0.057 0.173 0.291
Note: Standard errors (shown in parenthesis) are clustered on month, store, and UPC separately.
The results are reported in Table 1.2. The results confirm our earlier findings in Figure 1.1.
Columns (1) through (3) reports the results from equation (1.1). Column (1) includes only the
month fixed effect, column (2) adds a product category fixed effect, and column (3) includes both
store and UPC fixed effects. Columns (4) and (5) show results from estimating Equation (1.2);
column (5) adds product category fixed effects. The coefficients on log revenue strongly suggest
that the probability of price adjustment is increasing in revenue across all specifications.
The values in columns (1), (2) and (3) are very close to the baseline value of 0.0276. The
results imply that a 10% increase in revenue increases the probability of price adjustment by ap-
proximately 0.28 percentage points, which is approximately 5.2% of the average probability of
price adjustment in our sample. The result is statistically significant at the 1% level for all spec-
ifications and also quite large economically. The difference between the highest revenue goods
(99th percentile) and lowest revenue goods (1st percentile) in our sample is approximately 6 log
units, implying that the probability of price change for the highest revenue products is about 16
percentage points higher than products with the lowest revenue.
The estimated coefficients in columns (4) and (5) are also similar, and slightly smaller than the
values in columns (1) through (3). The weaker relationship is unsurprising given that it’s between
average revenue and average probability of adjustment, and product revenues fluctuate over time.
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Nevertheless, the results are still economically significant. The difference in the average frequency
of adjustment between products with the highest and lowest average revenue is approximately 11
percentage points. When considering the results in columns (1) through (5) altogether, there seems
to be a fundamental relationship between revenue and the probability of adjustment that cannot be
entirely attributed to differences across product categories, stores, UPCs, or any other time invari-
ant product characteristics.
Revenue and Size of Price Adjustment
We also test for the relationship between revenue and the absolute size of price adjustment
conditional on changing price. Similar to our test for probability of price adjustment, we esti-
mate
|∆pijt| = αt + βlogrevijt−1 + ijt
where |∆pijt| is the absolute size of adjustment in log price conditional on adjustment.12 The
coefficient β represents the expected increase in the size of adjustment given an increase in log
revenue. As before, we cluster on month, store, and UPC, and add specifications including product
category, store and UPC fixed effects.
We also compute the average absolute size of price adjustment and the log of average revenue
of each product and test for a relationship between the two variables using,
|∆pij| = α + βlogrevij + ij (1.3)
Table 1.3 shows the results. We find that the relationship between size of price adjustment
and revenue is negative and statistically significant across all specifications. However, unlike the
12We compute |∆pijt| as the absolute difference in price between the week that we observe a regular price change
and the price the previous week. If there is more than one price change in a given month they are treated as two
separate observations.
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Table 1.3: Size of price change
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Baseline Category Store, UPC Cross-section CS category
log revenue -0.0172 -0.0081 -0.0019 -0.0226 -0.0177
(monthly) (0.0011) (0.0010) (0.0009) (0.0008) (0.0008)
Observations 18,543,933 18,543,933 18,541,710 4,071,660 4,071,660
R-squared 0.029 0.093 0.246 0.030 0.094
Note: Standard errors (shown in parenthesis) are clustered on month, store, and UPC separately.
relationship between revenue and probability of price adjustment, we find that the coefficient varies
significantly across the different specifications. This is due to the fact that the expected size of
adjustment and the relationship between the expected size of adjustment and revenue both depend
on the entire distribution of price changes and are sensitive to large price adjustments, making the
magnitude of the effect sensitive to controls. The sign and statistical significance, however, remain
stable. On the other hand, the probability of adjustment only takes into account whether the price
has adjusted or not and is insulated from the distribution of price changes.
From the baseline specification, a coefficient of -0.0172 indicates that the average absolute size
of price change will decrease by 0.17 percentage points when revenue increases by 10%. This is
approximately 1.2% of the average size of adjustment in our sample. The implied difference in the
average size of adjustment between the highest and lowest revenue products is approximately 10
percentage points. The results from the cross-section in column (4) would suggest that a product
with an increase in average revenue of 10% would decrease the average size of change by 0.23
percentage points.
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1.2.3 A Menu Cost Interpretation
The empirical relationships found above between revenue and probability and size of price change
can be explained by a menu cost model where the menu cost does not scale with revenue. The
positive relationship between revenue and probability of price adjustment and the negative rela-
tionship with size of adjustment follows from the fact that potential losses from non-adjustment
increase with revenue. We illustrate this mechanism using a simple static menu cost model.
Consider a static problem of a firm with constant marginal cost and facing a demand curve
with constant elasticity of demand . To derive the optimal price the firm solves the following
problem.
max
p
pi(p) = (p−mc)y(p) (1.4)
where p is the firm’s price, mc is its marginal cost, and y(p) is the demand schedule for the firm’s
product. The optimal price for this firm p∗ can be solved as,
p∗ =

− 1mc
A second order approximation of the profit function pi around p∗ yields,
pi(p) ≈ pi∗ + 1
2
pi∗
′′
(p− p∗)2
where pi∗ = pi(p∗). We can then express the loss of a firm from having suboptimal price p as
L = −1
2
pi∗
′′
(p− p∗)2
where pi∗′′ = (1 − )(y(p∗)
p∗ ). Suppose that the firm inherits some price p (not necessarily equal to
p∗) and the firm must pay a small menu cost b in order to change its price. The firm will choose to
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change its price only if the loss from suboptimal price L exceeds the menu cost b, that is, if
L =
1
2
(− 1)(p∗y∗)
(p− p∗
p∗
)2
> b (1.5)
where y∗ = y(p∗). Rearranging equation (1.5) and utilizing the approximation that ln( p
p∗ ) ≈
(p−p
∗
p∗ ) around zero, we can solve for the inaction region of the firm to get,
∣∣∣lnp− lnp∗∣∣∣ <√ 2b
(− 1)(p∗y∗) (1.6)
If the firm’s inherited price p is adequately close to its desired price p∗ as described by equation
(1.6), the firm will not change its price. Note that the range of inaction, expressed as percent
deviations from optimal price, is decreasing in desired revenue p∗y∗. It is also decreasing in the
elasticity of demand and increasing in menu costs.13 All else equal, a smaller range of inaction
implies more frequent price changes and smaller size of changes conditional on change.
To derive analytical expressions for the relationships between log revenue and probability of
adjustment and size of adjustment, suppose that there is a continuum of firms of measure one,
with a distribution of inherited prices such that lnp− lnp∗ follows some distribution F.14 The firms
are identical otherwise. Denote x ≡ lnp − lnp∗. Then, we can derive the expressions for the
probability of price adjustment and expected absolute size of adjustment conditional on change
13Burstein and Hellwig (2007) present a similar intuition where they argue the inaction region varies with demand.
Their focus, however, is on the relationship between the price level and the frequency of price adjustment to infer the
relative importance of cost and demand shocks in their framework.
14For example, suppose all firm’s begin initially at their optimal price given some marginal cost mc−1. The firm
then receives a random shock to marginal cost such that their new marginal cost satisfies mc = ψmc−1 and ψ is the
shock to productivity. If lnψ is drawn from the distribution F, the distribution of lnp− lnp∗ follows F as well.
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as,
prob = F (−ζ(rev∗)) + (1− F (ζ(rev∗))) (1.7)
E[size] =
1
prob
{∫ −ζ(rev∗)
−∞
(−x)f(x)dx+
∫ ∞
ζ(rev∗)
xf(x)dx
}
(1.8)
where prob is the probability of adjustment conditional on revenue and E[size] is the expected
absolute size of adjustment conditional on revenue. ζ(rev∗) =
√
2b
(−1)rev∗ is the distance between
the optimal markup to the edges of the inaction region and rev∗ = p∗y∗ is the desired (frictionless)
revenue. We derive the relationship between these two statistics and log revenue by differentiating
equations (1.7) and (1.8) with respect to log revenue:
∂prob
∂ln(rev∗)
=
ζ(rev∗)
2
· [f(−ζ(rev∗)) + f(ζ(rev∗))] > 0 (1.9)
∂E[size]
∂ln(rev∗)
=
∂prob/∂ln(rev∗)
prob
{
ζ(rev∗)− E[size]
}
< 0 (1.10)
Equations (1.9) and (1.10) represent the analytical analogues to the regression coefficients on log
revenue from Tables 1.2 and 1.3. Equation (1.9) is trivially greater than zero and equation (1.10)
is negative as E[size] is greater than ζ(rev∗) by construction.
The inequalities in equations (1.9) and (1.10) that govern the relationship between revenue and
the probability and size of adjustment cannot be derived in standard New Keynesian Calvo pricing
models. Most notably, the probability of price adjustment is exogenous in these models and will
not be correlated with product revenue in any way. In menu cost models, the inequalities depend on
the assumption that menu costs do not scale with revenue. If the menu cost b scales with revenue
then revenue cancels out in the expression for ζ , both equations would be equal to zero. Only
a menu cost model where the adjustment cost does not vary with revenue is consistent with our
empirical findings.
16
Theoretically, menu costs can consist not only of physical costs of changing prices (i.e. the cost
of printing new menus) but also managerial costs and information acquisition costs associated with
the decision process. If menu costs consisted primarily of decision costs, it seems unlikely that the
costs of price adjustment would increase with revenue. Physical costs associated with changing
price tags, on the other hand, could presumably increase with sales. However, with the advent of
new technology, such as electronic shelf label systems that allow retailers to change shelf prices
electronically from a central computer via a wireless communication system (Levy et al., 1997),
even physical costs of changing prices may no longer increase with revenue. Studies by Zbaracki
et al. (2004) and the aforementioned Levy et al. that attempt to measure menu costs directly shed
some light on this point. Zbaracki et al. show that the managerial cost of price adjustment is 6
times larger than the physical cost for a U.S. industrial manufacturer.15 Levy et al. measure large
physical costs of changing prices for a U.S. supermarket chain. The prices they document, such as
the cost of preparing and changing a shelf price tag and verification and supervision costs, suggest
only a fixed cost associated with changing the price of a product.
However, many papers make the assumption that menu costs scale with revenue. This is primar-
ily done for technical convenience, either to derive analytically tractable expressions or to facilitate
computation. For example, Gertler and Leahy (2008) assume menu costs scale with firm size (rev-
enue) in order to derive analytical expressions for a dynamic Phillips curve. Midrigan (2011),
Alvarez and Lippi (2013), and Alvarez et al. (2016) assume that idiosyncratic demand shocks ex-
actly offset productivity shocks such that firm size is normalized. Midrigan utilizes this assumption
to reduce the computational burden of solving his model, while Alvarez and Lippi, and Alvarez et
al. do so to allow for analytical solutions to their dynamic problem.
However, this assumption is not only at odds with our findings but has a substantive effect on
15They also find that costs of informing and negotiating with customers are even greater, approximately 20 times
larger than physical costs. The relevance of customer costs in our setting, however, is less clear as the price of retail
items are generally non-negotiable.
17
the behavior of individual firm prices and the aggregate price level. In the following section, we
discuss the implications of our findings in the context of menu cost models and their implications
for aggregate behavior.
1.3 State-Dependence of Monetary Policy
In this section, we study the aggregate implications of the relationships documented above. The
finding that high revenue products adjust price more frequently than low-revenue ones has im-
portant implications for menu cost models and for the transmission of monetary policy in the
economy. It implies that high revenue product’s prices are more responsive to monetary shocks
than low revenue product’s prices. We refer to this effect as the revenue effect. Changes in the
distribution of revenue in recessions, along with the revenue effect, imply that monetary policy
has a larger effect on output response in recessions. We find support for this state-dependence of
monetary policy using a quantitative menu cost model, and we quantify the magnitude of the effect.
1.3.1 The Revenue Effect
The dependence of price adjustment on revenue implies a revenue effect in which the prices of
high revenue products are more responsive to monetary shocks than low revenue product prices.
As shown in section 2.3 this is due to the fact that the range of prices around the frictionless optimal
price for which the price is not adjusted is decreasing in product revenue meaning that high revenue
products are more likely than low revenue products to adjust their prices. This is true, not only for
different products, but also when a given product’s revenue changes over time.
The revenue effect implies that the cross-sectional distribution of revenue is an important deter-
minant of the real effect of monetary policy. First, if the overall level of product revenue increases,
18
the likelihood of price adjustment will increase as well. As losses from suboptimal prices increase
with greater revenue, prices will adjust to smaller deviations from the desired price induced by a
monetary policy shock. Consequently the output response will be mitigated.
Furthermore, given a mean of the revenue distribution, we find that the response of aggregate
output to a monetary shock decreases as the variance of the revenue distribution increases. As the
variance of the revenue distribution increases, products with revenue greater than the mean become
more likely to adjust prices and products with revenue lower than the mean become less likely to
adjust prices. Since the products whose probability of adjustment increase also constitute a larger
fraction of the aggregate output, their contribution to the response of output is more important.
Thus, as the revenue of these products and their probability of adjustment become larger, more
high revenue products adjust through prices instead of through output leading to an increase in the
response of the aggregate price level and a fall in the response of aggregate output.
An alternative perspective is through the composition of prices that adjust in response to a
monetary policy shock. Products with high revenue are more likely to respond to monetary shocks
via price change, so these products constitute a disproportionate fraction of the overall number
of price changes in response to monetary shocks. Products with low revenue constitute only a
small fraction. When the variance of the revenue distribution increases, low revenue products
become even less likely to adjust and high revenue product become more likely to adjust. Loosely
speaking, the number of low revenue products that adjust price will decrease and will be replaced
by high revenue products, leading to a larger response of aggregate prices and smaller response of
aggregate output.16
As discussed in section 2.3, assuming that menu costs scale with revenue undoes the revenue
16An increase in the variance of revenue will lead to an increases in the heterogeneity in the frequency of price
adjustment. Since Carvalho (2006), it has been long understood that heterogeneity in the frequency of price change
increases the aggregate output response in time-dependent models. Extensions of this research to state-dependent
models by Nakamura and Steinsson (2010) and Alvarez et al. (2016) have reached similar conclusions. However,
when the heterogeneity is due to the revenue effect, an increase in the heterogeneity of the frequency of price change
can mitigate the strength of the output response.
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effect. The revenue effect, as discussed above, has important implications for the transmission of
monetary policy. Furthermore, as we will discuss in the remainder of this section, the interaction
between the revenue effect and the movements in the revenue distribution imply that monetary
policy is state-dependent.
1.3.2 Revenue Distribution and Unemployment
To discuss the interaction between the revenue effect and the revenue distribution across the busi-
ness cycle, we first document the movements of the revenue distribution across the business cycle.
Our sample period is 10 years, which is relatively short for analyzing business cycle movements.
However, we leverage the fact that we have observations in many markets and exploit variation in
regional unemployment. For this exercise we expand our sample to include 112 product categories
instead of the 30 we used in section 2. We expand the sample at this point for a few reasons. The
fact that our unit of observation is now a moment of the cross-sectional revenue distribution in each
time period (rather than a single product) greatly decreases the computational burden and allows us
to handle more product categories with relative ease. Expanding the sample also gives us greater
coverage of products and increased statistical power. However, our results remain qualitatively
unchanged when we use the 30 product categories in section 2 (reported in appendix B).
To document the relationship between regional unemployment rate and various moments of the
log revenue distribution, we estimate
Ycmt = αt + δc + γm + β · URmt + cmt (1.11)
where Ycmt is a statistic for the distribution of revenue of product category c in market m in month
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t.17 URmt is the unemployment rate for the region m.18 αt is the month fixed effect, δc is the
product category fixed effect, and γm is the market fixed effect. The statistics we use for the left-
hand-side variable Ycmt include the mean, the median, the standard deviation, and the difference in
log revenue between a product at the 90th percentile in revenue and 10th percentile in revenue (the
spread).
We include time fixed effects for several reasons. First, they remove the secular and nomi-
nal trends from the data, addressing concerns about spurious long-run trends driving our results.
Second, the inclusion of time fixed effects suggests the relationship between unemployment and
revenue is driven by demand as discussed in Coibion et al. (2015). Because most goods are pro-
duced outside the local market, aggregate productivity shocks are external to the market, implying
that changes in revenue and unemployment are correlated mostly through local demand. The stan-
dard errors are clustered by market, product category, and time, to address concerns about temporal
and spatial correlations.19
Table 1.4 shows the results. We find that not only do the mean and median of the distribution
of revenue decrease in recessions as would be expected, but that both the standard deviation and
the spread between the 90th and 10th percentile goods falls as well. The results show that a 1%
increase in regional unemployment corresponds approximately to a 1.3% decrease in mean log
revenue, a 1.4% decrease in the median log revenue, a 0.37% decrease in the standard deviation
and a 1.1% decrease in the log revenue spread.
While we are focused on documenting the behavior of the revenue distribution and not on
explaining the reasons behind the documented patterns, recent studies of consumer shopping be-
havior over the business cycle provide many potential channels through which this may occur. For
example, Coibion et al. (2015) find that households reallocate consumption expenditures toward
17Additional results from alternative specifications are reported in appendix D.
18The regional unemployment rate URmt is computed as the population weighted unemployment rate of the coun-
ties that comprise market m. The unemployment rates by county are obtained from the American Community Survey.
19A discussion of robustness of our results is provided in appendix B.
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Table 1.4: Revenue distribution over the business cycle
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Mean Median Std deviation Spread
unemployment -1.293 -1.436 -0.370 -1.115
(0.392) (0.435) (0.159) (0.408)
Observations 351,125 351,125 351,125 351,125
R-squared 0.686 0.674 0.597 0.603
Note: Standard errors (shown in parenthesis) are clustered on month, market, and product category sepa-
rately.
low-price retailers when local economic conditions deteriorate. Jaimovich et al. (2017) find that
people traded down in the quality of goods and services they consumed during the Great Recession.
Nevo and Wong (2017) document extensive substitution behavior by consumers over the business
cycle. They find that households increase coupon usage, increase purchases of goods on sale, buy
larger sized products, buy generic products, and substitute purchases toward big box (discount)
stores during recessions. Any one or a combination of these extensive consumer substitution pat-
terns could potentially generate the movements in the revenue distribution that we document.
1.3.3 Quantitative Model
We build a quantitative model that matches both the pricing moments found in the micro data and
business cycle variations in the revenue distribution we find in the previous section. We augment
a standard menu cost model similar to those found in Golosov and Lucas (2007) and Midrigan
(2011) to match the shifts in the revenue distribution across the business cycle. We use this model
to quantify the degree of state-dependence of monetary policy implied by our mechanism.
Households
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Households maximize discounted expected utility,
maxEt
∞∑
τ=0
βτ{φt+τ (Ct+τ )
1− 1
γ
1− 1
γ
− N
1+ 1
η
t+τ
1 + 1
η
} (1.12)
subject to the budget constraint,
PtCt +Bt = Rt−1Bt−1 +WtNt + Πt.
Ct is the household consumption of the composite good, Nt is total labor supply, Bt is one-period
nominal bonds, Pt is the aggregate price level, Rt is the nominal rate of return, Wt is nominal
wage, and Πt is the firm profits that are transfered to the households. φt is an aggregate preference
shock that represents a shock to the discount rate and affects the intertemporal substitution of
households.
Households consume a continuum of a variety of products indexed by i. The composite good
Ct is a Dixit-Stiglitz index of these products,
Ct =
(∫ (
ιitcit
) −1
 di
) 
−1
(1.13)
where ιit is the idiosyncratic preference for product i and  is the elasticity of substitution across
goods. Households choose to consume variety cit to maximize Ct subject to the constraint,
∫
q−1it pitcit = PtCt
where pit is the price of product i. The household’s subproblem of variety choice is standard ex-
cept for qit. In this model qit serves as an exogenous demand shifter that is needed to match the
documented changes in the revenue distribution across the business cycle. We treat qit as exoge-
nous in order to focus on the firm’s decision process. Furthermore, we wish to remain amenable
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to different household processes that may generate the shifts in demand. Nevertheless, a possible
interpretation of qit is as the cost of shopping effort (see Coibion et al.,2015)). Another interpre-
tation would treat qit as the household’s valuation of product quality, defined as a function of the
product’s idiosyncratic components (zit, ιit); this is in line with the findings of Jaimovich et al.
(2017).20
We model qit as depending on the aggregate state of the economy as well as the idiosyncratic
characteristics of the product.
qit = q(q˜(zit, ιit), φt)
To be consistent with the empirical findings in section 4.1 we impose the condition that,
∂2lnqt
∂lnq˜t∂lnφt
> 0
With a shopping cost interpretation, this condition means that in recessions, the opportunity cost of
time falls and it becomes less costly to buy products that households usually purchase infrequently.
A product quality interpretation would imply that household sensitivity to quality differences de-
creases in recessions.
The inclusion of idiosyncratic preferences ιit is important in our setting. The revenue effect
implies that the revenue distribution is an important determinant of output fluctuations, and the
inclusion of idiosyncratic demand shocks are critical in this regard. Studies such as Burnstein and
Hellwig (2007) and Kumar and Zhang (2016) find that demand shocks constitute a large fraction
of the idiosyncratic shocks that firms face, and ignoring this component may lead to an understate-
ment of revenue dispersion. In the calibration of this model, we show that this is true in our sample
as well.
20To interpret as valuation of product quality it may be more intuitive to specify qit as a part of the composite good
index Ct = (
∫
(qitιitcit)
−1
 di)

−1 which gives almost identical results.
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The demand curve for good cit then follows,
cit =
(pit
Pt
)−
qitι
−1
it Ct (1.14)
and the expression for the aggregate price index can be derived as
Pt =
{∫ 1
0
( pit
qitιit
)1−
di
} 1
1−
(1.15)
Aggregate Shocks
Following much of the literature on menu cost models, we assume that the monetary authority
conducts monetary policy by targeting a path of nominal GDP
lnMt = g + lnMt−1 + mt (1.16)
where Mt = PtYt is nominal GDP. The aggregate preference parameter φt has two states {φH , φL}
that follows the Markov process,
φHt
φLt
 =
rHH rLH
rHL rLL
×
φHt−1
φLt−1

where rij is the transition probability from state i to state j. The parameter φt determines whether
the economy is in a high output state or a low output state.
Firms
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Firms produce a differentiated product yit with linear production technology
yit = zitnit
where zit is firm i’s idiosyncratic productivity and nit is labor demand. The firm’s current period
real profit is,
piit =
(pit
Pt
− Wt
zitPt
)
yit
where the demand for yit is given by equation (1.14).
Now consider the firm’s dynamic problem. Henceforth, for notational simplicity we omit the
subscript i except when explicitly necessary. It is more convenient to express the firm’s dynamic
problem in terms of real markup µt = ptztWt . Substituting in equation (1.14) for yit, the firm’s current
period profit is
pit = (µt − 1)µ−t qt(ztιt)−1Yt
(Wt
Pt
)1−
.
Idiosyncratic productivity follows the process
lnzt = lnzt−1 + zt
where zt is a shock to productivity. The shock 
z
t follows a Poisson process,
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zt ∼
 0 : with probability θzN(0, σ2z) : with probability 1− θz

21Midrigan (2011) and Alvarez and Lippi (2014) argue that the process of idiosyncratic productivity shocks is
important for the real effect of monetary policy as it determines the strength of the selection effect present in the
models. In appendix C, we argue that an accurate representation of the revenue effect in the model could suggest that
the selection effect in the model is accurately reflected as well.
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and idiosyncratic demand evolves according to
lnιt = lnιt−1 + ιt
where ιt follows the normal distributionN(0, σ
2
ι ). We assume that log productivity and log demand
follow a random walk, which allows us to define the idiosyncratic state of a firm jointly as ωt = ztιt.
This reduces the number of state variables and decreases the computational burden of solving this
model numerically. The idiosyncratic state ωt then follows
lnωt = lnωt−1 + zt + 
ι
t
Since this variable follows a random walk, we include a probability of firm exit to keep the
distribution of firms stationary. We assume that firms exit with probability α. When a firm exits,
it is replaced by a new firm with zt = ιt = ωt = 1. We now write the firm’s dynamic problem,
where each period it must pay a small menu cost b to change its price as,
V (µt, ωt;Yt, φt)
= max
{
pi(µt, ωt, Yt, φt) + (1− α)βEtΛt+1V
(
µt+1, ωt+1;Yt+1, φt+1
)
,
max
µ˜
{
pi(µ˜, ωt, Yt, φt) + (1− α)βEtΛt+1V
(
µt+1, ωt+1;Yt+1, φt+1
)}
− b
}
where Λt+1 is the stochastic discount factor. We use log linear approximations of the relationship
between labor supply and output to allow convenient aggregation as in Nakamura and Steinsson
(2010). We use the Krusell and Smith (1998) algorithm to solve the model numerically. We assume
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that firms perceive the evolution of the price level Pt
Pt−1
as a linear function of variables,
ln
(Pt+1
Pt
)
= β1 + β2lnYt + β3lnφt+1 + β4lnφt + β5
m
t+1.
1.3.4 Calibration and Results
Following our empirical results above, we set the time unit of the model to a month. The time
discount factor β is set to an annual value of 0.96. Following much of the menu cost literature,
we set the intertemporal elasticity of substitution γ equal to 1 and the inverse Frisch elasticity 1
η
to
zero to facilitate computation. We calibrate the elasticity of demand to  = 3, which is in line with
the median elasticities estimated in Nevo (2001) and Broda and Weinstein (2006). The monthly
growth rate for nominal GDP g is calibrated to be 0.17 percent and the standard deviation σm is set
as 0.29 percent, the average growth rate of nominal GDP and the standard deviation of HP-filtered
nominal GDP from 1990-2007 respectively.
The parameters governing the productivity process, demand process, probability of product
exit, and menu cost (θz, σz, σι, α, b) are jointly calibrated to match the average frequency of ad-
justment, the mean and median absolute size of adjustment, the strength of the relationship between
probability of adjustment and revenue, and the contribution of price dispersion to the variance of
revenue. We target an average frequency of adjustment of 11%, within the range of findings of
Nakamura and Steinsson (2008). We target the median absolute size of adjustment to be 8.5% also
following the results of Nakamura and Steinsson and target a mean absolute size of adjustment of
10% from Klenow and Kryvtsov (2008). We focus on these moments, which are computed using
the micro data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics used to compute the Consumer Price Index in-
stead of those of our sample because we are interested in the broader implications for the aggregate
economy. While our dataset has the advantage that we can observe the price and quantity of each
individual product at high frequency, our dataset is narrower in scope. However, for results that are
28
Table 1.5: Target moments
Steady state moments Target Model
Frequency of price adjustment 0.11 0.11
Average size of price adjustment 0.10 0.10
Median size of price adjustment 0.085 0.085
(−1)2var(price)
var(revenue) 0.20 0.20
∂prob
∂lnrev × 1prob 0.52% 0.51%
Business cycle moments
∆rev
∆N 1.3 1.3
∆(rev90−rev10)
∆N 1.1 1.1
Percent difference in output 0.07 0.07
(High vs low output state)
Non-target moments
∆rev50
∆N 1.4 1.1
∆std(rev)
∆N 0.37 0.23
∂E[size]
∂lnrev × 1size -0.12% ∼ -0.01% -0.13%
Note: Model refers to the baseline model described in section 3.3.
( (−1)2var(price)
var(revenue)
)
is the ratio of the con-
tribution of the variance of price to the variance of revenue.
(
∂prob
∂lnrev × 1prob
)
is the change in the probability
of adjustment as a percentage of the average probability of adjustment. ∆rev∆N is the percent change in mean
of the log revenue distribution over the percent change in total labor supply. ∆std(rev)∆N is the percent change
in the standard deviation of the log distribution over the percent change in total labor supply. ∆(rev90−rev10)∆N
is the percent change in the spread of the log revenue distribution over the percent change in the total labor
supply. ∆rev50∆N is the percent change in the median of the log revenue distribution over the percent change
in total labor supply.
(∂E[size]
∂lnrev × 1size
)
is the change in the change in the expected size of adjustment as a
percentage of the average size of adjustment.
unique to this paper, we have no choice but to utilize our results. Thus, we target for the probability
of adjustment to increase by 5.2% of the average frequency of adjustment when revenue increases
by 10% reflecting our earlier results. We target the contribution of the variance of price to the
variance of revenue to be 20% in steady state. This is based on Burstein and Hellwig’s (2007)
findings that the variance in revenue stemming from demand shocks are 3 to 4 times larger than
the variance in revenue stemming from productivity shocks in settings similar to ours.
The results of the calibration is shown in Tables 1.5 and 1.6. We calibrate the frequency of
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Table 1.6: Parameter values
Parameter Model Description
β 0.961/12 discount factor
 3 elasticity of demand
α 0.07 rate of product exit
b 0.05 (0.7%) menu cost (percentage of steady state revenue)
1− θz 0.29 probability of productivity shock
σz 0.10 standard deviation of productivity shock
σι 0.10 standard deviation of demand shock
g 0.17% monthly growth rate of nominal GDP
σm 0.29% standard deviation of nominal GDP
rij 0.05 probability of transition to different state
φ¯ 0.015 magnitude of aggregate preference shock
ψ0 0.012 slope parameter in exogenous demand
ψ1 2.87 intercept parameter in exogenous demand
productivity shocks 1 − θz to be 29% and the standard deviation of the shock σz to be 10%. The
standard deviation of the demand shock σι is also set to 10% and the rate of product exit α is set to
7 percent. The size of the menu cost b is 0.05 which implies that the total cost of changing prices
amount to 0.7% of the steady state revenue. This is approximately equal to the value of 0.7% of
revenue found by Levy et al. (1997) and slightly below the 1.2% of revenue found by Zbaracki et
al.(2004). We do not explicitly target the relationship between revenue and the expected adjustment
size of prices. Nevertheless the calibrated model delivers a coefficient of -0.013 which is -0.13%
of the average size of adjustment in the model. We find that this coefficient is between -0.01% and
-0.12% of the average size of adjustment for different specifications in our sample.
We calibrate the probability of transitioning to a different state rij to be 5 percent, which implies
an average business cycle length of 40 months. The size of the preference shock is assumed to be
symmetric where φH = (1 + φ¯) and φL = (1 − φ¯). We adopt the following functional form for
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lnqt in order to match the changes revenue distribution,
lnqt = ψ0 · (lnωt + ψ1)( lnφi
lnφH − lnφL )
where i ∈ {H,L}. The parameters (φ¯, ψ0, ψ1) are jointly calibrated to match the change in the
mean and spread of the log revenue distribution with the state of the economy as shown in Table
1.4 and a difference in the output level between the high and low output states of 7 percent. We
target the difference in output level between high and low output states to be 7 percent to reflect a
large fluctuation in output between peak and trough. The model slightly underpredicts the change
in the median and the standard deviation of the revenue distribution with output as shown in Table
1.5.
Figure 1.3 compares the relationship between price setting behavior in the steady state in the
model, to the data. Panel (a) shows the relationship between the probability of price adjustment and
log revenue. In both the data and our model, we group each product-month observation by revenue
into percentile bins. We then compute the average revenue and the probability of adjustment for
each bin. Then, we compute the log deviation of this revenue from the mean revenue of the data
and model respectively, to facilitate comparison. We also normalize the probability of adjustment
for easier comparison. We compute the deviation of the probability of adjustment from the mean
probability and divide by the mean probability for the percent deviation from mean probability of
adjustment. We plot, for each percentile bin, the log deviation from mean revenue and the percent
deviation from mean probability of adjustment. This allows close comparison to our calibration,
which targets the statistic
(
∂prob
∂lnrev
× 1
prob
)
as shown in Table 1.5.
The green dots in panel (a) represent each percentile grouping from the data and the orange
triangles show the results from model. The solid line represents the calibration target, with a slope
of 0.52% between log revenue and probability of adjustment. Panel (a) shows that the relationship
between revenue and probability of adjustment in the model closely resembles the relationship
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Figure 1.3: Revenue and price setting: compare data and model
Note: In panel (a) we first group each product-month observation by revenue into percentile bins and com-
pute the average revenue and the probability of adjustment for each bin for both the data and the model. We
then compute the log deviation of this revenue from mean of the data and model respectively. We compute
the deviation of the probability of adjustment from the mean probability and divide by the mean probability
to compute the percent deviation from mean probability of adjustment. We plot, for each percentile bin, the
log deviation from mean revenue and the percent deviation from mean probability of adjustment. The solid
line represents the calibration target, with a slope of 0.52% between log revenue and probability of adjust-
ment. In panel (b) we group each product-month observation by revenue into percentile bins and compute
the average revenue and the average size of adjustment for each bin. Then, we compute the log deviation
of this revenue from mean revenue of the data and model respectively. We normalize the size of adjustment
by computing the deviation of the size of adjustment of each bin from the mean size of adjustment in the
data and the model, and then divide by the mean size to compute the percent deviation from mean size of
adjustment. We plot, for each percentile bin, the log deviation from mean revenue and the percent deviation
from mean size of adjustment. The two lines in panel (b) show the range of the strength of the relation-
ship between size of adjustment and product revenue that we find in our data. The solid line represents the
maximum value (in absolute terms) and the dashed line represents the minimum value.
32
in the data. The relationship is robust throughout the support of revenue and is approximately
consistent in magnitude.
Panel (b) of Figure 1.3 shows the relationship between size of price adjustment and revenue.
As in panel (a), we group each product-month observation by revenue into percentile bins and
compute the average revenue and the average size of adjustment for each bin. Then, also for the
purposes of comparison, we compute the log deviation of this revenue from mean revenue of the
data and model respectively. We normalize the size of adjustment by computing the deviation of
the size of adjustment of each bin from the mean size of adjustment in the data and the model, and
then divide by the mean size to compute the percent deviation from mean size of adjustment. We
plot, for each percentile bin, the log deviation from mean revenue and the percent deviation from
mean size of adjustment. This corresponds to the statistic
(∂E[size]
∂lnrev
× 1
size
)
in Table 1.5.
As in panel (a), the green dots in panel (b) represent the each percentile grouping from the and
the orange triangles show the results from model. The two lines in panel (b) show the range of the
strength of the relationship between size of adjustment and product revenue that we find in our data.
The solid line represents the maximum value (in absolute terms) and the dashed line represents the
minimum value. Even though the relationship between the size of price adjustment and product
revenue was not explicitly targeted in the calibration, panel (b) shows that the relationship in the
model reflects the relationship in the data quite well.
Figure 1.4 depicts the impulse response function of output to a one standard deviation monetary
policy shock. The figure is scaled to reflect a response to a monetary shock of 1 percentage point.
The solid red line depicts the response of output to monetary policy when output is low, and
the dashed blue line represents the response when output is high. The figure illustrates that the
impact of monetary policy is stronger in recessions than expansions. The initial response is 10%
stronger in a low output state and increases in percentage terms over time. The difference in the
cumulative effect, measured as the percent difference of the area under the two impulse response
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Figure 1.4: Impulse response function of output to a one standard deviation monetary shock in low
versus high output states. The results are scaled to reflect a one percentage point monetary shock.
functions, implies that monetary policy has a 43 percent stronger effect on output in recessions
than in expansions.
Figure 1.5 and Table 1.7 illustrates the mechanism behind the difference in the output response
described in Figure 1.4. Figure 1.5 shows the impulse response for the cross-sectional frequency
of adjustment. It shows that the frequency adjustment is greater in high output states than low
output states as predicted. There is an initial increase in the frequency of adjustment in the initial
period as a response to the monetary shock but the frequency quickly returns to the steady state
level. This figure shows that the output response is greater in a low output state due, in part, to
the fact that the average frequency of adjustment is lower. Because products adjust their price less
often, there is a greater response in output.
Table 1.7 shows the average adjustment probability and the difference in average revenue by
34
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
Month
0.1
0.105
0.11
0.115
0.12
0.125
Pe
rc
en
t
high output state
low output state
Figure 1.5: Impulse response function of the cross-sectional frequency of price adjustment to a
one standard deviation monetary shock in low versus high output states.
Table 1.7: Revenue and adjustment probability by quantile (Model)
Adj. probability (%) Revenue (%)
Quantile High Low Diff Diff
1 6.06 5.99 0.07 6.66
2 9.55 8.69 0.86 8.88
3 11.40 9.18 2.23 8.91
4 12.82 10.29 2.53 10.54
5 14.68 13.58 1.10 13.15
Note: The table shows the average log revenue and average adjustment probability by quantile of revenue in
the baseline model. Column labeled High shows the results for the high output state and the column labeled
Low show the result for the low output state. Columns labeled Diff show the difference between the high
and low output states.
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revenue quantiles for the duration impulse response following a monetary shock. The column
labeled High shows the results for the high output state and the column labeled Low show the
results for the low output state. The columns labeled Diff show the difference between the two
states. Table 1.7 illustrates how the distribution of revenue effects the adjustment probabilities. By
construction, the difference in the average log revenue between the high and low output state are
increasing by quantile. For quantiles 1 through 4, both the difference in the adjustment probability
is also increasing by quantile. The difference in the adjustment probability is not strictly increasing
in quantile 5 as the inaction region of highest revenue goods are very small such that these products
respond to even small changes in marginal cost in both high and low output states. This is reflected
in the S-shape of the relationship between log revenue and probability of adjustment in panel (a)
of Figure 1.3. The marginal increase in the probability of adjustment to an increase in revenue
is decreasing at high levels of revenue. The differences in revenue and adjustment probability by
revenue quantile highlights the interaction of the revenue effect and the cyclical movements of the
revenue distribution in determining the real effect of output in high and low output states.
1.3.5 Extending the Model
We extend the basic model to account for a more realistic response to monetary policy shocks.
In particular, we add external habit formation to consumer preferences and add persistence to the
monetary process. A number of papers including Fuhrer (2000) and Christiano et al. (2011) find
that adding habit formation to models of monetary policy generates a more realistic hump-shaped
response in output and persistent reductions in the real interest rate. We add persistence in the
shocks to nominal GDP to reflect the empirical evidence showing persistence in monetary shocks
such as in Coibion (2012). Vavra (2014) shows that in menu cost models persistent monetary
policy shocks can also generate a hump shaped output response.
Figure 1.6 depicts the impulse response of output when we incorporate habit formation and
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Figure 1.6: Hump shaped impulse response function of output to a one standard deviation monetary
shock in a model with habit formation and persistent monetary shocks. The results are scaled to
reflect a one percentage point monetary shock.
persistent monetary shocks.22 The impulse response function has a hump shape as found in the
empirical evidence. The degree of state dependence increases significantly. In the baseline model,
the cumulative response of output was 43 percent greater in low output states measured as the area
under the impulse response function, when the difference in output between high and low states is
7 percent. In the extended model, it is 81 percent greater for the same difference in output. The
effect is greater in the extended model because of an accumulation of the differences in individual
price changes with persistent monetary shocks. In addition, the change in the firm’s marginal
cost is greater in percentage terms due to habit formation, increasing a firm’s desire to adjust in
response to a monetary shock. The degree of state-dependence in the real effect of monetary policy
is increasing as the responsiveness of the aggregate price level increases.
22A detailed description of the extended model, calibration, and its properties is given in appendix A.4.
37
−
8
−
6
−
4
−
2
0
2
Pe
rc
en
t
0 10 20 30 40
Month
Unemployment rate 6% Unemployment rate 9.5%
Figure 1.7: State-dependence of aggregate output
Note: The solid red line reports the cumulated response of output to a 1 percentage point shock to the
Federal Funds rate when the unemployment rate is 9.5% at the time of the shock. The solid black line
reports the cumulated response of output to a 1 percentage point shock to the Federal Funds rate when the
unemployment rate is 6%. The dashed lines show one standard deviation bands around the point estimates.
1.4 Empirical Evidence of State-Dependence
In this section we find evidence that the real effects of monetary policy is stronger in high un-
employment states than low unemployment states. While there is still debate as to whether the
real effects of monetary policy is stronger when the economy is doing well or poorly, our findings
add to a growing list of evidence in support of larger real effects of monetary policy in recessions
compare to expansions.23 In addition, because our sample of scanner data used to derive our micro
results consist mostly of non-durable retail goods, we also test for state-dependence for durable
and non-durable consumption separately to ensure that state-dependence holds for non-durable
23Empirical studies that find output response to monetary shocks is significantly larger in recessions than in expan-
sions include, Weise (1999), Garcia and Schaller (2002), Peersman and Smets (2005), Lo and Piger (2005), Santoro
et al.(2014), and Barnichon and Brownlees (2016). Tanreyro and Thwaites (2016) and Jorda et al.(2017), on the other
hand, find that the effects monetary policy is stronger when the economy is booming.
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consumption as well.24
We adopt a simple and intuitive approach which allows for clear interpretation. Using identified
monetary shocks of Romer and Romer (2004) and extended to 2007 by Wieland and Yang (2017),
we estimate the output response as a function of the state of the economy by interacting the mone-
tary shocks with the unemployment rate at the time of the shock. We estimate the equation
∆yt = α0 +
36∑
s=1
αsURt−s +
36∑
s=1
δt−s∆yt−s +
36∑
s=1
βsmst−s +
36∑
s=1
γs(mst−s×URt−s) + t (1.17)
where ∆yt is the monthly growth rate of industrial production,mst is the monetary shock, and URt
is the unemployment rate. The coefficient for the interaction terms γs pick up the state-dependent
effect of the monetary shocks. The marginal effect of a monetary shock at time t = 0 conditional
on the unemployment rate is as follows
∆y1 = β1 + γ1 · UR0
∆y2 = δ1(β1 + γ1 · UR0) + (β2 + γ2 · UR0)
∆y3 = δ2δ1(β1 + γ1 · UR0) + δ2(β2 + γ2 · UR0) + (β3 + γ3 · UR0)
...
We fix a lag length of 36 months for the dependent variable as well as unemployment, the mon-
etary shocks and the interaction terms. While the information criterion may suggest a shorter lag
length, we fix them at the expense of efficiency in hopes of alleviating bias. To permit comparison
across models we also fix the lag length across the models.25
24The data for industrial production, durable consumption, and non-durable consumption as well as the Federal
Funds rate come from the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. The Unemployment rate comes from
the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics.
25As in both non-linear VAR and local projection methods the exogeneity of the state of the economy at the time of
the shock may be questioned. In order to alleviate these concerns we include lags of relevant variables (growth rates
of industrial production as well as unemployment) which is the approach often taken in the local projection methods.
Nevertheless, there may be residual concerns about persistent shocks that affect both the variables indicating the state
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Figure 1.8: State-dependence in durable and non-durable consumption
Note: Durable and non-durable consumption refer to the industrial production of durable and non-durable
consumer goods respectively. The solid red line reports the cumulated response of output to a 1 percentage
point shock to the Federal Funds rate when the unemployment rate is 9.5% at the time of the shock. The
solid black line reports the cumulated response of output to a 1 percentage point shock to the Federal Funds
rate when the unemployment rate is 6%. The dashed lines show one standard deviation bands around the
point estimates.
A commonly adopted approach when studying state-dependence of monetary policy is to use
the smooth transition local project method used by Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2013) in their
study of fiscal policy. Both our method and the local projection method have an advantage over
VARs in that they are implementable in a single equation. Both methods require a choice of
the form of the non-linear component of the response. We believe ours is reasonable insofar as
unemployment proxies for the business cycle. Rather than estimating a parametric model for each
state of two states, our model allows responses to depend directly on a continuous state. The benefit
is clarity. Unlike the smooth transition local projection methods where the transition between
states is governed by a logistic link function and a parameter governing the speed of transition, the
relationship between monetary policy effects and the state of the economy in our method is simple
of the economy and future output changes that are not captured by the lagged variables. In appendix A.5 we show
results including two such potential shocks: changes to TFP to capture persistent changes in aggregate productivity
and the Federal funds rate changes to capture persistence in the systematic component of monetary policy. Our results
are robust to these checks.
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and clear. In addition, our approach requires only a slight modification to the Romer and Romer
(2004) setup, allowing for a clear comparison.
In Figure 1.7 we report the cumulative effect of a monetary shock contingent on the state of
the economy. The figure displays the average expected response of output to a monetary shock
amounting to a 1 percentage point increase in the Federal Funds rate conditional on the state of
the economy. The solid red line reports the cumulated response when the unemployment rate at
the time of the monetary shock is 9.5%, and the solid black line reports the response for an unem-
ployment rate of 6%. The dashed lines show the one standard deviation bands around the point
estimates.26 The results clearly show that monetary policy has stronger effects in high unemploy-
ment states. When the unemployment rate is 9.5% at the time of the shock, the peak effect of
monetary policy is 5.8%; when unemployment is 6%, the peak response is only 1.7%.
Figure 1.8 displays the results for durable and non-durable consumption goods. Panel (a) shows
the results for industrial production of durable consumption goods and panel (b) shows the results
for industrial production of non-durable consumption goods. The aggregate finding that output
response to monetary shocks is stronger in recessions holds for both durable and non-durable
industrial production and the effect is particularly large for durables. When the unemployment
rate at the time of the monetary shock is 9.5% the peak response of durable goods output is 10.8%
whereas the peak output response with 6% unemployment rate is 2.4%. The difference in the effect
is also large for non-durables, although smaller than for durables. The peak response of output to a
monetary shock with 9.5% unemployment rate is 3.9% compared to a peak response of 1.4% when
the unemployment rate is 6%.
26The standard errors for the cumulative responses are constructed by sampling 1000 times from the asymptotic
distribution of the parameters following Romer and Romer (2004).
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1.5 Conclusion
Empirically, the frequency of price adjustment is increasing in product revenue, while the average
size of price adjustment is decreasing in revenue. These patterns are consistent with menu cost
models where menu costs do not scale with revenue and that this finding has important implica-
tions for the workhorse menu cost models in general. To our knowledge, our paper is the first to
document these patterns.
We document movements in the distribution of product revenue across the business cycle. Not
only do the mean and median fall during recessions, but the variance and dispersion of log revenue
fall as well. Combined with the strong connection between product revenue and the frequency
of price adjustment, the cyclical variation in the distribution of revenue implies that monetary
policy should be state-dependent. In recessions, prices are effectively stickier and consequently
the real effects of monetary policy should be stronger. We confirm this implication using both
reduced-form estimates as well as a quantitative menu cost model. Our reduced-form estimates
indicate that monetary policy shocks have greater effects in recessions – this is true for durable
and non-durable consumption goods. The quantitative New Keynesian menu cost model matches
these predictions. In our baseline model, the cumulative output response is 43 percent larger in
low output states when the difference between output in high and low states is 7 percent. When the
model is extended to include habit formation and persistent monetary shocks the difference in the
output response is 81 percent.
Our findings suggest that examining the interaction of price setting behavior with product char-
acteristics may provide important insight into the behavior of aggregate prices and the real effect
of monetary policy. While this paper focuses on a particular characteristic – product revenue –
other characteristics such as the elasticity of demand or the degree of local market competition
may also be important factors governing price setting. Our findings may also be used to advocate
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for monetary policy that explicitly takes account the state-dependence of its effects.
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CHAPTER 2
Seniority
2.1 Introduction
A large literature investigates the effects of worker tenure on wage growth, attesting to the im-
portance and interest in this topic.1 Much of the empirical literature has traditionally focused on
firm specific human capital as the source of tenure effects on wage growth. However, some re-
cent papers (for example, Daniel and Heywood, 2007, Heywood et al., 2010, Zwick, 2014) find
deferred compensation as a driving force for upward sloping wage profiles with worker tenure.
Their findings suggest that firms often back-weight their wage profiles in order to illicit worker
effort.
Along with the empirical literature, much of the recent efforts in theoretical research have also
focused on the firm-specific human capital explanation for seniority wages (Stevens, 2003, Lazear,
2009, and Burdett and Coles, 2010). On the other hand, there is surprisingly little work that
focuses on the need for firms to motivate workers and its effect on wage profiles since Lazear
(1979, 1981) first proposed deferred compensation as an efficient method to induce worker effort.
1The debate regarding the size and source of the effect of worker tenure on wage growth is still ongoing due in part
to the fact there are many difficulties when measuring the effect of worker tenure on wage growth. Some papers that
present and address the various challenges in estimating this effect include Altonji and Shakotok (1987), Topel (1991),
Neal (1995), Altonji and Williams (2005), Kambourov and Manovskii (2009), Buchinsky et al. (2010), Pavan (2011),
and Kwon and Milgrom (2014) among others.
47
While Lazear’s earlier work was crucial in first illustrating the effectiveness of deferred payment
as a worker motivating device, there is still much left to be understood about how it pertains to
seniority and its effect on tenure earnings gradients.
An important goal of this paper is to provide a general framework in which agency frictions lead
firms to value seniority and consequently offer wage profiles that reflect this valuation. We derive
the optimal wage structure for the firm and provide a precise definition of seniority and its value
to the firm in this context. This provides important insight as to what it means for a worker to gain
seniority with tenure, which also enables a much richer interpretation of the empirical results. Our
model also provides sharp predictions regarding not only the evolution of worker wages but also
regarding the intensity with which firms monitor their employees and provide amenities.
We present a model in which workers receive significant returns to seniority above and beyond
their productivity increase as an optimal equilibrium outcome. The model we present is an effi-
ciency wage model with imperfectly verifiable effort, where firms hire workers by offering them
implicit long-term contracts. Unlike most existing models of efficiency wages where the choice of
effort is binary (work or shirk), we allow the workers to choose a desired level of effort at every
instant in time.
We find that in this setup a seniority wage structure is optimal for firms. Workers are paid ac-
cording to their seniority, a measure that does not directly reflect the worker’s current productivity.
Seniority is measured as the accumulation of marginal productivity gains gained by the firm from
increased worker effort. Workers accumulate this seniority as they continuously work for a firm
and their wages increase accordingly. Firms are willing to pay for this seniority because it reflects
the total the benefits that a firm gets from providing additional utility to the worker.
In addition to the result for the optimal wage path, we also find that seniority can determine
the level of monitoring a firm performs over the workers. If firms have the ability to vary their
monitoring intensity by worker, the firms will most likely choose to monitor junior workers more
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intensely and senior workers less. We also consider the case in which firms provide various ameni-
ties to workers in addition to wages. We find that how much a firm provides of a particular benefit
will depend not only on the amount utility it provides to the worker but also but its effect on the
marginal disutility of effort for the worker.
The seniority wage structure also has interesting implications for the issue of earnings losses
from job loss. Previous studies have found large and persistent losses in wages (Davis and von
Wachter, 2011) that are difficult to reconcile with existing theories. Here, we show that seniority
wages can provide an additional channel through which a job loss can result in large earnings
losses for a worker.
As mentioned above, Lazear (1979, 1981) first showed that deferred compensation may be
utilized by firms to motivate worker effort. However in his papers, the precise path of wage profiles
is indeterminate as long as it provides enough motivation for the workers. In addition, he allows
for the possibility that workers pay employment fees (or provide up-front bonds) which is seldom
observed in the real economy. Akerlof and Katz (1989) argue that when one does not allow up-front
bonds, firms should prefer to use wages higher than market clearing wages rather than choosing
to defer payment. We find that when the effort choice of workers is continuous and not binary,
upward sloping wage profiles will still be utilized by firms to motivate workers.
In addition to the work on seniority wages, this paper contributes to the study of efficiency
wage models and their properties. Efficiency wage was once a popular area of research, provid-
ing much insight into involuntary unemployment (Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984), the prominence of
inter-industry wage differentials and the effect of industrial policies (Bulow and Summers, 1986).
However for reasons that are unclear, the amount of research conducted on the topic declined
drastically and there is little research currently being done on efficiency wages.
There are many reasons to believe that there should be more research focused on efficiency
wages models and their implications. First, as the abundance of search models indicate, there is
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still a high degree of interest in the determinants of unemployment. However, the current state of
research is dominated by the search and matching framework. While search frictions are undoubt-
edly a very important component of unemployment, other sources of unemployment also deserve
attention.
The main alternative theory of unemployment in the economist’s current tool box is efficiency
wage theory where unemployment stems from the firms’ need to motivate workers. Efficiency
wage models provide an alternative prism through which to study the sources and consequences
of unemployment. How much of unemployment can be attributed to the existence of search fric-
tions and how much is motivational unemployment is ultimately a quantitative question that could
potentially have important consequences for not only our understanding of unemployment but for
business cycle fluctuations as well.
The nature of the employment relationship is also another area of great interest that could bene-
fit from efficiency wage theory. Similar to search models, efficiency wage models are intrinsically
about long-term labor relationships which contrasts with the traditional view of wages being de-
termined in spot markets. We believe that efficiency wage models can add interesting perspective
to the question of the employment relationship as well, including on the longstanding question of
whether observed wages should be thought of as being allocative. We view our paper as contribut-
ing to this cause.
Also, this paper is a part of a literature that studies the implications of variable labor choice.
Studies on this topic include Basu and Kimball (1997) who study the implications of variable
labor utilization and also Basu and Kimball (2002) and Epstein and Kimball (2014) that study the
implications of the stability of long-run labor supply. Nevertheless, while most of this literature
focuses on variable labor choice in a neoclassical framework, this paper studies the implications of
variable effort choice in an efficiency wage model.
Finally, the solution technique we utilize to solve the agents’ problems in the model deserves
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attention. The agents in our model solve an optimization problem where the expectations of other
agents are a forward-looking state variable. The structure of this problem makes it difficult to uti-
lize traditional techniques of dynamic optimization to solve this problem. The solution technique
we propose allows us to reformulate the problem in a manner such that we can utilize standard
optimal control methods to solve the optimization problems. This method can be used various
other situations where a forward-looking variable is a state variable of the optimization problem.
Examples of situations where such problems could arise include monetary policy, capital taxation
and even foreign policy.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we present and solve the worker and firm
problems. We also discuss the the solution technique. Section 3 analyzes the optimal contract using
graphs and phase diagrams. Section 4 considers extensions and applications of the framework and
section 5 discusses the steady state equilibrium. Section 6 concludes.
2.2 Model
The model is presented in continuous time and set in a partial equilibrium framework where interest
rates are exogenous and are quoted in terms of the consumption good as numeraire. Capital is fixed,
so output is a function of effective labor input alone. There are two types of agents in the model,
firms and workers. All workers are ex-ante identical as are all firms. Each firm hires many workers
to produce output.
An employed worker works for a fixed number of hours. While employed, a worker chooses the
amount of effort to exert at every instant in time. We assume that this effort level is only partially
observable to the firm. Firms can only verify whether or not a worker makes a bad blunder, the
frequency of which will depend on the worker’s effort level.
Firms hire in a competitive labor market by offering workers (implicit) long-term contracts. For
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each cohort of workers they hire, firms choose a wage path and a layoff policy, both of which may
be conditional on macroeconomic events. They may also choose the level of monitoring intensity,
which affects the accuracy with which the firm can verify workers’ blunders.
The instantaneous probability of dismissalm(1−z) is determined jointly by the firm’s monitor-
ing intensity m and the worker’s effort level z. Together with the exogenous quit rate q this makes
up the separation or attrition rate a(m, z) = q +m(1− z). In the expression for the probability of
dismissal m(1− z), we implicitly assume that the probability of making an observable blunder is
linear in effort. Because we assume that what matters for a firm’s productivity is the total effective
labor of all its workers, which is the sum of the effort of all the individual workers, this implies that
there is a linear relationship between a worker’s productivity and probability of dismissal. While
this assumption may hold merit in its own right, the main purpose of the assumption is to simplify
the analysis.
Because a firm cannot observe effort directly, it can only keep worker effort up by severely
punishing any worker who gets caught. One way to punish workers who get caught would be to
levy a stiff fine or to confiscate a performance bond put up by the worker when hired. In theory
this could circumvent the need to fire workers. However, explicit bond posting is seldom observed
in actual labor markets. There are many reasons as to why explicit bond posting is rarely observed,
including moral hazard of firms and capital market imperfections.
The approach taken in this paper is to rely on capital market imperfections to prevent explicit
bonding. We assume that workers cannot borrow or lend on the bond market. Being unable to
borrow at reasonable rates is plausible in a world where workers have no collateral and may lose
their job at any time especially since taking out a loan would reduce the worker’s effort if the debt
could be wiped out by bankruptcy when the worker becomes unemployed.
Being unable to save is less realistic, although the workers may be unwilling to lend because
of a high rate of discount or because they receive a lower interest rate than the capitalists when
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they lend. We assume that the worker’s discount rate ρ is greater than the interest rate through
out the remainder of the paper. In any case, allowing workers to save will not drastically alter the
qualitative implications of this paper.2
The worker’s problem
A worker chooses a path of planned effort {zt} to maximize life time expected utility. The
worker receives a flow utility of u(w) − v(z) from work when employed and a flow utility of
u¯ when unemployed. The level of utility a worker receives when unemployed u¯ is exogenously
determined.
The disutility of effort function v(z) should be thought of as combining elements of worker
preference and elements of the production function, since effort z is measured in effectiveness of
the effort in a particular job relative to the effectiveness of maximum effort in that job. Therefore
if one job took more care and attention than another in order to avoid mistakes, this would be
expressed as a high level of disutility necessary to get a reasonable level of effectiveness z. In
a model where worker preference and the characteristics of jobs vary the two elements of v(z)
should be analytically separated, but for the purposes of this paper the distinction is without con-
sequence.
Denoting the expected future utility of an unemployed worker at time t as Uu(t), the expected
future utility of an employed worker at time t0 is
UE(t0) =
∫ ∞
t0
e
− ∫ tt0 (ρ+a(m,zt˜))dt˜[u(wt)− v(zt) + a(m, zt)Uu(t)]dt (2.1)
where ρ is the time discount factor of the worker. The worker gets expected utility from the chance
of staying with the firm and getting u(wt) − v(zt) at future dates t. In addition, if the worker
2This can be seem from the fact that the workers first order condition for effort choice (2.2), which is also critical
for the firm’s problem, remains unchanged even if one allows the workers to save.
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is fired at date t he or she receives expected utility of Uu(t) from everything after time t′. The
instantaneous probability of being fired at time t depends not only on the rate of dismissal but also
the chance of lasting that long as is reflected in the discount factor.
The worker chooses a path of effort {zt} to maximize their expected future utility as described
by equation (2.1). Solving this maximization problem is not trivial, most notably due to the fact
that the endogenous variable z shows up in the discount factor e−
∫ t
t0
(ρ+a(m,zt˜))dt˜. The solution
technique used to solve the workers problem deserves more attention and the derivation of the
following first order condition is discussed in detail below. The first order condition for z is
− az(UE − Uu) = v′(z). (2.2)
A worker applies effort up to the point where the marginal distuility of effort is equal to the
marginal reduction in the probability of job loss (−az) multiplied by the cost of job loss, the
utility differential UE −Uu. Denoting the utility differential by ∆ ≡ UE −Uu and since az = −m
we can rewrite equation (2.2) as
m∆ = v′(z). (2a)
Assuming v′(z) is strictly increasing in z (v′′(z) > 0) then equation (2a) can be inverted to
yield
z = v′−1(m∆). (2b)
Effort depends only on the product of monitoring intensity and the cost of job loss. When m
is treated as exogenous, we can write z as a function of simply the expected utility differential
z = z(∆).
Unemployed workers have no decisions of consequence to make. They receive a certain reser-
vation utility and wait to be hired by firms choosing randomly from the pool of unemployed work-
ers. For unemployed workers, the present value of future utility comes from two sources: the flow
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utility one gets when unemployed u¯ and the probability of becoming employed again with a conse-
quent jump in expected utility. The instantaneous probability of being reemployed is h
N−L , where
h is the aggregate rate of hiring, N the whole labor force, and L the number of those employed.
The jump in utility on being reemployed is the utility differential ∆ for a newly hired worker which
we denote ∆0. Thus the expected future utility of an unemployed worker is,
Uu(t) =
∫ ∞
t
e−ρ(t
′−t)[u¯+
ht′
Nt′ − Lt′∆0,t
′ ]dt′ (2.3)
where we define,
ψ = u¯+
h
N − L∆0 (2.4)
as the pseudo-utility of being unemployed. This pseudo-utility accounts for the potential benefit
an unemployed worker may gain from being rehired as well as the reservation utility u¯. In the
model, ψ functions as the “going wage” (or more accurately the going utility) which a firm must
on average exceed to illicit effort from workers.
Given the expressions for UE and Uu we can derive an expression for the utility differential ∆
as
∆t =
∫ ∞
t
e−
∫ t′
t [ρ+a(m,zt˜)]dt˜[u(wt′)− v(z(∆t′))− ψt′ ]dt′. (2.5)
From this expression, we can see that u(w) − v(z) − ψ is the worker’s instantaneous surplus
from employment. This surplus utility must be discounted by the attrition rate a(m, z) as well as
by the impatience parameter ρ, since with instantaneous probability a(m, z) the worker becomes
unemployed again worker surplus drops to zero.
Note that ψ is exogenous to the firm. A small firm cannot affect the value of a worker’s oppor-
tunities when unemployed is seeking work. ∆0 is also outside of a firm’s control being a part of
the solution to another firm’s maximization problem.
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Solution technique
Before proceeding to the firm’s problem, the solution technique used to solve the employed
worker’s maximization problem needs to be discussed. The same technique is utilized to solve
the firm’s problem as well. We will call this method the “Retrograde approach.” The definition
of the word “retrograde” that we have in mind as defined by the Merriam-Webster dictionary
is “moving, occurring, or performed in a backward direction.” The method we propose treats the
endogenous variables as if they are in retrograde motion, traveling backward in time. This interpre-
tation allows us to reformulate the problem in a way that allows us to utilize standard Hamiltonian
methods.
We demonstrate this method using the worker’s problem from the previous section. As de-
scribed above, at time t0 the worker solves the problem,
max
{zt}
UE(t0) =
∫ ∞
t0
e
− ∫ tt0 [ρ+a(m,zt˜)]dt˜[u(wt)− v(zt) + a(m, zt)Uu(t)]dt
where the path of wage {wt} and expected future utility of unemployment {Uu(t)} are taken as
given. The problem cannot be solved using the usual optimal control techniques because the en-
dogenous variables affect the present value of all future flow utilities. However, using the Retro-
grade approach we are able to reformulate the problem so that we can use the standard Hamilto-
nian.
The first key insight is that the function UE itself can be thought of as a state variable. We can
reformulate the problem as,
max
{zt}
UE(t0) (2.6)
s.t. UE(t) =
∫ ∞
t
e−
∫ t′
t [ρ+a(m,z(t˜))]dt˜[u(wt′)− v(zt′) + a(m, zt′)Uu(t′)]dt′ ∀t ≥ t0
so that the endogenous discounting is no longer a problem. Here, we treat UE as a forward-looking
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state variable in the maximization problem with its law of motion described by an integral equation.
The objective is to maximize the value of UE at the initial point in time t0.
The problem, as currently formulated, still has a different structure than the usual optimization
problems in economics. The optimal control problem that economists are most used to is the
case with a backward-looking state variable accumulating over time according to a law of motion
described by a differential equation. This is the standard case most often seen with consumption
as the control variable and capital as the state variable. In this usual case, we solve the problem by
selecting the path of the control variables to “control” the path of the state variable such that the
two paths jointly maximize the objective function.
Thus we wish revert the problem in (2.6) into this familiar form. Note that since the state
variable in (2.6) is forward-looking it accumulates backwards in time. So, now suppose that time
flows backwards. Then, the state variable accumulates according to the law of motion
dUE(t)
−dt = −(u(wt)− v(zt) + a(m, zt)Uu(t))− (ρ+ a(m, zt))UE(t).
In other words, the worker’s problem can be thought of as a standard optimization problem where
the direction of time is reversed. UE(t0) is the objective function and UE is the state variable with
the above law of motion.
This Retrograde interpretation provides an interesting economic context to the maximization
problem. The problem can be thought of a worker trying to maximize expected utility by choos-
ing effort z conditional on the state variable UE . The worker accumulates this utility stock UE
by collecting the instantaneous utility benefit u(wt) − v(zt) + a(m, zt)Uu(t) over time with UE
depreciating each period by ρ+a(m, zt). In this interpretation, the worker is analogous to an agent
in the familiar Ramsey problem of agents maximizing expected utility by choosing consumption
while accumulating capital through savings. The difference is, the direction of time is reversed and
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the accumulation is occurring in reverse time.
The retrograde structure appears in the worker’s problem because the worker’s choice of effort
in the present and near future affects the present value of utilities gained in all future periods. Thus
the worker must always account for how effort choice today will affect the present value of future
expected utility, making effort choice depend on this value. The expected utility differential ∆t is,
therefore, the appropriate state variable of the worker.
While the retrograde interpretation gives a natural insight to the workers problem, the direction
of time flow itself is irrelevant to the solution of an optimal control problem. Thus we can simply
write,
max
{zt}
UE(t0)
s.t. U˙E(t) = −
(
(u(wt)− v(zt) + a(m, zt)Uu(t))− (ρ+ a(m, zt))UE(t)
)
and solve the problem using the Hamiltonian equations. The Hamiltonian has the form,
H = −ξ
(
[u(w)− v(z) + a(m, z)Uu]− [ρ+ a(m, z)]UE
)
(2.7)
where z is the control variable, UE is the retrograde state variable and ξ is the retrograde co-state
variable. The objective function does not show up in the Hamiltonian because there is no flow
utility that is directly affected by the values of the endogenous variables.
The Hamiltonian equations are textbook (Kamien and Schwartz, 1991). The derivative of the
Hamiltonian with respect to the control variable is set to equal zero (∂H
∂z
= 0), the derivative with
respect to the state variable is set to equal −ξ˙ ( ∂H
∂UE
= −ξ˙), the derivative with respect to the co-
state variable is set to equal U˙E (∂H∂ξ = U˙E), and the transversality condition is limt→∞ ξtUE(t). The
only unorthodox condition is the condition for the free initial point, ξ(t0) = 1. Finally, using the
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Retrograde Hamiltonian equations we can derive the first order condition in (2.2)
−az(UE − Uu) = v′(z).
The firm’s problem
Firms hire workers by offering each worker an implicit long-term contract. We assume that
firms can commit to a conditional wage path. This assumption is important as firms will have the
incentive to renege on its promises as the value of the worker to the firm falls. As will be shown,
it is beneficial for firms to defer payments to induce effort from their workers. As a result the
worker’s wages will exceed their productivity toward the latter parts of their careers.
It is not difficult to imagine why firms will be willing to honor their contracts even when workers
are paid more than their marginal products. The firm’s ability to hire workers and entice them to
exert effort depends on the worker’s belief that the firm will honor its promises. If a worker believes
that a firm is untrustworthy after it observes a firm renege on a contract, then it may be better for
the firm to honor its contracts rather than attain a bad reputation. In a game theoretical setting,
it may be the firm’s optimal strategy to honor all contracts if the worker’s punishment strategy
for broken promises is stringent enough. There can be potentially many different strategies of
the workers that enforce the firm to honor all contracts in equilibrium. The approach we take
here is not to explicitly model such a situation, but rather suggest that it is plausible to believe
firms would indeed be sensitive to their reputation and in return assume that firms are honorable.
Another possible interpretation is that these contracts, implicit as they may be, are nevertheless
legally enforceable and firms are bound by law to keep their promises.
Each firm hires many workers and produce according to an identical the production func-
tion
pf(Z)
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where p is productivity (or can also be thought of as the real price of output), Z is the total effective
labor done for the firm by all its workers, and f is an increasing and concave function of Z (f ′ >
0, f ′′ < 0). A firm chooses the wage path of a worker taking the path of the marginal revenue
product of effort µt ≡ ptf ′(Zt) as given, and taking as given that the firm will only fire for cause.
µt is only infinitesimally affected by what any one worker does so it can be treated as exogenous in
drawing up the contract. For now the monitoring intensity m will be treated as constant and thus
z = z(∆).
For the firm, an optimal contract is a contract that maximizes the marginal profit gained from
a worker over the worker’s career with the firm. Denoting the expected value of discounted profit
gained from a worker from time t0 as pit0 , the optimal contract is the solution to the firm’s prob-
lem,
max
{w′t}
pit0 =
∫ ∞
t0
e
− ∫ tt0 [rt˜+a(m,zt˜)]dt˜[µtz(∆t)− w(t)]dt (2.8)
such that ∆t satisfies (2.5) for all t > t0. The firm wishes to maximize the sum of the product
gained from a worker µz minus wages w, discounted by the interest rate r and the probability of
separation a(m, z). Again, we solve this problem using the retrograde approach, and reformulate
the problem as,
max
{wt}
pit0
s.t. p˙it = −
(
[µtz(∆t)− wt]− [rt + a(m, z(∆t))]pit
)
∆˙t = −
(
[u(wt)− v(z(∆t))− ψt]− [ρ+ a(m, z(∆t))∆t]
)
and proceed to solve the problem using the Hamiltonian. The Retrograde Hamiltonian for the
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firm’s problem is,
H = −λ
(
[µz(∆)−w]−[r+a(m, z(∆))]pi
)
−ζ
(
[u(w)−v(z(∆))−ψ]−[ρ+a(m, z(∆))]
)
(2.9)
where λ is the retrograde co-state variable for pi and ζ is the retrograde co-state variable for ∆. The
solution to the problem is,
1
u′(wt)
=
ζt
λt
≡ st (2.10)
The ratio st is the measure of “seniority rights” and is described by the expression,
st =
∫ t
t0
e−
∫ t
t′ [ρ−rt˜]dt˜[µt′ +mpit′ ]z∆,t′dt′ (2.11)
where pit′ is the value of profits obtained from the worker after time t′. Equation (2.10) shows that
the wage is a monotonic function of seniority. For example, if u(w) = w
1−σ
1−σ , then it implies that
wt = s
1
σ
t where
1
σ
is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution.
The units of “seniority” as implied by (2.10) are revealing. ζt, the co-state variable for ∆t, is
the marginal value of the utility differential ∆t to the firm. λt, the co-state variable for pit, is the
marginal value of the future expected profit. Thus st is the value of the utility differential in units
of future expected profit and is measured in dollars per utility. The higher a worker’s seniority the
more a firm is willing to pay for an extra unit of utility of that worker’s.
Equation (2.11) indicates that st is an accumulation of past marginal effects of the utility differ-
ential ∆ on effort multiplied by the value of marginal effort in terms of firm profit. Worker utility
at time t is valued by the firm because of its effect on effort over the interval [t0, t] as reflected
in the interval of integration in equation (2.11). A firm is willing to pay for a unit of utility later
on because utility off in the distance acts as a carrot for a long time since increased worker efforts
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comes not from utility in the present but from looking forward to the utility one will get if not
fired.
The factor µt′ + mpit′ in equation (2.11) is the value of increased effort to the firm. It is the
combination of a direct effect of increased output per extra unit of effort plus the reduction m per
unit of effort on the instantaneous probability of losing the profit pit′ from the worker’s activities
after t′. The effect of the increased effort on the worker’s utility (which the firm cares about
indirectly) cancel out on the margin because of the worker’s first order conditions.
The term e−
∫ t
t0
(ρ−r)dt˜ occurs because utility at time t has to be discounted at the rate ρ+a(m, z)
back to t0, to reflect the effect on the cost of job loss at t′, while dollars written in to the contract
at time t are cheaper by a factor discounted at the rate r + a(m, z). Utility at t is worth less if the
worker’s utility discount rate ρ is high but worth more in dollars at time t if those dollars are easy
to come by because r is high. The effects of the attrition rate a(m, z) cancel out.
The term z∆,t′ is the easiest to understand. This is the marginal effect of a worker’s expected
utility on effort which translates the utility the worker is concerned with into something the firm is
concerned about.
Equation (2.11) is still not fully understood until one notes that in a steady state situation the
expected present value of future profits from previously hired workers will be negative. The firm
will hire workers up to the point where expected profit from the time of hiring pit0 is zero. But the
firm tries to back-weight the path of wages so that most of the wages are off in the future which
will push wages further off into the future than productivity Therefore, after the worker has been
around for a while the firm will face relatively more future wages than future productivity. Because
the firm promises wages off in the future and gets the benefits before it delivers on its part of the
bargain, a worker ends up being a contractual burden on the firm. As a result, the fact that a worker
is more likely stay with the firm if their effort is higher makes the firm less eager to elicit greater
effort by promised wages later on.
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Figure 2.1: Optimal contract in (∆, pi)
2.3 The Optimal Contract
The optimal contract can be analyzed further with phase diagrams. The contract lies in the three
dimensional space of (pi,∆, s) with the dynamics of the contract given by the law of motion of the
three variables. The optimal contract will be on the three dimensional saddle path of the dynamics
described by the differential equations,
p˙i = −
(
(µz(∆)− w)− (r + a(m, z(∆)))pi
)
∆˙ = −
(
(u(w)− v(z(∆)− ψ)− (ρ+ a(m, z(∆)))∆
)
s˙ = (µ+mpi)z∆(∆)− (ρ− r)s
We depict the three dimensional diagrams in two dimensional space from three different angles.
While it is difficult to directly draw a phase diagram in (∆, pi) space as ∆˙ is only an indirect
function of pi, it is also the most illuminating. Thus we begin by analyzing the contract from this
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perspective.
If a worker is hired at time t0 the firm will value worker utility at t > t0 at st dollars per utility.
Since ∆t is measured in time t utility units it can be valued on the margin at st dollars per utility
unit. Therefore, the contract from t on will maximize expected profits from pit + st∆t. In other
words, the contract after time t will solve,
max
{wt}
pit + st∆t (2.12)
such that ∆t satisfies (2.5), pit satisfies (2.8) for time t and st is taken as given.
To analyze this contract graphically, consider that at any time t, there will be some bounded-
above set of attainable combinations of ∆ and pi given the expected path of the three key variables
exogenous to the contract µ, ψ and r. An optimal contract will always be a point on the efficient
frontier of this ∆ − pi possibility set. In Figure 2.1a the efficient frontier is shown by the thick
curved line. It is a subset of the upper right-hand boundary of the convex hull of attainable (∆, pi)
pairs.3
The set of possible (∆, pi) pairs will always be in the southeast quadrant. This is due to the fact
that in equilibrium, if pi is greater than zero the firm would immediately hire more workers until
lower marginal product µ brought the expected marginal profit from a worker back down to zero.
∆ is always greater than zero since a contract with ∆ less than zero would be less attractive to
workers than unemployment.
Different levels of seniority which are likely to coexist within the firm at any given time will
each lead to a different choice of ∆ and pi. Let the functions ∆ˆ(s) and pˆi(s) denote the optimal ∆
3The efficient frontier can be disconnected if the region of possible (∆, pi) pairs is non-convex. Non-convexity
may arise if firms are able to place workers on temporary leave. If ∆ falls such that the implied level of effort z is less
than zero, it is beneficial for the firms to temporarily layoff the workers (with pay) and get zero effort instead. This
arrangement would not be a breach of the longterm contract as the firms would still honor the terms of their agreement.
In any case, in steady state layoffs are unnecessary and the (∆, pi) possibility set will be convex.
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and pi for a given level of seniority s. Then the functions ∆ˆ(s) and pˆi(s) are respectively nonde-
creasing and non-increasing. Also, pˆi(s) + s∆ˆ(s) is nondecreasing.4 This can be seen most clearly
through figure 2.1a. First, note that for a given level of seniority s, the objective pi + s∆ is shown
as a straight line with the slope −s. Since firms maximize this objective, the optimal contract will
be the tangent point of this line with the efficient frontier of the feasible set. Now, because the
efficient frontier is downward sloping, we can see that as s increases the optimal point (∆, pi) will
move southeast implying pˆi(s) decreases and ∆ˆ(s) increases. The value of pi + s∆ is depicted as
the pi-intercept of the tangency line. The intercept also increases with seniority s. From Figure
2.1a we can see that the firm is willing to trade off more expected subsequent profit for a higher
expected utility as seniority s rises.
These results for a fixed (∆, pi) frontier have two meanings. The first is cross-sectional. At any
given time a firm is likely to have workers with various levels of seniority but the contacts for all
of the workers must be from the feasible set. Therefore, the graph shows that more senior workers
will be more of a burden on the firm (pi is more negative), will value their jobs more (∆ is higher),
have higher productivity (z(∆) is higher), and are less likely to be laid off (a(m, z) is lower).
The other use for these results is intertemporal. In steady state, the (∆, pi) possibility frontier
will stay fixed over time. As time passes, any worker who neither quits nor is fired will gain
seniority s and move down along the (∆, pi) possibility frontier.5 Therefore the dynamic path of
∆ and pi for a single worker when the economy as a whole is in steady state can be shown by the
(∆, pi) frontier as in Figure 2.1b. As the figure shows, the dynamic path of ∆ first turns down
at ∆ = v
′(0)
m
which is the point at which the worker is hired. In equilibrium, the worker’s effort
4Given s2 ≥ s1, let (∆1, pi1) maximize pi + s1∆ and (∆2, pi2) maximize pi + s2∆ in the feasible set. First,
note that pi1 + s1∆1 ≥ pi2 + s1∆2 and pi2 + s2∆2 ≥ pi1 + s2∆1 by definition. Subtracting the two conditions,
we get (s2 − s1)∆2 ≥ (s2 − s1)∆1. Which implies that ∆2 ≥ ∆1 and ∆ˆ(s) is non-decreasing. Next, from
pi1 + s1∆1 ≥ pi2 + s1∆2 we get pi1 ≥ pi2 + s1(∆2 − ∆1) ≥ pi2 which shows pˆi(s) is non-increasing. Lastly,
pi2 + s2∆2 ≥ pi1 + s2∆1 ≥ pi1 + s2∆1 − (s2 − s1)∆1 = pi1 + s1∆1 which shows pˆi(s) + s∆ˆ(s) is non-decreasing.
5In steady state, once a worker is called in to work, he or she will not be placed on leave, since the worker’s ∆
and z will only increase. Because temporary layoffs are unnecessary in steady state, the (∆, pi) possibility set will be
convex; the possibility of temporary layoffs is the only thing that introduces non-convexity into the problem.
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Figure 2.2: Optimal contract in (s, pi)
must be zero when hired because if effort is strictly positive, then it would be possible for the
firm the gain strictly positive profit by delaying all wages by a small amount of time. However, in
equilibrium the marginal profit from a worker must be zero when a worker is hired.
In the analysis above we show that pˆi(s) is monotonically decreasing in s and ∆ˆ(s) is monoton-
ically increasing in s. The graph of pˆi(s) in s− pi space and ∆ˆ(s) in s−∆ space along with figure
2.1b show the three dimensional saddle path of s,∆ and pi on which the contract lies.
Figure 2.2 illustrates the evolution of seniority s and profit pi. The thick lines represent the
s˙ = 0 and p˙i loci respectively. The direction of the dynamics are shown by the small arrows at
right angles and the saddle path is as labeled. From the boundary conditions of the Hamiltonian,
we know that seniority s is equal to zero when the worker is hired. Thus the contract begins on
the saddle path at the point where the saddle path intersects with the pi axis. Also shown in the
picture is the fact that the contract must begin with pi = 0 due to equilibrium effects. Thus expected
marginal profit from the worker begins at zero and is decreasing with the tenure of the worker. The
figure again illustrates that the expected value of an experienced worker is always negative to a
firm in the steady state.
Figure 2.3 shows the evolution of seniority s and utility differential ∆.6 Again, the contract
6Figure 2.3 depicts the case for when z∆ is decreasing in ∆ (effort is concave in ∆) which corresponds to the case
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Figure 2.3: Optimal contract in (s,∆)
begins at the point where the saddle path intersects with the ∆ axis. It becomes clear that both
seniority and the utility differential ∆ increase over time. Since effort z(∆) is also a monotonic
function of ∆, effort will also increase as well.
The above phase diagrams reveal that there is a stationary point s˙ = ∆˙ = p˙i = 0 where the
contract comes to rest. Seniority s stops growing in the end because as s increases the term mpi
in the µ + mpi of the integrand for s in equation (2.11) becomes increasingly negative. At some
point, promising the worker higher wages would make him or her tend to stay on too long from
the firm’s viewpoint, canceling out the benefit of extra productivity. This limit to how far s can
rise is a reflection of diminishing returns to the firm of raising wages. Also preventing seniority s
from rising indefinitely is worker impatience. When ρ > r, payments far in the future of a given
monetary present value of less and less effect on effort now.
We also know that the wage w ends up above the marginal product of the work µz, because as
t→∞ the stationary contract satisfies
pi∗ =
µz∗ − w∗
r + a∗
< 0.
with a positive 3rd derivative of v(z).
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Therefore, the marginal product at the stationary point µz∗is less than the worker’s wage w∗. We
also know that the wages must be below the worker’s marginal product at some point to balance
this, or the expected future profits due to taking on a worker at t0 would be negative, and the firm
would never agree to take the worker on those terms. Thus, the marginal product of a worker
µz must rise above the wage shortly after the worker arrives on the job. Figure 2.4 shows the
approximate shape of the path that wages and productivity will follow over the worker’s tenure in
steady state. It shows that productivity is greater than wage when the worker is junior and wage is
greater than productivity for senior workers.
2.4 Extensions and Applications
The framework presented above is amenable to various extensions and applications some of which
we consider in this section. First, we consider the possibility that firms can choose the intensity
with which they monitor their workers. We show that firms will likely monitor junior workers
more aggressively than senior workers in such a case.
Next, we allow the firm to provide amenities to workers in addition to wages to increase job
pleasantness and investigate what the optimal strategy for the firms will be. We find that in general,
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firms will provide amenities to workers in a manner similar to wages, but some amenities will be
provided more or less abundantly depending on its effect on the worker’s marginal disutility of
effort.
Lastly, we explore a possible application of the basic framework to the question of large earn-
ings losses from job loss. The model provides a new perspective in reconciling the disparity be-
tween the empirical results reporting large earnings losses from job loss and theoretical models
that mostly predict a smaller impact of job loss.
2.4.1 Variable Monitoring
In this section we consider the firms’ choice if firms are able to vary their monitoring intensity over
the worker’s tenure. The firms specify their level monitoring as a part of the implicit contract. In
the model described above, this amounts to firms choosing the path of the variable m, present in
the attrition rate a(m, z) = q +m(1− z), over the life of the contract.
To solve for the optimal path {mt}, we can simply solve the Hamiltonian equation for the firm’s
problem (2.9) such that ∂H
∂m
= 0. The resulting first order condition is,
[µ+mpi]zm︸ ︷︷ ︸
benefit of monitoring
− [pi + s∆]am︸ ︷︷ ︸
indirect cost
− c︸︷︷︸
direct cost
= 0 (2.13)
where c is the marginal cost that a firm incurs every period to monitor each worker with intensity
m.7
Equation (2.13) can be interpreted as follows. The benefits of monitoring come from the extra
effort zm extracted from the worker due to increased monitoring, with extra current effort having
the value of µ + m∆ as in equation (2.11) of the definition of seniority. On the cost side, in
7In addition to allowing m to be a choice variable, we also add a marginal cost c that a firm must incur to increase
their monitoring intensity by an additional unit.
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addition to the direct cost of monitoring c, there is a cost of shortening the average length of tenure
by increased firings. The overall value of the contract that would be terminated by firing is pi+ s∆
(expected profits plus the value of keeping the utility differential high). pi + s∆ is always positive
since the firm maximizes pi + s∆ at every point in time and can always attain at least pi + s∆ = 0
by putting the worker on temporary layoff.8 Thus, pi + s∆ measures the value to the firm of
maintaining the contract and (pi + s∆)am is the cost of terminating through a more draconian
firing policy.
Equation (2.13) predicts that junior workers will most likely be monitored more intensively
than senior workers. If monitoring intensity m were unchanged by seniority, the marginal benefits
of monitoring measured by (µ + mpi)zm would decline as pi became smaller from the worker’s
approaching his or her upper limit of effort more closely.9 On the cost side, the need to keep the
contract secure (pi + s∆) grows with seniority as demonstrated in Figure 2.1a. Thus the higher
attrition rate caused by more intense monitoring is a more serious problem for more senior work-
ers.
2.4.2 Amenities
Firms may also choose to vary the amount of amenities it provides its workers in order to increase
job pleasantness and worker utility. It is quite common to observe firms offering varying levels and
types of amenities (such as vacation days, office space, etc) to workers depending on the amenity
and the worker. In this section, we explore why and how firms provide various amenities to the
workers.
8If the expected future utility ∆ falls to the point that the worker’s implied effort level is below zero, such that the
firm’s marginal profit from the worker coming to work is actually negative, the firm can simply ask the worker to stay
home and put them on temporary layoff while still paying the worker in accordance with the longterm contract. The
firm can call the worker back in once the implied effort level becomes positive.
9zm∆ < 0 if the disutility of effort v(z) is such that v
′′
v′′′ <
v′
v′′ and v
′′′ > 0.
70
We can think of amenities as being utility enhancing, or equivalently reducing the disutility of
effort. To incorporate this feature into the model above, let amenities A enter the disutility of labor
function as a second argument v(z, A) where vA < 0, vAA > 0. Here, amenities is measured in
units of cost to the firm of providing another unit of A.
As with variable monitoring, the optimal path of amenities can be solved by solving the Hamil-
tonian (2.9) such that ∂H
∂A
= 0. The optimal path of {At} solves,
[µ+mpi]zA︸ ︷︷ ︸
benefit from
change in effort
+ s(−vA)︸ ︷︷ ︸
benefit from
increase in utility
− 1︸︷︷︸
marginal cost
= 0 (2.14)
This optimality condition for amenities is similar to equation (2.13). [µ + mpi]zA is the benefit
the firm reaps from the additional effort of the worker. s(−vA) is the firm’s (indirect) benefit from
the increase in worker utility. The marginal cost of providing an addition unit of amenities is
normalized to one.
If v(z, A) is additively separable (vzA = 0) then an increase in amenities does not effect the
marginal disutility of effort (zA = 0).10 Condition (2.14) can then be expressed as,
s =
1
−vA
which is identical to the optimal condition for wages in equation (2.10) with the marginal utility
gain from amenities −vA replacing the marginal utility gain from wages u′(w). As with wages,
amenities A will increase as the worker gains seniority.
If v(z, A) is not additively separable than zA no longer is equal to zero. Then, equation (2.14)
10Rewriting the worker’s f.o.c. (2a) with amenities becomes m∆ = vz(z,A). Taking the total differential with
variables z and A becomes 0 = vzzdz + vzAdA. Rearranging, we get dzdA = −vzAvzz .
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can be rewritten as,
s =
−(µ+mpi)zA
−vA +
1
−vA (2.15)
Suppose that amenities decrease the marginal distuility of effort (vzA < 0) which implies that
effort is increasing in amenities (zA > 0). In this case, the first term in equation (2.15) (
−(µ+mpi)zA
−vA )
is negative. This implies that more of such amenities will be provided by the firm than the addi-
tively separable case all else equal. This is because in addition to the utility benefit, providing
amenities makes it easier for workers to exert effort, increasing worker effort.
For amenities that increase the marginal disutility of effort (vzA > 0) and thus decrease effort
(zA < 0), the term
−(µ+mpi)zA
−vA in equation (2.15) is positive. Such amenities will be much more
scarcely provided, as the increase in the marginal disutility of effort will discourage workers from
increasing effort.
The predictions of the model seem to be in line with what is often observed in the real world.
The model predicts that amenities that do not effect the marginal disutility of effort will increase
as workers gain seniority. Examples of such amenities may include vacation days or packages,
luxurious office spaces, or tuition subsidies for a worker’s children. These types of benefits are
often provided incrementally as workers gain seniority and rank.
Amenities that decrease the marginal disutility of effort will be offered in abundance by firms.
This is intuitive, as such amenities will allow the workers to increase effort more easily. Items
such as air conditioning or ergonomic chairs allow workers to work longer hours with minimal
physical fatigue and unpleasantness. Improved organizational techniques such as improved ways
of providing workers with constructive feedback allow workers to put in the right kind of effort
without increasing disutility. We can easily observe firms eagerly providing such amenities in
order to increase worker effort.
On the other hand, amenities that increase the marginal disutility of effort will not be offered
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Figure 2.5: Wage loss
much by firms. Amenities that tempt the worker to slack are not popular items in most workplaces.
It is difficult to think of many such amenities provided by firms, consistent with the prediction that
they are rarely provided, but amenities such as on-site recreational rooms or sleeping pods seem to
be appropriate examples. Again, these facilities are rarely provided by most workplaces.11
2.4.3 Earnings Loss
Many empirical studies have found that there is a large loss in life time earnings when a worker
loses their job. Most notably, they find that job loss is a highly persistent negative shock to future
wages and results in a persistent increase in the likelihood of future unemployment.
Most models that attempt address earnings losses are based on search theory. However Davis
and von Wachter (2011) find that current search models, for the most part, are inconsistent with
these findings. They find that realistically calibrated models predict much smaller earnings losses
then found in empirical studies.
The model presented in this paper provides an alternative channel in explaining large earnings
11One interesting counterexample is the attention some recent startups and even some larger companies such as
Google have received by providing such unorthodox amenities in their work spaces. While the fact that they have
garnered so much attention by doing so only emphasizes the scarcity of such policies, how such companies and
industry differ from the general structure presented in this paper may be an interesting question in itself.
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losses. In this model, large losses in life time earnings arise naturally from the optimality of the
seniority wage structure. Wages are a reflection of seniority, and when a worker is fired they lose
the seniority that they have accumulated. Since seniority is not transfered from firm to firm when
a worker is fired, workers do not regain the lost seniority even when they are rehired.
Figure 2.5 illustrates this fact. Panel (a) shows the seniority that a worker accumulates as he
or she works for the firm. The solid lines depict the worker’s accumulated seniority. As shown, a
worker loses all seniority with job loss. Even when rehired a short period later, the worker must re-
accumulate seniority from scratch as would any new hire. Panel (b) shows the cumulative effect on
wages. The solid lines show the workers wage and the dashed line show the counter factual wage
of the worker had they not been fired. The loss is considerable. In addition to the lost wage during
unemployment (the area labeled A), there is a persistent reduction in wage compared to the counter
factual case due to the difference in the level of accumulated seniority (the area labeled B). This
fact leads to the persistence and size of earnings losses resulting from temporary job loss.
The model can also replicate the fact that the probability of future unemployment is persistently
higher after job loss. This is because senior workers have higher effort levels than junior workers
in the model. The utility differential between employed and unemployed workers ∆ increases as a
worker gains seniority as was shown in Figure 2.3. Because effort is a monotonic function of ∆,
effort increases with tenure. Thus senior workers are less likely to be fired as they work harder and
make fewer mistakes as shown in Figure 2.6.
Furthermore, firms that vary monitoring intensity will choose to monitor junior workers more
intensely as described in section 4.1. Thus when workers lose their accumulated seniority with job
loss, the effort level is reset as is firm monitoring and this will add to the persistent increase in the
probability of future job loss.
74
effort
0 tjob loss rehired
(a) effort
attrition rate
0 tjob loss rehired
increased likelihood
of unemployment
(b) attrition rate
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2.5 The Steady State Equilibrium
2.5.1 Equilibrium
At any given time a typical firm will employ many workers of varying degrees of seniority. The
firm will act to maximize the expected present value of profits while keeping the promises made to
workers in the past. Given a path of productivity µt a firm will pay workers according to equations
(2.10) and (2.11).
As long as the marginal profit of a newly hired worker (pi0) is positive the firm will hire more
workers. If the marginal profit is negative, there will be no hiring. Thus for markets to clear in
equilibrium, the marginal profit of a newly hired worker must be zero as long as there is positive
hiring. The number of workers a firm hires at time t will be pinned down by the market clearing
condition pi0,t = 0.
Recall that workers will choose effort according to (2.2) where ∆t is a function of the path
of ψt. Then equilibrium of this model will be a fixed point mapping in {µt, ψt}. The implied
paths of effort, hiring and firing given the path of {µt, ψt} must be such that it in turn satisfies
the definitions µt ≡ ptf ′(Zt) and ψt ≡ u¯ + htNt−Lt∆0,t for all t, where total effective labor Z is
defined as Zt ≡
∫ t
−∞ zt(τ)lt(τ)dτ with lt(τ) denoting the number of workers hired at time τ that
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are employed by the firm at time t and zt(τ) is the time t effort level of a worker hired at time
τ .
2.5.2 The Steady State
The equilibrium dynamics of this model can be quite complex and is beyond the scope of this
paper.12 Here, we focus on the steady state equilibrium and comparative statics to gain some
insight into the general equilibrium properties of this model.
In the steady state, the aggregate variables (ψ, µ, r, h, pi0,∆0, Z, L) must be constant. In ad-
dition, the steady state involves a constant even flow of new hirings balancing separations due to
firings and exogenous quits. The hiring rate must equal the attrition rate,
ht =
∫ t
−∞
a(m, zt(τ))lt(τ)dτ = a¯tLt
where a¯t ≡
∫
a(m,zt(τ))lt(τ)dτ∫
lt(τ)dτ
and Lt ≡
∫ t
−∞ lt(τ)dτ .
Note that the steady state equilibrium does not imply that the contract is at the stationary point.
The solution to ∆˙ = s˙ = p˙i = 0 visible in Figures 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3 does not describe the steady
state, but only the eventual condition of employees who by good fortune remain with the firm for
a long time. Since new workers are constantly being hired, much of the employed labor force will
always be far from this stationary point. The steady state of the system involves constant motion
out of unemployment and, once hired, motion toward this stationary point coupled with attrition
into unemployment.
In the steady state there must be positive hiring so pi0 must be zero. As discussed above, the two
key variables ψ, and µ determine the steady-state path of wages, effort and utility. ψ is the flow
benefit of unemployment and, loosely speaking, can be thought of as a measure of inverse wage. µ
12See Kimball (1994) for an exposition of the dynamics of a basic efficiency wage model.
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on the other hand, can be expressed as a function of total employment L as µ = pf ′(z¯L) where z¯
is the average effort of the firm’s employees. We can then express the steady state equilibrium on
the (ψ,L) plane in terms of the familiar supply and demand relation of the labor market.
First, consider firm demand for labor. Higher ψ increases the attractiveness of being unem-
ployed and lowers the cost of job loss. The firm must either accept lower effort from the worker as
a result of this weakened job attachment, or it must raise wages to keep the cost of job loss high.
Either way the profits expected from a worker suffer. In particular, the expected present value of
hiring a new worker would be negative unless the marginal revenue product of effort µ rises to
make up for the reduced effort or increased wages of a worker.
The qualitative effect on the total number of employed workers L from a higher ψ, and conse-
quently higher µ, is ambiguous. At a cursory glance it would seem that the total number of workers
L should decrease in order for µ, which is a function of the marginal productivity total effective
effort f ′(Z), to increase. However, since Z is the product of the average effort of firm’s employees
z¯t =
∫
zt(τ)lt(τ)dτ∫
lt(τ)dτ
times L, it is possible that a fall in average effort all by itself, might increase µ
by enough to allow the firm expand the number of workers in order to make up for less effort per
worker.
To see this, consider the following example. Let the interest rate r be zero so that the current
cross-section of workers gives the same relative weights to different seniorities as does the integral
giving the expected present value of the career of a newly hired worker. Since pi0 = 0,
w¯ = z¯µ = z¯pf ′(z¯L) (2.16)
where w¯ and z¯ are present value averages and cross-sectional averages as well since r = 0. We
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write (2.16) in elasticity terms,
%∆w¯ = %∆z¯ + %∆p¯− γ[%∆z¯ + %∆L] (2.17)
where γ = f
′′(Z)Z
f ′(Z) measures the degree of diminishing returns to labor input. Solving (2.17) for
%∆L , we obtain
%∆L =
1
γ
[(1− γ)%∆z¯ + %∆p¯−%∆w¯]. (2.18)
Now, suppose we are near a rounded off corner of the production function so that γ = 3 at that
point and that an exogenous increase in ψ leads to a 3% decrease in effort z¯ and a 3% increase in
the wage. Then (2.18) predicts that the number of employees will increase by 1%.
As can be seen from the foregoing example, while the graph of pi0 in terms of µ against ψ is
upward sloping, and the graph of ψ against Z is downward sloping, the graph of pi0 = 0 in L− ψ
space can be either upward or downward sloping. If effort is only moderately responsive to changes
in ψ, z¯ is relatively constant and L will decrease resulting in a downward sloping curve. However,
if effort is very responsive to changes in ψ, z¯ will fall sharply and L must increase resulting in a
upward sloping curve.
A downward sloping curve corresponds to the usual intuition, since this curve is in effect the
firm’s demand curve for labor. If the number of workers and the amount of effective labor move in
opposite direction as in the example above, the demand curve will be upward sloping. One thing to
note is that the demand curve in ψ − L space must be downward sloping for high enough ψ since
high enough ψ would make it unprofitable to employ any workers. This could be a continuous
function of L but there may be a discontinuous jump from positive to zero L as ψ rises. L can
continue to decrease indefinitely as ψ decreases since a firm may be sated with a certain amount
of effective labor so that any increases in the effort per worker may only reduce the number of
workers needed.
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The supply of labor to the firm is horizontal, since ψ is exogenous to the firm. Thus, ψ is
analogous to the market wage in a competitive labor market. However, the market supply curve
for labor is not horizontal. In the steady state,
ψ = u¯+
a¯L
N − L∆0
where a¯ is the appropriately weighted average attrition rate of labor. This curve is upward sloping
in general, the more so if the attrition rate a¯ increases with ψ. For the supply curve to be downward
sloping would require a¯ to be a strong inverse function of ψ.13 Barring such perversities, the supply
curve will be upward sloping. The curve will become very steeply sloped as total labor employed
approaches N.
The market demand and supply of labor can now be put together. Note that the supply curve
is the analog of Shapiro and Stiglitz’ “No Shirking Condition” and the demand curve to their
“Marginal Product of Labor” schedule. Figure 2.7 shows the two cases in which the demand is
downward and upward sloping respectively.
The comparative statics in the steady state can be analyzed from supply and demand. An in-
crease inN will move the ψ = u¯+ a¯L
N−L∆0 curve out, while a reduction in u¯will move it down, both
changes therefore increasing employment in Panel (a) of Figure 2.7 and decreasing employment in
Panel (b), reducing ψ in both cases. An improvement in productive technology that increases the
marginal product of labor will move the demand curve out. A reduction in the exogenous quit rate,
an improvement in monitoring technology or exogenous worker motivation as reflected in worker
utility functions will shift the pi0 = 0 curve out in ψ − µ space and thereby cause an increase in
demand in ψ − L space. Any increase in demand causes both L and ψ to rise.
In the intuitive case of a downward sloping labor demand curve, the supply curve will be the
13In a recent paper, Shimer(2012) finds that employment exit probability is largely acyclical.
79
ψ0 L
pi0 = 0u¯
N
ψ = u¯+ a¯LN−L∆0
(a)
ψ
0 L
pi0 = 0
u¯
N
ψ = u¯+ a¯LN−L∆0
(b)
Figure 2.7: Steady state equilibrium
main determinant of the equilibrium unemployment rate due to the steep slope of the supply curve
for reasonable levels of unemployment.14 Therefore, the main effect of shifts in the demand curve
will be on equilibrium ψ, with very little effect on equilibrium L. As a result, the effects of changes
in the exogenous quit rate, monitoring technology or worker utility functions on unemployment
through the supply curve overshadow their effects through the demand curve.
For example, if two distinct worker groups have different exogenous quit rates but the same
utility functions, the implied lower work effort for one group will have only a small effect on the
unemployment rate. The main factor leading to a higher unemployment rate for this group would
be that labor discipline requires about the same average spell of unemployment for both groups, but
the flow into unemployment would be greater for the group with the higher attrition rate leading
the percentage of persons unemployed at any time to be greater.
Finally, as described above, the shape of the labor demand curve can potentially have important
implications for the comparative statics of the labor market. This can lead to interesting policy
implications as well. For example, if the effort is very responsive to changes in ψ the slope of
the demand curve will become steeper and steeper and may even imply that the demand curve is
upward sloping. A steep demand curve, can imply that increased unemployment benefits will have
14For example, the slope of the supply curve will equal a∆0 N(N−L)2 = 100a¯∆0N for 10% unemployment
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Figure 2.8: Increase in unemployment benefits
very little effect on the unemployment rate and may even lead to a decrease in the unemployment
rate if the curve is upward sloping. This is because an increase in unemployment benefits will
increase u¯ which would shift the supply curve upwards. The equilibrium values of ψ and L will
move along the demand curve as depicted in Figure 2.8 for the upward sloping case. Neverthe-
less, the analysis shows that it is unclear whether this is a desirable outcome as the increase in
employment is driven by a large decrease in effort and therefore productivity.
2.6 Conclusion
This paper finds that when firms cannot monitor worker effort perfectly, they will choose to pay
wages that reflect worker seniority. Seniority will be accumulated by the worker as they work for
the firm, in a manner that reflects the value of the worker to the firm. Firms will monitor junior
workers more closely than senior workers and also provide amenities according to seniority and its
effect on the marginal disutility of effort. The steady state equilibrium is studied as well.
The findings of this paper not only enhances our understanding of the relationship between firm
and worker but should also prove beneficial to empirical studies. The clear and concrete definition
of seniority and a well defined relationship between seniority and wages allows for a much richer
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interpretation of empirical findings. It may also potentially allow for more sophisticated empirical
designs. The paper also provides predictions regarding worker monitoring and amenities that can
be tested empirically.
While much of this paper focused on the individual worker-firm relationship, a potentially in-
teresting question is the business cycle consequences of the effects described in this paper. A study
of the full general equilibrium dynamics of this model could contribute to our understanding of
business cycles and especially the cyclical properties of unemployment.
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CHAPTER 3
System Wide Runs and Financial Collapse
3.1 Introduction
Losses from the subprime mortgage sector that triggered the recent financial crisis was small in
comparison to the catastrophic events that were to follow. According to former Fed chairman Ben
Bernanke (2013),
The problem was not just the losses. If you put together all the subprime mortgages in
the United States and assumed they were all worthless, the total losses to the financial
system would be about equivalent to one bad day in the stock market: they were not
very big. (p.71)
How then, can one explain the dire consequences that followed the subprime shock? Gorton and
Metrick (2012) characterize the financial crisis as a system wide run and argue that problems in the
subprime mortgage sector triggered a run on repos resulting in the panic of 2007-2008. While this
characterization of the crisis is compelling there is some disagreement over the interpretation of
the events. Krishnamurthy, Nagel and Orlov (2014) also find a sharp contraction in funding to the
financial sector through tri-party repos and asset-backed commercial paper. However, they argue
that the phenomenon more closely resembles a credit crunch rather than traditional bank runs. The
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debate is not in whether there was a dramatic contraction of credit flowing to the financial sector
but whether that contraction can be described as a run. In this light, it is unclear whether what
Gorton and Metrick mean by a system wide run entails more then simply a collection of well
timed runs on individual institutions. The purpose of this paper is to study what a system wide run
is and whether it can be triggered by small shocks to fundamentals.
The paper presents a stylized model of the financial system where small shocks to fundamental
asset values can cause large contractions in credit due to informational frictions. Asset fire sales
can amplify these effects and lead to the complete collapse of the financial system. The large ag-
gregate contraction of liquidity provided to the financial sector resembles what Gorton and Metrick
describe as a system wide run.
A system wide run in this model is fundamentally different from a collection of individual bank
runs. System wide runs stem from the incentives of high quality borrowers to distinguish them-
selves from low quality borrowers whereas traditional bank runs arise from coordination failures
of the lenders.
Bank runs such as in Diamond and Dybvig (1983) or He and Xiong (2012) rely on an implicit
lack of arbitrageurs that can intervene to mediate the run. In theory, arbitrageurs could always step
in to the benefit of all relevant parties. Coordination problems could be rendered irrelevant. For
individual institutions one may think of many reasons why such arbitrageurs are unavailable such
as geographic segmentation or informational frictions. However, when dealing with system wide
phenomena it is more difficult to imagine why and the issues of arbitrage need to be considered
more carefully.
The key insight of this paper is that system wide runs can be caused by the by the incentives of
financial institutions to secure better terms on their debt. Institutions with different probabilities of
default have divergent preference over the combination of the amount of total debt they issue and
the price of each unit of debt. Those with lower probabilities of default have a higher affinity for
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receiving a better price for each unit of their debt where as institutions with a high probability of
default would prefer to obtain as much funding as they can.
When there is asymmetric information between borrowers (financial institutions) and lenders
regarding the financial health of the borrowers, the healthier institutions can credibly signal their
type through the terms they demand for their loans. They can promise to decrease the total amount
of borrowing in exchange for more favorable prices. The distressed institutions will be reluctant
to follow. However, to decrease the total amount of borrowing financial institutions are forced to
liquidate their assets. If the amount of assets that need to be sold is too large, it may result in asset
fire sales.
Asset fire sales threaten the survival of the financial sector.1 If the fire sale discount is too
large, even otherwise healthy institutions may turn insolvent. Since lenders are unwilling to lend
to insolvent institutions this can result in a complete credit market collapse and consequent failure
of the financial system. This is what I describe as a system wide run.
The main friction in the model is the asymmetric information between finacial institutions and
their creditors regarding the institutions’ financial state. This friction captures a commonly held
sentiment shared by many observers during the crisis. It was not the losses per se but the uncer-
tainty regarding who was suffering the losses that was most damaging. The model highlights the
precise economic mechanism as to why this may have been so damaging. It was the desire of the
healthy borrowers to differentiate themselves that paradoxically drove the crisis.
In addition to the literature on bank runs, this paper bears some resemblance to the work of
Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) in that small shocks to fundamentals create credit contractions that in
turn worsen assets prices which further contracts credit. However, the credit constraint in Kiyotaki
and Moore is based on the inalienability of human capital and the renegotiation of debt. For
1For other papers that emphasize the importance of fire sales during the crisis see Shleifer and Vishny (2011), or
Stein (2013) for their importance in financial regulation.
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industrial firms in the real sector (which is their intended setting) this is a grave concern. For
financial institutions whose assets are mainly securities, the assumption is not well justified and
their mechanism does not accurately represent the phenomenon of system wide runs in the financial
sector.
Understanding the source of credit contraction is policy relevant. Because the credit contraction
is initially driven by the costly signaling (by decreasing the total amount of debt) that allows
financial institutions to differentiate themselves, a policy that completely shuts down the possibility
of signaling is effective. The paper finds that mandating participation in a government clearing
house for loans garners results very similar to that of a perfect information benchmark. Also
the paper finds that the effect of a widely debated policy of counter-cyclical borrowing limits is
ambiguous and may not be effective in this setting.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the model and the main
findings. Section 3 explores potential policy implications and section 4 offers a discussion on the
various elements of the model. Section 5 provides a review of how the paper fits into the existing
literature and section 6 concludes.
3.2 Model
The ensuing model describes a financial system where a small shock to the fundamental value of
the asset can result in a collapse of the financial system. When there is a shock to the asset values,
liquidity contractions occur endogenously and generate fire sales that threaten the solvency of all
financial institutions. System wide runs may follow.
The financial system consists of three types of agents, broker-dealers, households and banks.
They are all risk-neutral. There are three periods in the model, periods zero, one, and two. There
is no discounting.
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Broker-Dealers
Broker-dealers represent highly sophisticated financial institutions with the skills and exper-
tise to exploit profitable, albeit complicated, investment opportunities. For example, they can be
dealer banks investing in asset-backed securities and derivatives or hedge funds executing complex
trading strategies.2
There is a continuum of long-lived broker-dealers of measure one who consume their entire
wealth in period two. The broker-dealers have no initial wealth and must borrow from the house-
holds to finance their investment.
In period zero, each broker-dealer is given the opportunity to purchase aH > 1 units of risky
assets for one unit of cash. Think of these assets as complex securities or portfolios that only
broker-dealers can invest in. The expected payoff of one unit of the risky asset is arbitrarily close
to one (the meaning of this will become clear below) and thus the expected return from the risky
asset is aH . Investing in risky assets is very profitable and this reflects the proprietary skills of the
broker-dealers that can generate excess profits. The broker-dealers will always choose to purchase
the full amount (aH units) of risky assets. This is optimal for them as long as the probability of a
crisis is small (which will be assumed).
The return of the risky asset has the following structure. In period one, the state of the world
is revealed. The economy can either be in a “normal” state with probability 1 − δ or in a “crisis”
state with probability δ. In a normal state of the world, each unit of risky asset is revealed to give a
deterministic payoff of one in period two. In a crisis state the risky assets give a stochastic return
of R with distribution F on [0,∞) with an expected return of one. In addition, in a crisis state a
small random subset α of broker-dealers are hit with a shock that wipe out a fraction 1−φ of their
2See Duffie (2010) for a detailed description of dealer banks and the difficulties they faced during the financial
crisis.
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assets.
Thus in a crisis state, a fraction α of the broker-dealers (to be labeled the low type) hold aL ≡
φaH units of assets and the remaining fraction 1 − α of broker-dealers (to be labeled the high
type) hold aH units of risky assets, all of which have a stochastic return of R on distribution F .
Furthermore, I assume that α > 0 converges to zero. This not only simplifies the algebra but also
highlights the amplification process and the fact that the magnitude of the aggregate shock can be
arbitrarily small. A larger α will only reinforce the results that follow.
In period one, the broker-dealers can buy and sell the assets on a secondary market. However,
the broker-dealers face an exogenous borrowing limit of dlimit. This borrowing limit is fixed and
does not depend on the price or any other characteristic of the asset. The borrowing limit can
generally be assumed to be greater than their period zero debt level and thus is not in itself a source
of credit contraction.
One interpretation of the borrowing limit in this model can be as a form of regulation. For
example, the Basel II accords regulate the amount of risky investments financial intermediaries
could make given their quantity of capital. The Basel III accords introduce even more stringent
constraints. Another potential explanation for the existence of the borrowing limit could be due
to moral hazard concerns. Experts may have the incentive to steal the funds and disappear once
the amount of debt becomes too large. Because the borrowing limit is fixed and essentially a free
variable in the model, the source of the borrowing limit is not critical to the main arguments of the
paper.
Households
The households are the source of all financing for the broker-dealers and banks in this model.
The household can be thought of as any entity that provide funding to the financial system. They
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can literally be thought of as households or any intermediate institution (for example money market
funds) that provides financing to the financial system via funds from the households.
A continuum of short-lived households of measure one are born in period zero with an endow-
ment of ω units of cash. They consume their entire wealth one period later in period one and exit
the system. Similarly another cohort of short-lived households of measure one enter in period one
and consume in period two.
The households can either store cash at no discount or purchase short-term debt issued by
broker-dealers or banks. They cannot invest in risky assets because they do not have the necessary
expertise. Furthermore, they are only willing to lend through debt contracts as they do not have
the capabilities to verify the returns of the risky assets and thus the cash flow of their counter
party.3
The amount of resources that the households are endowed is large in aggregate. Specifically,
ω is sufficiently large enough to fund all investment opportunities that arise in the model if the
households so choose. Thus the households are competitive and are willing to lend as long as their
expected return is greater than zero.
The structure of the households in the model imply that all lending is restricted to be through one
period debt. To begin with, it is well known that financial institutions seem to be funded through
disproportionately large amounts of short-term debt.4 Diamond (1991), for example, focuses on the
debt maturity structure of financial institutions and their heavy reliance on short-term debt.
In addition, recent work by Brunnermeier and Oehmke (2013) support the restriction to short-
term debt in this model. They show that because of the possibility of debt dilution, creditors will
3While this model does not explicitly feature a cost to state verification, it is consistent with the costly state
verification framework of Townsend(1979).
4Recent empirical evidence shows that the reliance on short-term funding is exacerbated during a crisis. For exam-
ple, Krishnamurthy, Nagel and Orlov (2014) find that the maturities in tri-party repo markets decrease dramatically as
the crisis unfolds.
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rely entirely on short-term financing if the interim information that is released is mostly about the
probability of default rather than the expected recovery in default. In this paper, all the information
that is released has to do with the probability of default and does not change the recovery structure
post-default.
Furthermore, the households in this model is purposely structured such that one can ex-ante
rule out coordination failure among households as the source credit contractions. By ruling out co-
ordination failures among lenders, it becomes clear that the mechanism driving system wide runs
is fundamentally different from those of traditional bank runs.
Banks
Banks represent traditional commercial banks that borrow from the household sector and lend
to firms. In the context of this paper, banks are important because they can participate in the
secondary market for risky assets in period one. In a crisis state, banks are the buyers of risky
assets that the broker-dealers seek to liquidate. The liquidity they provide in the asset market
determines the price of the assets. This feature of the model is motivated by the observation by
He, Khang, and Krishnamurthy (2010) and others, who find that securitized assets such as asset-
backed securities liquidated by broker-dealers and hedge funds ended up on the balance sheets of
commercial banks during the crisis.
There is a continuum of long-lived banks of measure one who consume in period two. The
banks have no initial endowments and must borrow from the households to invest. The borrowing
capacity of the banks is capped at B. In period zero, banks can invest in a continuum of safe
projects that give a deterministic return in period two. The marginal return of the projects are
captured by a decreasing function I(β) where β is the amount invested in the projects. While the
projects are safe, they are illiquid and cannot be sold for cash before they mature in period two.
The banks do not have the opportunity to invest in risky financial assets in period zero. However,
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in period one they have the ability to participate in the secondary market for risky assets.
Now, consider the funding decision between banks and households. In period zero, the banks
can borrow from the households at zero cost because the banks’ projects have deterministic returns
and the households who lend to them are competitive.
In period one, a bank’s cost of borrowing may depend on the state of the world. In a normal
state, the borrowing cost is zero because the return of a risky asset is deterministic going forward.
However, in a crisis state, the cost of funding may no longer be zero as the banks can choose to
invest in risky assets with stochastic returns. Let qB denote the price of one unit of bank debt in
period one in a crisis state.
The price of the risky asset in secondary markets is determined by supply and demand. In a
normal state, the price of the risky asset must equal its expected return of one for markets to clear.
In a crisis state, the price will depend on the amount of liquidity available from the banks and the
amount of assets that need to be sold by the broker-dealers. Let ρ ≤ 1 denote the price of the risky
asset in a crisis state.
Because the safe projects of the banks are illiquid, banks must consider all potential future
profits when choosing the amount β to invest in safe projects in period zero. The marginal return
from the safe project should equal the expected return from purchasing risky assets in period one.
The banks choose β such that
I(β) = δ(
qB
ρ
− 1) (3.1)
The left-hand-side of equation (1) describes the marginal return from investing in a safe project.
The right-hand-side describes the expected return from purchasing risky assets in period one. With
probability δ the economy will be in a crisis state, and in a crisis state for each unit of debt the bank
is able to issue its expected profit is qB
ρ
minus the amount it must pay back, one. In the normal state
the expected profit from investing in risky assets is zero.
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For the sake of simplicity, I assume that the total return from a bank’s safe project is enough
to make bank debt risk-free even in a crisis state. Given β, if
∫ β
0
I(β˜)dβ˜ ≥ B, the bank’s future
return from safe projects are enough to guarantee full repayment of debt regardless of the return
from risky assets. Bank debt is safe and thus banks should always be able to borrow at zero cost.
In other words, I assume that I(β) is such that in equilibrium the banks are able to borrow at the
risk-free rate. This assumption does not change the qualitative implications of the results.5
3.2.1 The Credit Market
In this section I describe the interaction between the broker-dealers and the households. The inter-
action is straight forward in period zero and in a normal state period one in in period one. However,
in a crisis state, the funding decision between households and broker-dealers is complicated by the
fact that there are two types of broker-dealers, high types with aH units of risky assets and low
types with φaH units, that may either separate or pool in equilibrium.
To borrow from the households, the broker-dealers make a take-it-or-leave-it offer (dt, qt) to
the households specifying the total quantity of debt they plan to issue and the price per unit of that
debt. That is, if accepted, a broker-dealer obtains cash qt ·dt at date t and owes dt at date t+1. The
households can either accept and fund the broker-dealer or reject the offer and refuse to provide
any funds. This feature of the credit market is designed to capture the fact that the lending market
is competitive and the fact that there is no aggregate shortage of loanable funds in the model. It is
also consistent with standard economic environments where agents can only earn excess profits if
they have proprietary technology or skills.
In period zero, the broker-dealers need one unit of cash to invest in risky assets. They offer a
price and quantity combination (d0, q0) such that q0 · d0 equals one while allowing the households
5Note that this is equivalent to assuming that the banks begin with enough net worth to absorb the potential losses
from investing in risky assets.
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to break even. In period one, the broker-dealers must pay off their maturing debt d0 and issue new
debt to a fresh cohort of households. If the broker-dealers cannot pay off their maturing debt, they
immediately default and their entire portfolio is liquidated. The proceeds from the liquidation are
distributed to the households in proportion to the original debt.
In a normal state in period one, the broker-dealers are able to borrow at the risk-free price of
one as the return on the risky asset is henceforth deterministic. However, if the economy in a crisis
state, the equilibrium is more involved.
Suppose that the economy is in a crisis state and the price of the risky asset in the secondary
market is ρ ≤ 1. Then, a broker-dealer with a units of risky assets and d0 units of maturing
short-term debt has the expected payoff,
V (d1, q1) =
∫ ∞
Rˆ
[(a− d0 − q1d1
ρ
)R− d1]dF (R) (3.2)
where Rˆ = ρd1
q1d1+ρa−d0 denotes the minimum required return for the broker-dealer to be able to
service their debt in full.
In the event of default, households claim the residual value of the broker-dealers. The expected
return from buying one unit of debt from a broker-dealer who issues d1 units of new short-term
debt at price q1 can be expressed as
pi(d1, q1) = (1− F (Rˆ))(1− q1) +
∫ Rˆ
0
[
1
d1
(a− d0 − q1d1
ρ
)R− q1]dF (R) (3.3)
If equation (3) is greater than zero households accept the broker-dealer’s offer and provide them
cash. If its less than zero households reject the offer. If equation (3) is exactly zero households are
indifferent between accepting and rejecting. In this case I assume that households always accept
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the broker-dealer’s offer.6
In a crisis state, there is asymmetric information in the credit market because households cannot
distinguish between a high type broker-dealer with aH units of risky assets and low type broker-
dealers with only φaH units. However, the terms of the broker-dealer’s offer can serve as a sig-
nal to their type. Thus this period one credit market between broker-dealers and households can
be described as a signaling game where the debt contract (d, q) serves as a signal to the house-
holds.
The equilibrium in the period one market for credit between experts and lenders in a crisis state,
is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium that consists of the broker-dealer’s offer, the household’s action
of either accepting or rejecting the offer, and the household’s belief of the broker-dealer’s type
given the offer. In addition, all equilibria must satisfy the Cho-Kreps intuitive criterion. Imposing
this condition greatly reduces the set of potential equilibria and allows for interesting and insightful
results.
The intuitive criterion is the standard and most commonly used refinement of perfect Bayesian
equilibria and imposes some structure on the off-equilibrium beliefs of the players. It says that
when an agent deviates from the equilibrium play, and the deviation is such that for a certain type
of agents it implies a lower payoff than the equilibrium payoff under any belief of the opposing
player, it is unreasonable for the opposing player to believe that the deviator is of that type.
The equilibrium can then be expressed as {(dH1 , qH1 ), (dL1 , qL1 ), (x, µ)} where (di1, qi1) is the offer
by the broker-dealer of type i ∈ {H,L} and (x, µ) denotes the lender’s action and belief respec-
tively. The remainder of this section solves for this equilibrium.
6This assumption is only meaningful in the case of hybrid equilibria. In the pure-strategy equilibria of this model,
households always accept when they are indifferent. However, for pure strategy equilibria this is a result, not an
assumption.
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The Intuitive Criterion
The equilibrium of the credit market can be either a pooling equilibrium, a separating equilib-
rium or a hybrid equilibrium. Remarkably, all pooling and hybrid equilibria in which the broker-
dealers can borrow can be ruled out by the intuitive criterion.
First, consider pooling equilibria. In any pooling equilibrium the high type and the low type
broker-dealers should both offer the same debt contract. An important result of this paper is that all
pooling equilibria fail the intuitive criterion. There is always a deviation from the pooling equilib-
rium such that the high type receives a higher payoff then he would from his equilibrium action but
the low type receives a lower payoff then he does from his equilibrium action if the lender believes
that the deviator is the high type. In turn, by the intuitive criterion the lender must believe that the
deviator is the high type and accept the offer.
Proposition 1. All pooling equilibria in which the broker-dealers can borrow fail the intuitive
criterion.
A proof is given in the appendix. To see proposition 1 consider the following lemma. Recall
that equation (2) describes the broker-dealers expected payoff.
Lemma 1 (Single-crossing property). Given d0 and ρ, the slope of the indifference curve of the a
broker-dealer dq1
dd1
, is increasing in the amount of risky assets owned by the broker-dealer.
Lemma 1 implies a single-crossing property of the indifference curves of the broker-dealers.
Intuitively, the property holds because the amount of risky assets held by the broker-dealers de-
termines their probability of default in period two. Because the low type eventually defaults for
a larger range of returns, the benefit they receive from a better price for their debt is smaller than
that of the high type. The difference in the benefit from borrowing another unit of debt is mitigated
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by the fact that it must be paid back. Therefore to decrease a unit of funding, the low type broker-
dealers must be compensated with a greater increase in the price of debt than the high types.
Given lemma 1, there is always a deviation where the total amount of debt d1 is smaller than the
pooling equilibrium offer, such that if the household accepts the offer, the high type broker-dealer
benefits from the deviation but the low type broker-dealer does not. Furthermore, at least one such
deviation exists for all quantities of debt less than the equilibrium offer. Then at such a deviation
point that is very close to the equilibrium offer, it is beneficial for the household to accept the
deviation if they believe the deviator is the high type.
This implies that for any pooling equilibrium there is always a deviation that the household ac-
cepts, and the high type broker-dealer benefits but the low type does not. Thus all pooling equilibria
fail the Cho-Kreps intuitive criterion. Similar logic can be used to show that all hybrid equilibria
fail the intuitive criterion as well.
Proposition 2. All hybrid equilibria in which the broker-dealers can borrow fail the intuitive cri-
terion.
A proof is in the appendix.
The Household’s Problem
Propositions 1 and 2 imply that any equilibrium of this model in which the broker-dealers
can borrow must be separating. A broker-dealer’s type will be identifiable to the households in
equilibrium. Thus consider the lender’s problem given they are aware of the borrower’s type. The
interesting case occurs when the low type broker-dealers are fundamentally insolvent (φaH < d0)
but the high types could repay their maturing debt without borrowing if the price of the risky asset
was equal to its expected value (aH > d0). This is the case if 11−δ < a
H < 1
φ
which I assume.
98
Again suppose that the price of the risky asset in the secondary market is ρ ≤ 1. First, note
that the household’s expected payoff from equation (3) is concave in q1 for a given d1. This is
because there is a tradeoff. Increasing q1 provides broker-dealers more money to invest in profitable
risky assets decreases their probability of default in period two. On the other hand increasing q1
decreases the gains by the household from each unit of conditional on repayment.
Due to the concavity of pi in q1 there is a price qmax(d1) that maximizes the household’s expected
profit. From the first-order condition of equation (3), qmax(d1) solves
ρ =
∫ R∗
0
RdF (R) (3.4)
where R∗ ≡ ρd1
qmax(d1)d1+ρa−d0 . If the liquidation value of the broker-dealer is positive (ρa
H − d0 >
0), the expected profit of the household will be positive at qmax(d1) for any d1. However, if the
liquidation value is negative, this is no longer true.
Suppose that the liquidation value of the broker-dealer is negative. Then, the expected profit of
the household will be positive at qmax(d1) only if d1 is greater than
difloor ≡
d0 − ρai
1− F (R∗) (3.5)
Equation (5) can be derived by plugging qmax(d1) in to equation (3) and solving for the min-
imum d1 that makes pi positive. This means that any offer where the total quantity of debt is
less then difloor will not be accepted. At d
i
floor the only price of debt that can be accepted is
qmax(difloor).
Now, consider the maximum price per unit debt that the household will be willing to accept
given d1. Denote this price qi(d1). Again qi(d1) only exists if the liquidation value of the broker-
dealer is positive or d1 > difloor. At the maximum price the household’s expected profit should be
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zero. From equation (3) the household’s zero profit condition is
(1− F (Rˆ)) + 1
Rˆ
∫ Rˆ
0
RdF (R) = q1 (3.6)
where Rˆ = ρd1
q1d1+ρai−d0 . Because pi is concave in q1, there can be multiple solutions to equation (6)
for a given d1. However, qi(d1) is the solution to equation (6) that is greater than qmax(d1) and this
is unique.
Lastly, there is a price of debt below which the broker-dealer will default even if the households
agree to accept the offer. Let qid(d1) denote the price of debt below which the broker-dealer de-
faults. The expression of this price can be solved to qid(d1) =
d0−ρai
d1
. At this price for their debt the
broker-dealer cannot repay its maturing liabilities even if it sells its entire portfolio of risky assets
at price ρ.
The Broker-Dealer’s Problem
Given the range of quantities and prices of debt the households are willing to accept one can
now study the broker-dealer’s decision problem. To focus on the spillover of distress across insti-
tutions, I further assume that not only are the low type broker-dealers fundamentally insolvent, I
assume that they would still be insolvent even if they could borrow to the full extent of the bor-
rowing limit. Assuming dlimit < (1 + 1
aH−1)(1 − φ) satisfies this condition. This is a slightly
stronger assumption than fundamental insolvency when there are fire sales of risky assets, because
a broker-dealer can improve its solvency by purchasing risky assets at discounted prices and mak-
ing large profits. Without a borrowing limit all broker-dealers, regardless of their current financial
condition, could in theory bail themselves out by purchasing infinite amounts of risky assets at fire
sale discounts.
Now, consider the broker-dealer’s problem. It is not obvious that the high type broker-dealer can
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borrow in equilibrium when there are fire sales and asymmetric information. The only sustainable
equilibrium may be a pooling equilibrium where no broker-dealer can borrow. Nevertheless, I
suppose for now that the high type broker-dealer can borrow in equilibrium and solve for what the
equilibrium offer must be in such a case.
In any separating equilibrium the low type broker-dealers will never be able to borrow and will
always default. This implies that the low types have the incentive to pool with the high types as
long as the terms of the high type’s offer allows them to pay off their maturing debt. Thus any
separating equilibrium offer of the high type cannot have price of debt greater than qLd (d1).
In addition, for any equilibrium quantity d∗1 the high type’s offer will have the price q
H(d∗1).
To see why, suppose that in equilibrium the high type offers q1 that is strictly less than qH(d∗1).
Then from proposition 1 we know that the high type can deviate to a slightly smaller d1 with a
higher price for which he is strictly better off and the low type will not mimic. Because q1 is
strictly smaller than qH(d∗1) there is always such a deviation that the household will accept. The
equilibrium unravels. This deviation is only possible when the price is less than qH(d∗1). When the
price is equal to qH(d∗1) the household may not be willing to fund such a deviation. Thus the high
type will offer the maximum acceptable price qH(d1) in equilibrium.
Thus, the equilibrium offer of the high type (d1, qH(d1)) will be the solution to the broker-
dealer’s constrained optimization problem,
max
d1
V H(d1, q
H(d1)) =
∫ ∞
Rˆ
[(aH − d0 − q
H(d1)d1
ρ
)R− d1]dF (R) (3.7)
s.t. qH(d1) ≤ qLd (d1)
The solution to this optimization problem is described by the following proposition.
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Proposition 3. In any separating equilibrium in which the high type broker-dealers can borrow,
their equilibrium offer is (d∗, qH(d∗)) where qH(d∗) = qLd (d
∗).
Proposition 3 states that the high type broker-dealers will choose the maximum quantity of debt
that the low type broker-dealer will not have the incentive to mimic when the price of the debt is
qH(d1). In other words, V H(d1, qH(d1)) is weakly increasing in d1.
First, note that qH(d1) is a decreasing function of d1 when the liquidation value of the broker-
dealer is positive and an increasing function of d1 if the liquidation value is negative. Since
pi(d1, q
H(d1)) = 0 by the implicit function theorem,
dqH(d1)
dd1
=
ρaH − d0
d21
∫ R˜
0
RdF (R)∫ R˜
0
RdF (R)− ρ
(3.8)
where R˜ = ρd1
qH(d1)d1+ρaH−d0 . Because q
H(d1) is greater than qmax(d1) this means that R˜ is smaller
than R∗ and by extension
∫ R˜
0
RdF (R) <
∫ R∗
0
RdF (R) = ρ. Therefore, equation (8) is negative if
ρaH − d0 > 0 and positive otherwise.
Thus, if the liquidation value of the broker-dealer is negative, V H is increasing in d1 because
qH(d1) is increasing in d1. When the liquidation value of the broker-dealer is positive the same can
no longer be said. Instead consider the following lemma.
Lemma 2. V ∗(d1) is increasing in d1 for broker-dealers with positive liquidation value, where
V ∗(d1) ≡ V (d1, qH(d1)).
It can be shown that V ∗(d1) is increasing in d1 by showing that dV
∗
dd1
(d1) > 0 as d1 converges to
infinity and that V ∗ is concave. Lemma 2 implies that high type broker-dealers prefer to maximize
their borrowing quantity subject to the constraints when they are separately identified.
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d1dlimit
qLd (d1)
qH(d1)
q∗
d∗
Figure 3.1: Separating equilibrium in the credit market
Thus if a separating equilibrium exists in which the high type broker-dealer can borrow, their
offer will be at the point where qH(d∗) = qLd (d
∗). Figure 1 illustrates this point. The solid point
indicates the high type broker-dealer’s offer in a separating equilibrium. The low type broker-
dealer always defaults and thus their equilibrium point is not depicted.
3.2.2 Equilibrium
With an understanding of the credit market outcomes one can now solve for the equilibrium of
the full model. The equilibrium can be described as the equilibrium in the market for risky assets
and market for credit in periods zero and one. The market for risky assets is a competitive market
where prices are determined to clear the market. The credit market equilibrium in period one is a
perfect Bayesian equilibrium that satisfies the Cho-Kreps intuitive criterion.
Equilibrium: The equilibrium consists of {β, (d0, q0), ρ, (sH , sL), (dH1 , qH1 ), (dL1 , qL1 ), (x, µ)};
the amount invested in safe projects by banks in period zero, the broker-dealer’s debt contract in
period zero, the price of the risky asset in period one, the number of units of risky assets that need
to sold by each type of broker-dealer, the debt contracts of high and low type broker-dealers, and
103
the household’s action and beliefs in the period one crisis state.
Note that the broker-dealer and household’s actions and the price of the risky asset in a period
one normal state is omitted. In this state, the price of the asset is equal to its expected return of
one and the price per unit of the broker-dealer’s debt must also be one. The quantity of debt each
broker-dealer borrows is indeterminate.
Depending on the parameters of the model, two distinct equilibrium outcomes can prevail. In
one outcome, the financial suffers a large credit contraction in the crisis state but only the low
type broker-dealers default in period one. The system as whole is able to withstand the crisis. In
another outcome, the financial sector suffers a system wide run and all broker-dealers of both type
fail, resulting in a complete collapse.
Credit Contraction
Whether or not the financial system can survive a crisis depends on the severity of the fire sales
in the secondary market for risky assets. The price of the risky asset in period one is determined
by the supply and demand of assets in a competitive market.
First, the demand for assets depends on the availability of liquidity by the banks. As long as the
price of the assetρ is less than one, the banks will devote their entire remaining borrowing capacity
to purchasing the risky assets. Let sL and sH denote the number of assets sold by each type of
broker-dealer respectively. Then the market clearing condition for risky assets is
B − β = ρ(αsL + (1− α)sH) (3.9)
B − β is the remaining borrowing capacity of the banks after investing in period zero safe
projects and αsL + (1 − α)sH is the total number of units of assets supplied. Price ρ must clear
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the market. Then combining bank’s optimal investment decision described by equation (1) with
the market clearing condition (9), the equilibrium price of the asset will be then determined as the
solution to the following equation.
δ(
1
ρ
− 1) = I(B − ρ(αsL + (1− α)sH)) (3.10)
A unique solution to this equation exists as long as I(B − (αsL + (1 − α)sH)) is greater than
zero.
Now consider the supply of assets in the period one secondary market. The supply of assets will
be determined by the amount of assets the broker-dealers need to sell in order for them to repay
their maturing debt.
Suppose that in equilibrium the high type broker-dealers can borrow from the households. Then
by proposition 1, the resulting equilibrium has to be separating. The high type broker-dealers can
only separate from the low types if they offer a price of debt such that the low types default even if
they pool. As described in proposition 2, the high type broker-dealers are able to secure d∗ of debt
at rate qH(d∗) where d∗ solves qH(d∗) = qLd (d
∗).
The high types then need d0 − d∗qH(d∗) additional units of cash to pay off their maturing debt.
Since qLd (d
∗) = d0−ρa
L
d∗ , this equates to ρa
L units of cash. They must sell sH = aL = φaH units of
risky assets. In order to separate the high types must liquidate a considerable amount of assets. The
low types are unable to secure any funding and default. Thus they liquidate all of their remaining
assets, supplying sL = aL = φaH units of risky assets. Then the total supply of assets is
αsL + (1− α)sH = φaH (3.11)
Remarkably, the supply of assets into the period one market for assets does not depend on the
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fraction of experts α who are hit with the idiosyncratic shock 1 − φ. Even with α converging to
zero, the number of assets that need to be sold can be large. Because of the high type broker-
dealer’s incentive to separate, a very small number of distressed broker-dealers can induce a large
sale of assets.
Combining equations (10) and (11) the price of the asset will be determined as,
δ(
1
ρ
− 1) = I(B − ρφaH) (3.12)
Let ρ∗c denote the solution to equation (12). ρ
∗
c is an equilibrium price of the asset if the high
type broker-dealer can borrow at the separating quantity of debt as was assumed. They can borrow
if they satisfy the following condition
Condition 1. dH,cfloor ≤ (1− φ)aHR∗c
where dH,cfloor =
1−ρ∗caH
1−F (R∗c ) and R
∗
c solves equation (4) for ρ
∗
c .
Condition 1 is a solvency condition for the high type broker-dealers at their separating quantity
of debt. The high type broker-dealer may not be able in equilibrium if they become insolvent at
the separating quantity of debt. When the high type broker-dealers are forced to liquidate some of
their assets in order to separate, they suffer significant losses for each unit of asset they sell. When
the losses are severe, either because the discount is high or because they are forced to liquidate a
large number of assets, the high type broker-dealers may become insolvent.
Condition 1 can be thought of as governing the size of the idiosyncratic shock 1− φ. When the
severity of losses that the distressed broker-dealers face is large, the high type broker-dealers do
not need to liquidate as large a portion of their assets at a discounted price to separate and are more
likely to remain solvent at the separating quantity of debt. The following proposition describes the
equilibrium.
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Proposition 4. If condition 1 holds, there is an equilibrium in which, during a crisis state, the
broker-dealers experience a contraction in credit but most broker-dealers are able to survive.
In a crisis, the high type broker-dealer’s offer is determined by proposition 3 and is accepted
by the households. The low type broker-dealer defaults in period one regardless of their offer.
sL = sH = φaH and the price of the risky asset ρ is determined by equation (12), and β by equa-
tion (1) where qB = 1. In period zero (d0, q0) = (1,1) as α converges to zero.
System Wide Run
When condition 1 fails, there is no equilibrium outcome in which the high type broker-dealers
can borrow during a crisis. The only possible equilibrium outcome is where all broker-dealers
default in a crisis and liquidate all their remaining assets. All lending to the broker-dealers is
suspended and the broker-dealers suffer a system wide run.
Now suppose that the high type broker-dealers are insolvent at the separating quantity of debt.
Then they can no longer borrow and must default. When both types of broker-dealers default they
liquidate their entire portfolio of assets. Thus sL = aL = φaH and sH = aH . Furthermore, with α
converging to zero equation (10) can now be written as
δ(
1
ρ
− 1) = I(B − ρaH) (3.13)
Let ρ∗r denote the solution to equation (13). Because both high type broker-dealers and low type
broker-dealers default in a crisis, the price of period zero debt will be determined as:
q0 = 1− δ + δρ
∗
r
d0
aH (3.14)
Because the broker-dealer’s purchase the risky assets for one unit of cash in period zero, the quan-
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tity of period zero debt will equal d0 = 1q0 . Therefore,
d0 =
1
1− δ (1− δρ
∗
ra
H) (3.15)
The high type broker-dealer is indeed insolvent at the separating quantity of debt when the price
of the risky asset is ρ∗r , if the following condition is satisfied.
Condition 2. dH,rfloor > (1− φ)aHR∗r
where dH,rfloor =
1−ρ∗raH
1−F (R∗r) and R
∗
r solves equation (4) for ρ
∗
r . The price ρ
∗
r is an equilibrium price
only if condition 2 is satisfied.7 The following proposition describes the equilibrium.
Proposition 5. When condition 2 holds, there is an equilibrium in which the broker-dealers ex-
perience a system wide run. During a crisis, neither the high type broker-dealer or the low type
broker-dealer can borrow. All offers are rejected by the households and all broker-dealers default.
sL = φaH and sH = aH . The price of the risky asset ρ is determined by equation (13), and β by
equation (1) where qB = 1. In period zero d0 is determined by equation (15) and q0 by equation
(14).
3.2.3 A Numerical Example
In this section, I provide a numerical example of an economy that suffers a system wide run during
a crisis. This economy serves as a benchmark for the the remainder of this paper.
7Note that if conditions 1 and 2 fail simultaneously an equilibrium may not exist. A sufficient condition for the
existence of an equilibrium is f(x)1−F (x) ≤ 1x for values x > R∗f . This condition regarding the distribution of risky asset
returns guarantees that if condition 1 fails that condition 2 will hold.
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Let the number of units of risky assets held by the high type experts be aH = 1.2, the probability
of a shock δ = 0.1, and the size of the idiosyncratic shock 1 − φ = 0.2 implying aL = 0.96. The
borrowing limit is dlimit = 1.05. Suppose that the distribution of the return of the risk asset R
follows a lognormal distribution with parameter values µ = −1
4
and σ2 = 0.16. The distribution
F then has mean of one and variance of 0.188. Let the marginal return function on the bank’s safe
project be I(β) = 20e−4β + 0.01 and the borrowing capacity of the bank B = 2.4. Assume α
converges to zero.
First, suppose that the high type broker-dealers can borrow in equilibrium. In this case the price
of the risky asset is decided by equation (12). The implied price of the risky asset is ρ = 0.75. At
this price the debt floor of the low type is dLfloor = 1.72. This is higher than the debt limit, consistent
with the assumption that the low type cannot borrow at any quantity and price. However, in this
example, condition 1 fails. The debt floor of the high type is dHfloor = 0.63 whereas the right side
of condition 1 is equal to 0.34. The above is not an equilibrium of the model.
Instead assume that no broker-dealer can borrow in equilibrium. Then the equilibrium asset
price solves equation (13). The equilibrium asset price is ρ = 0.684. In the debt floor of the low
type broker-dealer is dLfloor = 1.73 and the high type broker-dealer is d
H
floor = 0.95. The right-
hand-side of condition 2 is equal to 0.32 and thus condition 2 holds. All broker-dealers default
during a crisis. In period zero, d0 = 1.02 and q0 = 0.98. Banks invest β = 1.58 units of cash in
safe projects in period zero.
3.2.4 Properties of the Model
3.2.4.1 Comparative Statics
Various parameters determine the equilibrium of the model including the fire sale prices of the
assets and which outcome, a complete financial collapse or a more moderate contraction, will
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(a) Probability of Aggregate Shock (b) Magnitude of Idiosyncratic Shock
Figure 3.2: Equilibrium fire sale prices for values of δ and 1− φ
prevail. The price discount incurred by the assets in a fire sale is determined by equations (12) and
(13) respectively. The comparative statics can be explicitly worked out by studying the effects of
changes in various parameters to the prices implied by the equations.
Panel (a) of Figure 2 illustrates the equilibrium price of the risky asset in the secondary market
as a function of the ex-ante probability of the crisis, where all other parameter values are as in
the example economy. The figure shows that the price of the asset is increasing in the ex-ante
probability of the crisis. Furthermore, if the ex-ante probability of the crisis is small the financial
system will experience a system wide run whereas if the crisis is somewhat anticipated the system
will suffer a credit contraction but the majority of broker-dealers will survive.
This relationship between the ex-ante probability of a crisis and the equilibrium price of the
risky asset holds because the probability of the crisis determines the amount of excess borrowing
capacity the banks maintain to capitalize on a fire sale. With a greater probability of a crisis, and
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thus a fire sale, the banks reserve a greater portion of their borrowing capacity for the possibility of
a fire sale. This behavior coincides with behaviors of liquidity hoarding both reported empirically
and observed in various models.8 The focus of many models of liquidity hoarding is on the fact that
this behavior decreases the lending activities of these institutions and depresses economic activity
in the period leading up to the crisis. This is also true in the current model. However, this paper
also highlights a potential benefit to the liquidity hoarding behavior of banks. The extra liquidity
that the banks hold may allow the financial system to survive a crisis that they otherwise could
not.
Panel (b) illustrates change in the equilibrium price of the asset as a function of the severity of
the shock. While the aggregate magnitude of the shock is not important, as evidenced by the fact
that α does not affect the outcome, the depth of the difficulties that the distressed institutions face
is very important for the equilibrium outcome.
Surprising, the equilibrium outcome is worse for relatively smaller shocks. Panel (b) shows that
in the example economy if the distressed institutions lose 20% of their overall value to a shock the
financial system will suffer a system wide run. However, if the shock is greater than 30% of the
value then there is an equilibrium outcome in which the high type broker-dealers avoid default.
With shocks greater than 60% there is no longer an equilibrium in which the system fails.
When the shock is small, the high type broker-dealers must decrease their borrowing quantity
significantly in order to separate from the low type broker-dealers. This results in a significant
credit contraction and a greater likelihood that the financial system fails. With larger shocks, the
low type broker-dealers are left with a much smaller portfolio and readily default with a smaller
contraction in credit.
8For example, Acharya and Merrouche (2012) report evidence of liquidity hoarding by banks. Acharya and Skeie
(2011) construct a model in which a bank hoards excess liquidity in anticipation of adverse asset shocks due to
precautionary motives. Gale and Yorumazer (2013) construct a model in which both precautionary and speculative
motives for liquidity hoarding exist.
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(a) Profitability of Risky Assets (b) Borrowing Capacity of Banks
Figure 3.3: Equilibrium fire sale prices for values of a and B
Figure 3 illustrates the equilibrium price of the asset in response to varying degrees of slack
in the financial system. In panel (a) the parameter of interest is the period zero expected return
of risky assets. When the return on assets are low the system is vulnerable to a system wide run.
When the returns are high the system is better able to withstand a crisis. The result is intuitive as
the broker-dealers will have an easier time remaining solvent when their initial profit margins are
large. Conditional on which equilibrium outcome prevails, the equilibrium price is decreasing in
asset returns. This is due to the fact that a larger a implies that there are more assets that need to
be liquidated.
In Panel (b) the parameter of interest is the total borrowing capacity of banks. As can be ex-
pected, when the total borrowing capacity of the banks increase the equilibrium price increases.
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3.2.4.2 Fragility and Multiple Equilibria
As figures 2 and 3 clearly illustrate, this model exhibits both fragility and multiple equilibria. Brun-
nermeier and Pedersen(2009) define fragility as “the property that a small change in fundamentals
can lead to a large jump in illiquidity.” Illiquidity is measured as the deviation of price from its
fundamental value. They find that when creditors cannot distinguish between falls in the funda-
mental value of the asset and deviations of prices from the fundamental value, funding markets
can be fragile. This paper finds that market can be fragile even when households can make that
distinction.
In addition the model features multiple equilibria for some parameter regions. In some regions
an equilibrium with system wide runs and an equilibrium with only credit contractions can both
exist. In these regions conditions 1 and 2 hold simultaneously. Which outcome prevails depends
on the expected price of risky asset in the secondary market.
The fragility and multiplicity properties of the model have some important ramifications. It
suggests that when the economy is in a region close to the boundaries of parameter regions even
subtle government policy can have substantial effects. However, it also indicates that sometimes
the effects of policy can be discontinuous and surprising. For example, when an economy is in a
region that exhibits multiple equilibria the policy authority may be able to change the equilibrium
outcome by influencing the expectation of the asset price.
3.3 Policy Implications
In this section I consider the effects of various policies on the outcome of the model. There are
two distinct approaches to studying the effects of a policy. One can assume an ex-post approach
and suppose that the government intervention is unexpected by the agents. In the midst of an
unexpected crisis this may be the appropriate way to evaluate policy. However, if a policy is to
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be considered an appropriate course of action in a more general sense, it may be more appropriate
to consider a situation in which the policy intervention is anticipated ex-ante. This approach can
incorporate the fact that the expectation of policy intervention may alter agent behavior ex-ante.
That is the approach I take here.
There are some difficulties in comparing the desirability of the outcomes. The difficulty arises
from the fact that there is no natural concept of social welfare in the model. One option would
be to define a social welfare function balancing the welfare considerations of the various agents
in the model. That is not the approach I take. Instead I compare the equilibrium outcomes of
economies in which the policies have been implemented against the equilibrium outcome of a
perfect information economy. The implicit assumption is that the perfect information outcome
should be efficient.
I find that the policy that mandates the participation of all broker-dealers in a clearing house
for loans during a state of crisis can garner outcomes that are very close to the outcome of perfect
information economy. The effect of a counter-cyclical borrowing limit is ambiguous.
3.3.1 Perfect Information Benchmark
In the perfect information case, the equilibrium outcome will depend on the borrowing limit. First,
let β0 denote the investment quantity of the bank such that I(β0) = 0 (if I(β) > 0, β0 = B). Then,
if the borrowing limit is high, such that (1 − dlimitqH(dlimit)) is less than B − β0, the price of the
risky asset on the secondary market will equal its expected value of one. Since the price of the
risky asset is equal to the expected value of the asset, there is no surplus to be gained from buying
or selling the assets.
Because the expected profit from purchasing risky assets is zero, the banks will fully invest in
safe projects in period zero to the point that β = β0. The broker-dealers are indifferent to the
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amount of debt they issue in a crisis. In equilibrium, the high type broker-dealers can borrow any
amount (d1, qH(d1)) where d1qH(d1) is between 1−(B−β0) and one. The low type broker-dealers
will be unable to borrow in a crisis and will default.
On the other hand, if (1 − dlimitqH(dlimit)) is greater than B − β0, the high type broker-dealer
will borrow to the limit dlimit. The price of the asset will be determined such that
δ(
1
ρ
− 1) = I(B − (d0 − dlimitqH(dlimit))) (3.16)
In either case the high type broker-dealers are able to fully repay their period zero debt whereas
low type broker-dealers default, so the price of period zero debt is given as
q0 = 1− δα(1− φa
H
d0
) (3.17)
Because the broker-dealer’s purchase the risky assets for one unit of cash in period zero, the quan-
tity of period zero debt will equal d0 = 1q0 . Therefore,
d0 =
1− δαφaH
1− δα (3.18)
As α converges to zero (d0, q0) converges to (1,1).
The perfect information outcome of the example economy yields the latter case. At the debt
limit of 1.05 the price of debt will be 0.88. The high type broker-dealers will be able to secure
0.925 in funds and will need to make up the difference by selling their assets. Nevertheless, the
amount of funds that need to be obtained by selling assets is comparatively small and the fire sale
price will be determined to be 0.894. The high type broker-dealers will be able to avoid default in
period one.
Ideally, the perfect information benchmark could be achieved if the policy authority could man-
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date the truthful disclosure of financial status for all financial institutions. However, implementing
such a policy may prove difficult. Does the authority have the expertise to swiftly and accurately
assess the health of financial institutions? Recent experience during the financial crisis suggests
otherwise. Without the technical capacity to promptly assess the state of the financial institutions,
it is unclear as to how the governing authority can force them to truthfully reveal their financial
status. It seems unlikely that the institutions would report their financial difficulties, and even less
likely that potential creditors would trust the announcements.
3.3.2 Government Clearing House for Loans
While it may not be difficult to achieve the perfect information outcome through policy channels,
it may be possible to attain an outcome that is very close. Because the credit contraction stems not
from the household’s refusal to extend credit but from the incentive of the high type broker-dealers
to separate, it may be possible to improve the equilibrium outcome by preventing all attempts at
signaling. If the government could enforce a pooling equilibrium by not allowing broker-dealers
the opportunity to signal their type through their debt contracts, all broker-dealers would be better
off.
The government could sustain pooling equilibria by mandating all broker-dealers to participate
in a government clearing house for debt. During a crisis, all broker-dealers would only be allowed
to borrow through a government clearing house. The government would choose a total quantity
and unit price of debt that is the same for all broker-dealers. The households can either choose to
provide funds to the clearing house or choose not to. As long as terms that the government chooses
allow the households to break even in expectation, the households will participate willingly.
It is important that the participation in the clearing house is mandatory during from a period one
perspective. If a broker-dealer is able to opt of participating in the midst of a crisis, this can serve
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as a signal similar to that of the original model. The pooling equilibrium will be unsustainable.
Broker-dealers cannot be allowed to decide on participation after their type has been (privately)
revealed.
Nevertheless, the idea of mandating all broker-dealers to participate in this clearing house is
not far fetched or particularly tyrannical. From a period zero perspective, all broker-dealers benefit
from the implementation of this policy. As long as they are not allowed to opt in at a future date,
they would all agree to participate in this policy in period zero. Participation could be achieved
voluntarily.
This policy can be very effective. In fact, if I(B) ≤ 0 and the fraction of low type broker-
dealers α converges to zero, a well implemented policy would result in an aggregate outcome that
is arbitrarily close the outcome in the perfect information case. Let piH(d1, q1) be the expected
profit of the households of equation (3) when a equals aH and piL(d1, q1) the expected profit when
a equals aL.
Proposition 6. Let βPI , ρPI , (dPI0 , qPI0 ), (d
H,PI
1 , q
H,PI
1 ) denote the respective equilibrium outcomes
in the perfect information economy and βCH , ρCH , (dCH0 , q
CH
0 ), (d
CH
1 , q
CH
1 ) the equilibrium out-
comes with a government clearing house for debt where (dCH1 , q
CH
1 ) is the debt contract of the
clearing house determined by the government.
Let α > 0 converge to zero. Then, if I(B) ≤ 0, there exists an η > 0 for all  > 0 such that,
if |dCH1 −dH,PI1 | < η, |qCH1 −qH,PI1 | < η and (1−α)piH(dCH1 , qCH1 )+αpiL(dCH1 , qCH1 ) ≥
0,
then |ρCH − ρPI | < , |βCH − βPI | < , |dCH0 − dPI0 | <  and |qCH0 − qPI0 | < .
Even if the ideal conditions do not hold the policy seems to be reasonably effective. In other
words, even when I(B) > 0 and (dCH1 , q
CH
1 ) is not arbitrarily close to (d
H,PI
1 , q
H,PI
1 ), as long as
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the government chooses reasonable terms the aggregate outcome should be a vast improvement
over the alternative of having no policy.
For example, suppose that in the example economy of section 2.5 that the government chooses
dCH1 = 1 and q
CH
1 = 0.85. Then the implied price of the asset ρ
CH will be 0.889, considerably
higher than the 0.684 of the benchmark economy. The households will be willing to accept these
terms because in equilibrium their expected profit from each unit of debt purchased is 0.02, which
is strictly greater than zero. The high type broker-dealers will not default in period one and the
financial system will not suffer a system wide run.
3.3.3 Counter-Cyclical Borrowing Limits
Recently there has been much debate about the role of borrowing limits, mostly in the form of
capital requirements, as a regulatory measure against rapid liquidity contractions in the financial
sector. Imposing capital conservation buffers has been suggested as a method of implementing
counter-cyclical borrowing limits.
It turns out that, within the framework of this paper, the effects of a counter-cyclical borrow-
ing limit is ambiguous. The counter-cyclical borrowing limit is effective only if the borrowing
limit increases enough for the low type broker-dealers to borrow even when identified. An equilib-
rium potentially exists where the low type broker-dealer borrows up to the borrowing limit at the
maximum price the household will accept. The high type broker-dealer borrows less, but at more
favorable price.
Figure 4 illustrates the credit market outcome of this equilibrium. The red point represents the
equilibrium contract of the low type broker-dealer and the blue point represents the contract of the
high type broker-dealer. The debt contract of the high type is such that the low type is exactly
indifferent between the two contracts.
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Figure 3.4: A potential credit market equilibrium with counter-cyclical borrowing limits.
However, for this equilibrium to exist, the increase in the borrowing limit must be substantial.
With higher debt limits the supply of assets in fire sale markets decrease and the fire sale discount
for the assets will become smaller. As the potential profit margins decrease the low type broker-
dealers need to purchase still larger quantities of the assets to become solvent. If the debt limit
does not increase beyond the debt floor of the low type broker-dealers the policy will have no
effect.
Applying the policy to the example economy shows that the debt limit must increase signifi-
cantly for the policy to be effective. Numerically solving the model shows that the debt limit must
be greater than 2.1 to be effective. If the debt limit is below 2.1, the policy has no effect and the
equilibrium will be as in the example economy.
When the borrowing limit is equal to dlimit = 2.1 the prevailing fire sale price is ρ = 0.883. The
debt floor of the low type broker-dealer is 1.993 and thus they can borrow in equilibrium. They
will borrow up to the debt limit of 2.1 and the price per unit debt will equal 0.666. The high type
broker-dealer will borrow a nominal amount of 0.88 for the price 0.887.
The analysis above shows that a policy of counter-cyclical borrowing limits can be an effective
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measure against systemic failures in financial systems. However, it also cautions that for the policy
to take effect the magnitude of the counter-cyclicality of the borrowing limit may need to be quite
large to be successful. A moderate and mechanical approach to counter-cyclical borrowing limits
may result in a completely ineffective policy.
3.4 Discussion
Commitment to Quantity and Collateralized Lending
A question that is not addressed in the main section of this paper is whether it is reasonable
to believe that financial institutions can commit to their declared borrowing quantities. While this
is a legitimate concern, in the end it seems plausible that the financial institutions could indeed
commit. If the institution, for example, was borrowing from commercial paper markets the total
quantity of debt they try to secure could be plainly visible. Admittedly, this does not preclude the
institution from attempting to secretly secure funds in addition to their committed quantity.
Nevertheless, there is another method to enforce commitment that is reminiscent to transactions
via collateralized lending. The financial institutions and their creditors could ensure commitment
by hypothecating the assets as collateral. To ensure commitment to the quantity promised, the
financial institutions must first sell some their assets to acquire the funds required to payoff their
maturing debt, in excess of what they will eventually be able to borrow. Then they can provide
their entire remaining portfolio as collateral and ensure commitment to their declared quantity. The
implied haircut in this case would be the difference between the value of the assets and the amount
of debt they issue. The interest rate would be the inverse of the price per unit of debt. Repurchase
agreements and asset-backed commercial paper markets are some examples of such collateralized
lending arrangements.9
9A detailed description of tri-party repos and their behavior during the crisis can be found in the paper by Krishna-
murthy, Nagel and Orlov(2014).
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Quantitative Easing
While not the focus of this paper, the analysis of this paper suggests an effect of quantitative
easing that is not often discussed. Proposition 6 states that if banks are unconstrained in period
zero (I(B) ≤ 0), the government can achieve a perfect information outcome by implementing
a government clearing house for loans. This result is predicated on banks being unconstrained
because if I(B) > 0 even a very small amount of risky assets needing to be liquidated can gen-
erate a discrete drop in the price of the risky asset. Quantitative easing, or the act of providing
banks with excess reserves and thus excess liquidity, is equivalent to increasing B in this model.
Increasing B to the point that the banks are unconstrained, can improve the outcome of this policy
intervention.
The result need not be confined to this model. Providing ample liquidity to banks may be
beneficial as it may allow banks to provide liquidity in various asset markets and help curtail
harmful fire sales and stabilize asset prices during a crisis. Even if certain frictions inhibit an
immediate and direct effect, quantitative easing may still be useful in conjunction with various
other government policies geared toward stabilizing asset markets. The analysis of this paper
suggests that even if quantitative easing cannot achieve much on its own, it can help maximize the
effects of certain crisis management policies.
3.5 Related Literature
This paper is related to several strands of literature on financial market failures and crises. The
literature on bank runs starting from Diamond and Dybvig (1983) is large and diverse. Some
notable papers include Uligh (2010) who considers uncertainty aversion, Goldstein and Pauzner
(2004) who use global games techniques to derive unique equilibrium predictions depending on
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the fundamentals and He and Xiong (2012) that extends runs to dynamic settings. Recently Martin
et al.(2014) model bank runs of repo markets during the crisis.
There is a large literature regarding asset illiquidity, market freezes and funding difficulties that
arise from asymmetric information problems. Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) show how credit may
be rationed even with competitive lenders when there is asymmetric information between lenders
and borrowers. Some recent papers in this vein include House and Masatlioglu (2010) and Kurlat
(2013).
A closely related literature studies signaling and screening in credit markets with asymmetric
information. Leland and Pyle(1977) present a model of capital structure where the entrepreneur’s
willingness to invest in their own projects serves as a signal of project quality. Bester (1985,1987)
finds that when there is a cost to posting collateral, banks maybe able to screen applicants by con-
ditioning rates as a function of collateral requirements. Milde and Riley (1987) find that banks may
be able to screen borrowers when their return is a function of loan size by offering a loan schedule.
These papers are similar to this paper in that they find mechanisms that allow the borrowers to be
separated by their credit worthiness.
This paper is also related to the literature regarding liquidity mismatch and the interaction be-
tween credit market conditions, asset market conditions and the health of financial institutions.
Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) analyze the complex relationship between what they term as
funding liquidity and market liquidity. They find that the two can be mutually reinforcing and lead
to liquidity spirals. Diamond and Rajan (2005) find that bank failures can shrink the aggregate
pool of liquidity and this shortage of liquidity can lead to a systemic crisis. Holmstrom and Tirole
(1998) study how the suppy and demand of liquidity interact and affect the investment decision of
the firm.
In a recent paper, Shleifer and Vishny (2011) suggest fire sale risk as the most coherent mech-
anism in understanding systemic risk and the propagation of the financial crisis. Many papers
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utilize fire sales to explain financial market failures. Diamond and Rajan (2011) take this approach
when they study why some banks may deliberately increase their illiquidity in a crisis. Kiyotaki
and Moore (1997) show that this approach can generate large credit cycles and amplifications of
the business cycle in the real economy. Stein (2012) studies how monetary policy can be uti-
lized as a tool for financial stabilization when fire sales may occur. Shelifer and Vishny (1997),
Gennaioli, Shelifer and Vishny (2013) and Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) generate fire sales
by assuming that outside creditors cannot distinguish fire sales from deterioration of fundamental
asset value.
Recent papers by Alvarez and Barlevy (2013) and Caballero and Simsek (2013) are related
to this paper in that they model how uncertainty over which institutions suffer losses can lead to
contagion, credit market failures, and even fire sales. However, these papers take the approach of
modeling complexity in network structures where banks need to understand the cross exposures
to accurately assess individual risk but find it difficult to do so, whereas in this paper the key
mechanism is the signaling via debt contracts.
Lastly, the policy interventions in this paper have a connection to research on government
bailouts and financial regulations. Farhi and Tirole (2012) study firm leverage and maturity de-
cision in anticipation of distress and identify a strategic complementarity that arises due to the pos-
sibility of government intervention. Chari and Kehoe (2013) show that in a model with bankruptcy
costs ex-ante regulation of debt-to-value ratio can eliminate the incentive of the authority to bail
out distressed firms.
3.6 Conclusion
This paper offers a model of financial market failures and illustrates how system wide runs can be
triggered by small shocks to asset values. It illustrates the channels of amplification and analyzes
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the effects of various policies in minimizing the consequences of a financial crisis. It sheds a new
light on the ongoing discussions for prudential regulation and how they can be designed to be more
effective.
In addition to the main result of system wide runs, many features and predictions of this model
seem to be consistent with the empirical observations during the financial crisis. Acharya and
Merrouche (2012) find that liquidity provisions increased significantly leading up to the onset
of the sub-prime crisis for settlement banks in the U.K. In this paper, banks are incentivized to
increase their liquidity provisions when they anticipate fire sales to take advantage of the lucrative
investment opportunities they provide. Mitchell and Pulvino (2010) find that large deviations from
arbitrage in the order of 10-15% were commonly observed during the crisis and such deviations
persisted for long periods. They find that very similar securities that were the basis of many low
risk arbitrage strategies of hedge funds experienced steep and long-lasting mispricings during the
crisis due to the arbitragers’ inability to borrow. The magnitude, persistence, and prevalence of
the mispricings reported by Mitchell and Pulvion lend strong support for the arguments of this
paper.
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APPENDIX A
Product Revenue and Price Setting: Evidence and Aggregate Implications
A.1 List of Product Categories and Markets
A.1.1 Product Categories
The following table provides the list of the 30 product categories in our main sample. Product
categories are defined and categorized by the The Nielsen Company. They were chosen randomly
to the sample using product codes provided by The Nielsen Company. The full list is provided in
Table A.1.
Additionally we add product categories for the results in section 4.1. They product categories
we add are the following.
ANCHOVY PASTE, BABY CARE PRODUCTS-LOTIONS, BABY CARE PRODUCTS-OIL,
BABY CARE PRODUCTS-OINTMENTS, BABY CARE PRODUCTS-POWDER, BARBECUE
SAUCES, CANNED FRUIT - APPLE SAUCE, CANNED FRUIT - APPLES, CANNED FRUIT
- BERRIES, CANNED FRUIT - FIGS, CANNED FRUIT - FRUIT MIXES & SALAD FRUITS,
CANNED FRUIT - GRAPES, CANNED FRUIT - PINEAPPLE, CANNED FRUIT - PRUNES,
CANNED FRUIT-APRICOTS, CANNED FRUIT-CHERRIES, CANNED FRUIT-FRUIT COCK-
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Table A.1: Product categories
Product Description
PIE & PASTRY FILLING - CANNED
CANNED FRUIT - ORANGES
CANNED FRUIT - PEACHES - FREESTONE
GRAVY - CANNED
SEAFOOD-CRAB-CANNED
SEAFOOD - SARDINES - CANNED
SEAFOOD-TUNA-SHELF STABLE
CAT FOOD - WET TYPE
CAT FOOD - MOIST TYPE
DOG & CAT TREATS
EGG MIXES-DRY
CRACKERS - SPRAYED BUTTER
CRACKERS - OYSTER
COFFEE - SOLUBLE
COFFEE SUBSTITUTES
BEER
NEAR BEER/MALT BEVERAGE
GIN
VODKA
WINE-SANGRIA
WINE-SWEET DESSERT-IMPORTED
CLEANERS-METAL
CLEANERS-HUMIDIFIERS/VAPORIZERS
COOKER STEAMER AND DEHYDRATOR APPLIANCE
AIR PURIFIER AND CLEANER APPLIANCE
NUTRITIONAL SUPPLEMENTS
VITAMINS-B COMPLEX W/C
MANICURING NEEDS
HAIR SPRAY - MEN’S
BABY CARE PRODUCTS-BATH
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TAIL, CANNED FRUIT-GRAPEFRUIT, CANNED FRUIT-PEACHES-CLING, CANNED FRUIT-
PEARS, CANNED FRUIT-PLUMS, CAT FOOD - DRY TYPE, CATSUP, CHILI SAUCE, CLEAN-
ERS - BATHROOM, CLEANERS - DISINFECTANTS, CLEANERS - POWDERS, CLEANERS
- WINDOW, COOKING SAUCE, COOKING WINE & SHERRY, CRANBERRIES - SHELF
STABLE, DOG FOOD - DRY TYPE, DOG FOOD - MOIST TYPE, DOG FOOD - WET TYPE,
ENTREES/SIDE DISHES - SHELF STABLE, FISH & SEAFOOD & COCKTAIL SAUCE, FLOOR
CARE-CLEANERS, GLAZES - FRUIT, GLAZES-MEAT, GRAVY - CANNED, GRAVY MIXES
- PACKAGED, HOT SAUCE, MEAT SAUCE, MEXICAN SAUCE, MINERALS, MUSHROOM
SAUCE, MUSTARD, OVEN CLEANERS, PET CARE - DOMESTIC BIRD FOOD, PET CARE
- PET FOOD, PET CARE - WILD BIRD FOOD, PIZZA SAUCE, PUMPKIN-CANNED, RUG
CLEANERS, SAUCE & SEASONING MIX-REMAINING, SAUCE & SEASONING MIX-REMAINING
MEXICAN, SAUCE MIX - CHEESE, SAUCE MIX - MEAT LOAF, SAUCE MIX - SOUR
CREAM, SAUCE MIX - SPAGHETTI, SAUCE MIX - TACO, SAUCES - DIPPING, SAUCES -
MISCELLANEOUS - SHELF STABLE, SEAFOOD - ANCHOVIES, SEAFOOD - OYSTERS -
CANNED, SEAFOOD - REMAINING - CANNED, SEAFOOD - SALMON - CANNED, SEAFOOD
- SHRIMP - CANNED, SEAFOOD-CLAMS-CANNED, SEASONING MIX - CHILI, SEASON-
ING MIX - SLOPPY JOE, SPAGHETTI/MARINARA SAUCE, TABASCO/PEPPER SAUCE,
TOILET BOWL - CLEANERS, TOILET BOWL - DEODORIZERS, UPHOLSTERY CLEAN-
ERS, VACUUM CLEANER BAGS & ACCESSORIES, VINEGAR, VITAMINS-MULTIPLE,
VITAMINS-REMAINING, VITAMINS/TONICS-LIQUID & POWDER, WORCESTERSHIRE
SAUCE.
A.1.2 Markets
We choose 32 markets on which we conduct our analysis. The designated market areas are defined
by The Nielsen Company and correspond approximately (although not exactly) to a metropolitan
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statistical area (MSA). The full list is provided in Table A.2
A.2 Robustness: Revenue distribution
To construct log revenue moments, we find the mean, median, standard deviation, and the 10th
and 90th percentiles for each market product category and month. We only consider month prod-
uct category markets with more than 100 UPC stores observations, this is to ensure our results
exclude potentially noisy observations. The spread of the distribution is defined as the difference
between the 90th and 10th percentiles. We not only include mean and standard deviation of the
log revenue distribution but also consider the mean and the spread to allow for greater robustness
to outliers.
In Table A.3 we show the results for the 30 product categories used in section 2. The qualitative
results remain unchanged. In Table A.4 we show the results of the same set of regressions including
market-product category fixed effects instead of market fixed effects and product category fixed
effects separately. The results are again robust.
A.3 Inference into the Selection Effect
At least since Golosov and Lucas (2007), it is generally believed that large idiosyncratic productiv-
ity shocks are needed to match the large average size of price changes. Golosov and Lucas find that
such large productivity shocks introduce a large selection effect in menu cost models that mitigate
the output response to monetary shocks. Also known as the extensive margin effect, the selec-
tion effect refers to the number of additional products that change price in response to a monetary
shock, that would not have changed their price if there was no monetary shock. If this number is
large, the aggregate price level is very responsive to aggregate shocks and the output response is
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Table A.2: Designated market areas
DMA Name
PORTLAND-AUBURN ME
NEW YORK NY
PHILADELPHIA PA
DETROIT MI
BOSTON (MANCHESTER) MA-NH
FT WAYNE IN
CLEVELAND OH
WASHINGTON DC (HAGERSTOWN MD)
BALTIMORE MD
CINCINNATI OH
CHARLESTON SC
ATLANTA GA
INDIANAPOLIS IN
LOUISVILLE KY
HARTFORD & NEW HAVEN CT
TAMPA-ST PETERSBURG (SARASOTA)
RALEIGH-DURHAM (FAYETTEVILLE)
CHICAGO IL
ST LOUIS MO
MINNEAPOLIS-ST PAUL MN
KANSAS CITY MO-KS
OKLAHOMA CITY OK
OMAHA NE
NASHVILLE TN
WICHITA-HUTCHINSON PLUS KS
DES MOINES-AMES IA
LITTLE ROCK-PINE BLUFF AR
DENVER CO
PHOENIX AZ
BOISE ID
ALBUQUERQUE-SANTA FE NM
LOS ANGELES CA
SAN FRANCISCO-OAKLAND-SAN JOSE
SEATTLE-TACOMA WA
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Table A.3: Revenue distribution: 30 product categories
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Mean Median Std Deviation Spread
unemployment -0.982 -1.029 -0.239 -0.978
(0.311) (0.359) (0.226) (0.385)
Observations 80,988 80,988 80,988 80,988
R-squared 0.804 0.802 0.666 0.733
Note: All specifications include market, month and product category fixed effects. Standard errors are
clustered on month, market, and product category separately.
Table A.4: Revenue distribution: market-product category fixed effect
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Mean Median Std Deviation Spread
unemployment -1.710 -1.854 -0.407 -1.248
(0.476) (0.511) (0.162) (0.416)
Observations 351,115 351,115 351,115 351,115
R-squared 0.824 0.817 0.748 0.751
Note: All specifications include market, month and product category fixed effects. Standard errors are
clustered on month, market, and product category separately.
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small, which is what Golosov and Lucas find.
Midrigan (2011), however, argues that this effect is quite small in economies have large and
infrequent idiosyncratic productivity shocks and multi-product firms. Alvarez and Lippi (2014)
and Alvarez et al. (2016) develop the idea of multi-product firms further and find a relationship
between micro level moments such as the frequency of adjustment, and the variance and kurtosis
of the distribution of price changes to the aggregate output response of an economy to monetary
policy shocks in certain settings. Nevertheless, it is still difficult to compare the strength of the
selection effect implied by models to the data as it is difficult to observe directly.1
In our framework, it is possible to gain some insight into the empirical magnitude of the selec-
tion effect from the relationship between revenue and probability of price adjustment. The strength
of both the revenue effect and the selection effect depend on the density of prices that are far away
from the optimal price and near the edges of the inaction region. A stronger effect in one implies
that the other will be stronger as well.
Figure A.1 depicts this relationship. The horizontal axis depicts the range of prices for a product
for which p∗ is the optimal price, pH is the upper bound of the inaction region and pL is the lower
bound. If the inherited price p∗ of a product is either greater than pH or less than pL the price is
adjusted to the optimal price . The red lines labeled GL depicts the distribution of prices within
the inaction region in Golosov and Lucas’ (2007) setting. The solid black lines represent the
distribution of prices in Midrigan’s (2011) setting. In Golosov and Lucas the prices are distributed
relatively evenly across the inaction region whereas in Midrigan there is a large mass of prices at the
optimal price (represented by the thick vertical line) and a low density of prices else where.
Consider an expansionary monetary shock that increases marginal cost and in turn the optimal
price. This moves the entire inaction region of inherited prices upward. The new range of inaction
1In addition to these papers Caplin and Spulber (1987) and Caballero and Engel (2007) analyze the selection effect
and its aggregate consequences in detail.
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Figure A.1: Inference into the selection effect
is now between the dashed lines labeled (1) and (3). Prices previously located below the dashed
line labeled (1) now must adjust to the new optimal price. Note that the mass of prices that adjust
is much greater in the GL case than in Midrigan’s. This difference in the density of prices that
adjust is why there is a large discrepancy in the magnitude of the selection effect between the two
economies.
Now consider the relationship between revenue and likelihood of price adjustment. As we show
in section 2.3, an increase in revenue diminishes the inaction region. Suppose that an increase in
revenue shrinks the range of inaction to areas between dashed lines (1) and (2). Prices previously
located below dashed line (1) or above line (2) must now adjust. The increase in the probability of
price adjustment is the result of prices outside these lines.
In this manner, the increase in the probability of price adjustment with revenue and the strength
of the selection effect is closely related as both depend on the density of prices near the edges of
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the inaction region. An accurate representation of one should also lead to a good approximation of
the other.
A.4 Extended Model
To add habit formation, we replace the household’s problem in (1.12) with,
maxEt
∞∑
τ=0
βτ{φt+τ (Ct+τ −Ht+τ−1)
1− 1
γ
1− 1
γ
− N
1+ 1
η
t+τ
1 + 1
η
}
where habit Ht is external. The stock of external habit follows the process
Ht = λCt
as commonly found in the literature. We also replace the nominal GDP process in equation (1.16)
with,
gt+1 = ρmgt + 
m
t+1
where gt = lnMt − lnMt−1 is the growth rate of nominal GDP and ρm is the autocorrelation
of the growth rate. Following Midrigan (2011), we calibrate the autocorrelation ρm to be 0.61
and the standard deviation of the nominal GDP shock to be 0.0037. The parameter governing
habit formation λ is calibrated to 0.77 following the estimated values in Christiano et al. (2011).
Table A.5 shows the target moments of the extended model and Table A.6 shows the calibrated
parameters.
Figure A.2 compares the relationship between price setting behavior in the steady state in the
extended model and the data. Panel (a) shows that the relationship between revenue and probability
of adjustment in the model closely resembles the relationship in the data for the extended model.
The green dots show the relationship between log revenue and the probability of adjustment in
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Table A.5: Target moments
Steady state moments Target Extension
Frequency of price adjustment 0.11 0.12
Average size of price adjustment 0.10 0.11
Median size of price adjustment 0.085 0.082
(−1)2var(price)
var(revenue) 0.20 0.22
∂prob
∂lnrev × 1prob 0.52% 0.53%
Business cycle moments
∆rev
∆N 1.3 1.3
∆(rev90−rev10)
∆N 1.1 1.1
Percent difference in output 0.07 0.07
(High vs low output state)
Non-target moments
∆rev50
∆N 1.4 0.6
∆std(rev)
∆N 0.37 0.33
∂E[size]
∂lnrev × 1size -0.12% ∼ -0.01% -0.04%
Note: Extension refers to the extended model including habit formation and persistent monetary shocks
presented in section 4.4.
( (−1)2var(price)
var(revenue)
)
is the ratio of the contribution of the variance of price to the
variance of revenue.
(
∂prob
∂lnrev × 1prob
)
is the change in the probability of adjustment as a percentage of
the average probability of adjustment. ∆rev∆N is the percent change in mean of the log revenue distribution
over the percent change in total labor supply. ∆std(rev)∆N is the percent change in the standard deviation of
the log distribution over the percent change in total labor supply. ∆(rev90−rev10)∆N is the percent change in
the spread of the log revenue distribution over the percent change in the total labor supply. ∆rev50∆N is the
percent change in the median of the log revenue distribution over the percent change in total labor supply.(∂E[size]
∂lnrev × 1size
)
is the change in the change in the expected size of adjustment as a percentage of the average
size of adjustment.
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Figure A.2: Revenue and Price Setting: Extended model
Note: In panel (a) we first group each product-month observation by revenue into percentile bins and com-
pute the average revenue and the probability of adjustment for each bin for both the data and the model. We
then compute the log deviation of this revenue from mean of the data and model respectively. We compute
the deviation of the probability of adjustment from the mean probability and divide by the mean probability
to compute the percent deviation from mean probability of adjustment. We plot, for each percentile bin, the
log deviation from mean revenue and the percent deviation from mean probability of adjustment. The solid
line represents the calibration target, with a slope of 0.52% between log revenue and probability of adjust-
ment. In panel (b) we group each product-month observation by revenue into percentile bins and compute
the average revenue and the average size of adjustment for each bin. Then, we compute the log deviation
of this revenue from mean revenue of the data and model respectively. We normalize the size of adjustment
by computing the deviation of the size of adjustment of each bin from the mean size of adjustment in the
data and the model, and then divide by the mean size to compute the percent deviation from mean size of
adjustment. We plot, for each percentile bin, the log deviation from mean revenue and the percent deviation
from mean size of adjustment. The two lines in panel (b) show the range of the strength of the relation-
ship between size of adjustment and product revenue that we find in our data. The solid line represents the
maximum value (in absolute terms) and the dashed line represents the minimum value.
138
Table A.6: Parameter values
Parameter Extension Description
β 0.961/12 discount factor
 3 elasticity of demand
α 0.085 rate of product exit
b 0.21 (0.7%) menu cost (percentage of steady state revenue)
1− θz 0.50 probability of productivity shock
σz 0.10 standard deviation of productivity shock
σι 0.12 standard deviation of demand shock
g 0.17% monthly growth rate of nominal GDP
σm 0.29% standard deviation of nominal GDP
rij 0.05 probability of transition to different state
φ¯ 0.005 magnitude of aggregate preference shock
ψ0 0.010 slope parameter in exogenous demand
ψ1 6.0 intercept parameter in exogenous demand
Note: Extension refers to the extended model including habit formation and persistent monetary shocks
presented in section 3.4.
the data and the orange triangles show the relationship in the model. The solid line represents the
calibration target, with a slope of 0.52% between log revenue and probability of adjustment. Panel
(b) shows the relationship between size of adjustment and log revenue. The green dots show the
relationship between revenue and the size of adjustment in the data and the orange triangles show
the relationship in the model. The two lines in panel (b) show the range of the strength of the
relationship between size of adjustment and product revenue that we find in our data. The solid
line represents the maximum value (in absolute terms) and the dashed line represents the minimum
value. While the relationship between the size of adjustment and revenue is weaker in the extended
model compared to the data, there is still a negative relationship. Furthermore, the magnitude of the
negative relationship corresponds approximately to the slope of the dashed line, which represents
the lowest value of the strength of the relationship we find in our empirical section, which we get
when we control for store and UPC.
Figure A.3 shows the impulse response of the cross-sectional frequency of adjustment and Table
A.7 shows the average log revenue and average adjustment probability during the impulse response
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Figure A.3: Impulse response function of the cross-sectional frequency of price adjustment to a
one standard deviation monetary shock in low versus high output states.
period by quantiles of revenue.
A.5 Robustness: State-Dependence
We show results that include potential controls for shocks that may effect both the state of the econ-
omy and the growth rate of industrial production. We include the utilization adjusted TFP shocks
from Basu et al. (2006) and Fernald (2014). As these data are quarterly we include the 3-month
through 36-month lags of the quarterly data as controls. In addition we control for persistence in
the systematic component of monetary policy by including lags of changes in the Federal funds
rate. We add the first 12 lags of the changes to our main specification. The impulse responses
given in Figures A.4 A.5, A.6, and A.7 show that our results are robust to these controls. The error
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Table A.7: Revenue and adjustment probability by quantile (Model)
Adj. probability (%) Revenue (%)
Quantile High Low Diff Diff
1 7.66 7.78 -0.12 7.42
2 10.29 9.65 0.64 6.95
3 13.94 9.08 4.86 3.98
4 15.10 10.01 5.10 9.46
5 17.08 16.03 1.05 15.69
Note: The table shows the average log revenue and average adjustment probability by quantile of revenue in
the baseline model. Column labeled High shows the results for the high output state and the column labeled
Low show the result for the low output state. Columns labeled Diff show the difference between the high
and low output states.
bands, however, grow due to the loss of degrees of freedom as we include more variables in the
regression.
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Figure A.5: Persistent Federal Funds rate changes (Industrial Production)
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Figure A.7: Robustness check: Federal Funds rate changes
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APPENDIX B
System Wide Runs and Financial Collapse
B.1 Proofs
Proposition 1. All pooling equilibria in which the broker-dealers can borrow fail the intuitive
criterion.
To prove proposition 1, I first prove the following lemma. Note that the broker-dealer’s ex-
pected payoff can be described by equation (2) and the household’s expected payoff by equation
(3).
Lemma 1. Given d0 and ρ, the slope of the indifference curve of the broker-dealers dq1dd1 is
increasing in the amount of risky assets owned by the broker-dealer.
(proof) Let V (d1, q1) = v¯ where v¯ is some constant. By total differentiation dVdd1dd1 +
dV
dq1
dq1 =
0. Thus the slope of the indifference curve is dq1
dd1
= −
dV
dd1
dV
dq1
. I show that ∂
∂a
( dq1
dd1
) > 0.
First, ∂
∂a
( dq1
dd1
) = − ∂
∂a
( q1
d1
∫∞
Rˆ
(R− ρ
q1
)dF (R)∫∞
Rˆ
RdF (R)
) = − 1∫∞
Rˆ
RdF (R)
∂Rˆ
∂a
{ q1
d1
Rˆ[
∫∞
Rˆ
(R− ρ
q1
)dF (R)∫∞
Rˆ
RdF (R)
−1]+ ρ
d1
}
Note that { q1
d1
Rˆ[
∫∞
Rˆ
(R− ρ
q1
)dF (R)∫∞
Rˆ
RdF (R)
− 1] + ρ
d1
} can be rearranged to equal ρ
d1
[1 −
∫∞
Rˆ
RˆdF (R)∫∞
Rˆ
RdF (R)
] > 0.
Furthermore, 1∫∞
Rˆ
RdF (R)
> 0 and ∂Rˆ
∂a
= − Rˆ2
d1
< 0.
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Now, let pii(d1, q1) denote the expected payoff of the household given d1 and q1, under the belief
that the broker-dealer is of type i and V i(d1, q1) the expected payoff of the broker-dealer of type
i. Let C((d, q), r) denote a circle with radius r around the point (d, q). Then by lemma 1, for any
given (d∗, q∗) and r, there exists a point (d˜, q˜) ∈ C((d∗, q∗), r) such that d˜ < d∗ and
(i) V H(d∗, q∗) < V H(d˜, q˜)
(ii) V L(d∗, q∗) > V L(d˜, q˜)
Suppose that such a point does not exist. Consider the indifference curves of the high type and
low type broker-dealer that cross at (d∗, q∗). If the above point does not exist this implies that the
indifference curve of the high type is above the indifference of the low type at any d < d∗ inside
C((d∗, q∗), r). However, this is a direct contradiction of lemma 1.
Now suppose that (d∗, q∗) is a pooling equilibrium offer. Then pi(d∗, q∗) = (1−α)piH(d∗, q∗)+
αpiL(d∗, q∗) ≥ 0. Since pi is increasing in a,1 piH(d∗, q∗) is strictly greater than piL(d∗, q∗) which
implies that piH(d∗, q∗) > 0. Because pi is continuous in both d and q, there is an  > 0 small
enough such that piH(d, q) > 0 for all (d, q) ∈ C((d∗, q∗), ).
Therefore, there is always a deviation from any pooling equilibrium offer (d∗, q∗) such that (i)
and (ii) hold and the household will accept under the belief that the deviator is the high type. Thus
all pooling equilibria fail the Cho-Kreps intuitive criterion .
Proposition 2. All hybrid equilibria in which the broker-dealers can borrow fail the intuitive
criterion.
(proof) Without loss of generality, suppose that multiple actions of (d1, q1) are played in a
1 dpi
da =
1
d1
∫ Rˆ
0
RdF (R) > 0
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hybrid equilibrium in which the broker-dealers can borrow. Suppose (d∗, q∗) and (d∗∗, q∗∗) are two
such equilibrium actions. Let d∗∗ > d∗.
Because households always accept when they are indifferent (by assumption), the households
accept all equilibrium offers with probability one. Then for households to accept, the high type
broker-dealers must play all equilibrium actions with non-zero probability. Thus (d∗, q∗) and
(d∗∗, q∗∗) lie on the same indifference curve of the high type broker-dealer on a d− q plane.
Since, by lemma 1, the broker-dealers’ indifference curves have the single-crossing property,
the low type broker-dealers always prefer (d∗∗, q∗∗) over (d∗, q∗). This implies only high type
broker-dealers play (d∗, q∗).
First, suppose that qH(d1) is decreasing. Note that lemma 2 (on pg 13 and proven below)
implies that the slope of the indifference curve of the high type broker-dealer is always steeper
than the slope of the curve qH(d1) at all points on qH(d1).(|
dV H
dd1
dV H
dq1
| < |dqH(d1)
dd1
| for all q1 = qH(d1).)
Otherwise V ∗(d1) cannot be increasing.
Now consider the low type broker-dealer’s indifference curve that crosses the point (d∗∗, q∗∗).
Let (d˜, q˜) denote the point that this indifference curve crosses the curve qH(d1). Because the
indifference curve of the low type is steeper than the indifference curve of the high type, d˜ >
d∗.
Consider a deviation by the high type broker-dealer to the point (d∗ + 0.5 ∗ (d˜ − d∗), qH(d∗ +
0.5 ∗ (d˜ − d∗)). If the household believes the deviator is the high type the household will accept
this offer.
According to the intuitive criterion, the household should believe that the deviator is the high
type. By lemma 2, the high type broker-dealer prefers d∗ + 0.5 ∗ (d˜− d∗), qH(d∗ + 0.5 ∗ (d˜− d∗))
over (d∗, q∗). Because the indifference curve of the low type broker-dealer is steeper than qH(d1),
they prefer (d∗∗, q∗∗) over d∗ + 0.5 ∗ (d˜− d∗), qH(d∗ + 0.5 ∗ (d˜− d∗)). The low types can always
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get at least V L(d∗∗, q∗∗) in equilibrium. Thus the deviation is strictly dominated by the equilibrium
play for the low types.
Now, suppose that qH(d1) is increasing. Again, consider the low type broker-dealer’s indif-
ference curve that crosses the point (d∗∗, q∗∗) and let (d˜, q˜) denote the point that this indifference
curve crosses the curve qH(d1). Because the indifference curve of the low type is steeper than the
indifference curve of the high type, d˜ > d∗.
Again, consider a deviation by the high type broker-dealer to the point (d∗ + 0.5 ∗ (d˜ −
d∗), qH(d∗ + 0.5 ∗ (d˜ − d∗)). If the household believes the deviator is the high type the house-
hold will accept this offer. The household should believe that the deviator is the high type. The
high type broker-dealer prefers d∗+0.5∗(d˜−d∗), qH(d∗+0.5∗(d˜−d∗)) over (d∗, q∗). Because the
indifference curve of the low type broker-dealer is steeper than qH(d1), they prefer (d∗∗, q∗∗) over
d∗+ 0.5 ∗ (d˜− d∗), qH(d∗+ 0.5 ∗ (d˜− d∗)). The deviation is strictly dominated by the equilibrium
play for the low types.
Thus all hybrid equilibria fail the intuitive criterion.
Lemma 2. V ∗(d1) is increasing in d1 for experts with positive liquidation value, where V ∗(d1) ≡
V (d1, q
H(d1)).
(proof) I show that V ∗(d1) is increasing in d1 indirectly by showing that dV
∗
dd1
(d1) > 0 as d1 goes
to infinity and that V ∗ is concave.
V ∗ is increasing if its first derivative is greater than zero.
dV ∗
dd1
=
1
ρ
∫ ∞
R˜
[(qH(d1) + d1q
H′(d1))R− ρ]dF (R) (B.1)
where qH′(d1) =
dqH(d1)
dd1
. From equation (6) we know the expression for qH′(d1). For the sake of
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convenience let A ≡ ∫ R˜
0
RdF (R) and q∞1 denote the value of q
H(d1) as d1 converges to infinity.
Now, if d1 converges to infinity d1qH
′
(d1) converges to zero because d1 · qH′(d1) = ρaH−d0d1 AA−ρ .
Since equation (4) holds for qH(d1), A − ρ = − ρq∞1 (1 − F (
ρ
q∞1
)) which is a constant. Therefore,
dV ∗
dd1
(d1 →∞) =
∫ 1
ρ
q∞1
[
q∞1
ρ
R− 1]dF (R) which is greater than zero.
V ∗ is concave if its second derivative is less than zero.
d2V ∗
dd21
=
1
ρ
∫ ∞
R˜
[2qH
′
(d1) + d1q
H′′(d1)]RdF (R)− dR˜
dd1
(
qH(d1) + d1q
H′(d1)
ρ
R˜− 1)f(R˜) (B.2)
qH ′′(d1) =
d2qH(d1)
dd21
= −2ρa
H − d0
d31
A
A− ρ +
ρaH − d0
d21
−ρ
(A− ρ)2
dA
dd1
(B.3)
where dA
dd1
= dR˜
dd1
R˜f(R˜) and dR˜
dd1
= ρ
qH(d1)d1+ρaH−d0 (1−
d1(qH(d1)+d1qH
′
(d1))
qH(d1)d1+ρaH−d0 ) > 0
From equation (23),
2qH
′
(d1) + d1q
H′′(d1) =
ρaH − d0
d1
−ρ
(A− ρ)2
dR˜
dd1
R˜f(R˜) (B.4)
Substituting (24) into (22),
d2V ∗
dd21
=
dR˜
dd1
R˜f(R˜)
ρaH − d0
d1
ρ− 1
(A− ρ)2 < 0
The inequality follows because dR˜
dd1
> 0 when the liquidation value is positive. Thus since V ∗
is concave and increasing as d1 goes to infinity, V ∗ is increasing.
Proposition 6.
Let α > 0 converge to zero. Then, if I(B) ≤ 0, there exists an η > 0 for all  > 0 such that,
if |dCH1 −dH,PI1 | < η, |qCH1 − qH,PI1 | < η and (1−α)piH(dCH1 , qCH1 ) +αpiL(dCH1 , qCH1 ) ≥ 0,
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then |ρCH − ρPI | < , |βCH − βPI | < , |dCH0 − dPI0 | <  and |qCH0 − qPI0 | < . Let
{βPI , ρPI , (dPI0 , qPI0 ), (dH,PI1 , qH,PI1 )} denote the respective equilibrium outcomes in the perfect
information economy and βCH , ρCH , (dCH0 , q
CH
0 ), (d
CH
1 , q
CH
1 ) the equilibrium outcomes with a
government clearing house for debt where (dCH1 , q
CH
1 ) is the debt contract of the clearing house
determined by the government.
Let α > 0 converge to zero. Then, if I(B) ≤ 0, there exists an η > 0 for all  > 0 such that,
if |dCH1 −dH,PI1 | < η, |qCH1 − qH,PI1 | < η and (1−α)piH(dCH1 , qCH1 ) +αpiL(dCH1 , qCH1 ) ≥ 0,
then |ρCH − ρPI | < , |βCH − βPI | < , |dCH0 − dPI0 | <  and |qCH0 − qPI0 | < .
(proof) First, note that dCH0 = q
CH
0 = 1 since (1 − α)piH(dCH1 , qCH1 ) + αpiL(dCH1 , qCH1 ) ≥ 0
implies that all period zero debt is repaid. If 1−dlimitqH(dlimit) ≤ B−β0, dPI0 = qPI0 = 1 as well
and if 1 − dlimitqH(dlimit) > B − β0, both dPI0 and qPI0 converge to zero from equations (17) and
(18) as α converges to zero.
Also note that dPI1 q
PI
1 − ξ < dCH1 qCH1 < dPI1 qPI1 + ξ where ξ = η(dPI1 + qPI1 ) + η2 since
dPI1 q
PI
1 − η(dPI1 + qPI1 ) + η2 < dCH1 qCH1 < dPI1 qPI1 + η(dPI1 + qPI1 ) + η2.
(1) Suppose that 1 − dlimitqH(dlimit) < B − β0. Then ρPI = 1 and dPI1 qPI1 > 1 − (B − β0).
Then, there exists ξ > 0 small enough such that dCH1 q
CH
1 > 1 − (B − β0). Denote this ξ as
ξˆ1. Then, ρCH = 1. If ρCH < 1, βCH < β0 and markets could not clear. Since ρCH = 1,
βCH = βPI = β0.
(2) Suppose that 1 − dlimitqH(dlimit) ≥ B − β0. Then, βPI = B − (dPI0 − dPI1 qPI) and
βCH = B − (dCH0 − dCH1 qCH) implying |βPI − βCH | < ξ. Then because I(·) is continuous, for
any ψ > 0, there exists a ξ > 0 such that |I(βPI)− I(βCH)| < ψ. Then since ρ(1
ρ
− 1) = I(β) in
this case, |ρPI − ρCH | = | I(βPI)
δ+I(βPI)
− I(βCH)
δ+I(βCH)
| < ψ
δ+min(I(βPI ,I(βCH)))
. Then there exists an η such
that ψ < .
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